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OCEANIC CHRISTIANITY*

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ATTENDING the meetings of a distinguished theological society year after year cannot fail to create certain impressions upon one's mind. Particularly vivid are these impressions if that mind belongs to one whose academic life is spent outside the circle of professional theologians. I would be lacking in personal integrity were I not to confess quite frankly what has been going through my head as I have been privileged to hear and even to participate in the discussions of such a company of the elect.

Among the earliest and most lingering of these impressions is a noticeable theological air among professional theologians which has seemed to me somewhat nebulous and artificial. It may well be that this is not a sin of theologians any more than it is of any professional class. But I do testify that it has seemed conspicuous to me. Living among fresh, virgin, new-blown, practical-minded and nonprofessional students, the change of atmosphere is noticeable, and it is disturbing. For instance, the questions which theologians seem to discuss—while interesting as they are as a game of professional solitaire or social dialectics—have seemed to me often to be too remote and scholastic to attach themselves to what is going on in the pews of flesh-and-blood contemporary human beings. Having had a fairly decent theological education in conservative circles, with particular emphasis upon the conventional Protestant doctrines à la sixteenth-century Lutheran confessional orthodoxy, and later among genuine theological liberals, I am no stranger to what is being said among professional theologians. The doctrines of sin and grace, of atonement with its more orthodox formulations—I carry the hallowed name Anselm—the references to biblical texts as final sources of truth, these are not at all new to me. I was soaked in them. The sermon notes of my earliest ministry which lie no longer usable in a preacher's barrel (now happily nailed tight) testify that though I did not know too much about Kierkegaard and the saints of these latter days—although I had heard of Kierkegaard through a professor of church history in 1918-1919—and about the gulf which lies between God and man miraculously bridged by Jesus through some approved theological

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theory—that though these ideas are now popular, fresh, and contemporary, they belong among my souvenirs. I sometimes have the suspicion that many modern liberals who have gone the way which began afresh with Barth have never intimately known Protestant scholasticism earlier in life and appear to herald these convictions as if they were new truths, admittedly rediscovered, and correct because they fit an Augustine or a Paul and do not miss the way of St. Thomas. I have the wicked suspicion that the popularity among the run-of-the-mine clergy of these views is due not so much to the conviction that they are true or that they are deeply experienced, as that they serve as a development of a fundamentally traditional apologetics. Karl Barth is hero to many whose real heroes are Luther and Calvin and Charles Porterfield Krauth and Charles Hodge and the like. But enough of this wickedness.

My other impression which grows rather than diminishes is the conviction that what a man says after forty, especially after he has had the thrill of seeing himself fixed in printer's ink, tends to become apologetic, except for minor variations of the same melody. We used to anathematize Bertrand Russell by the laughing slur that one never knew where he stood from book to book; but I am becoming convinced that Bertrand Russell on that score was the real saint and those who cleared their throats were the sinners. This charge I do not lay against theologians; it is a common human frailty. When a personalistic metaphysics shall be defended by John Dewey and a positivistic humanism acclaimed by Professor Brightman, we shall then have come to the day when these sins are no more. But the fact remains, the impression is that our theologies tend so early to solidify into avowed or disguised apologetics—and as apologists we become immune to newer insights, adopting new views only as they seem to clarify or illustrate what we already hold or as serving as contrasts or what we think to be devilish. And if we can attach our view to some old saint—so much the better. Blessed is the man who doth not publish a book too early. He is being spared the temptation of succumbing altogether too soon to the vicious circle of an apologist. Frankly, this has been very noticeable in this society of theologians. One can almost predict rebuttals. I can almost hear the post-mortem on myself. If you have a theology in which man is held to stand apart from God because of his intellectual pride or general sinfulness, you have the advantage of calling anyone out at home plate even before he is given his usual three strikes—if he attempts to work his way into a theology by the only tool with which he has to work, *viz.*, his reason. To me it is just a sorry game of theological baseball if you can never get to first base on your own—but must be carried there by some supernatural device. I would much prefer to get struck out cleanly by foul or fair balls than to run the bases only by proxy. Critics of any rational

position may be proud that *they* are not proud—pride is a many-headed monster—but I take my chances on eternity on a rational theology although it may be mixed with my sins.

I do not wish to seem to say that because my many impressions have led me to believe that an open-theology (I coin this word with the help of Bergson) is not one of the most conspicuous virtues among members of this society, a closed-theology is altogether absent among some men of the traditional churches. To me, the most hopeful case of a nonapologetic theology which I have come across was the movement which began some years ago under the term empirical theology. It all seemed so utterly scientific and open-minded, until I found the conclusions came out altogether too nicely. I then suspected that the scientific approach was loaded in favor of a favorable outcome. It was then that some of us took issue with our theological teacher along this seemingly prophetic line and were given the boldness to accuse its protagonist as fundamentally apologetic albeit under the term scientific. My great disillusionment on this score found expression in a naughty essay over my name which was published in the volume entitled *The Nature of Religious Experience* (1937) in honor of one of my most respected teachers, long a member of this society. Since that day, within the circle of so-called respectable theologians, I have not found an exponent of a viewpoint which may be said to be free from the shadows of apologetics. It is very noticeable to me that the presence on important ecciesiastical assignments of a person with an open-theology is conspicuously lacking. Such persons do not seem now to rate.

Insofar as we like to belong to the Christian tradition, even by name, all of us are to some extent apologetic. Whether we like it or not, our thinking has been affected by the Christian tradition. As I believe Ritschl made clear in his day and in his type of apologetic, we are all valuing creatures, and a strictly unpartisan approach is psychologically but a remote ideal. The men who founded this society were avowedly "Christian" theologians, and it was probably the intent of these founding fathers that theologians of this circle should keep within its circumference. The very use of the word "theology" in the discussions each year has taken on a connotation of "Christian" although, it is clear, there are many non-Christian theologies in the world.

This leads me to my topic directly. Assuming that we are apologetic to some degree, those of us who maintain that we are Christian in spite of speculation, we ask: May not a new type of Christian apologetic be framed which would more adequately fit the thoughtful minds of our generation,

particularly those who are unsophisticated by the atmosphere of conventional terms and ideologies? In other words, is there not a better defense of Christianity than that of the traditional types which assume the authorities of Catholic and Protestant semigods, a type of apologetic which would, in the words of James and Pratt, have more reality-feeling to the thoughtful masses than to those who are more or less closeted in theological cells? To the construction of this type—in terms of a sketch or outline or an approach—is the burden of this paper.

Traditional Christian apologetics has been biblical. The thesis has been that there is an authoritative word to which appeal is made. The theological student accordingly studied biblical theology with the help of biblical philology on the assumption that there was but one. We now know, of course, that there is no one biblical theology, but many. We no longer say naïvely: "It's in the Bible"; but we say: "Obadiah or Paul says" (and even then our tongue is in the cheek because we are not too sure that the historical critics will nod their approval). Traditional Christian apologetics took some frail human interpreter as giving the norm of interpretation; and so generations of students study the *Institutes* of Calvin or the Catechisms of Luther and find their bearings. But we are no longer sure of Calvin and Luther—and, yea verily, even of Hodge. Or, it may be that we appeal to an inverted mysticism: by which we first learn what doctrines or truths we believe to be normative and then seek an experience to confirm them. A real mystic is noninverted; he gets an experience first and doctrines afterwards. Such a mystic surely would stand outside the pale of conventional apologetics—for who knows where his mysticism may lead? He may even see the golden plates at Palmyra.

Without making an attempt to outline the various historical types of apologetics which have been set up for the Christian religion I shall set down what seems to me a valid approach.

There are two ways toward an understanding of any phenomenon or event: the historical and the philosophical. Ideally speaking, the historian records what he finds, much as the photographer's untouched proof reveals what happened before the camera. It is purely descriptive. Ideally speaking, the philosopher evaluates the event in terms of himself, of larger issues, of ideals and norms, much as the photographer's finished picture is more than a naked description. The philosopher is the artist. It is clear that when a given event takes place the two are intermingled. One sees what happened and one interprets its meaning. Each age, each person is its or his own interpreter. If the historian makes much of his interpretation, we call him a philosopher of history.

This distinction seems necessary to emphasize when one comes to the perennial question, "What is Christianity?" The disciplined historian goes

about his job ideally, as the descriptive scientist, following the ideals of objectivity with the minimum of eisegesis. The philosopher sees the question in the framework of values and larger issues. The New Testament writers, for the most part, in this sense were philosophers rather than historians.

Now, historically speaking, Christianity is a name for a plurality of events and names and ideas and practices. It would be better to speak of Christianities in the plural; for there are countless. There was the Christianity of Jesus, those of his disciples, that of Paul, those of the Apostolic Fathers, those of the anti-Gnostic Fathers, those of the quarreling Niceneists, and so on down interminably through the centuries. No two Christianities are identical.

Philosophically speaking, Christianity is the name for anybody's appraisal or what he thinks Christianity is for him or his group. He says, "This is good," "This is bad," "This isn't Christianity at all," "That is unchristian." Now, where does the philosopher get his yardstick of valuation? In the long centuries, the custom has been to quote some authority: "Paul says of Christianity and I believe Paul is right"; "Augustine said and Augustine certainly knew"; "Jesus said and who would dispute Jesus?" "The Cappadocian Fathers said"; "Luther said"; "Calvin's *Institutes* affirm"; and "Karl Barth has rightly proclaimed"; etc. It is clear that much of the historic philosophical approach has been authoritatively apologetic. Many theologians today move in the same groove: Christian theology, so they say, to be respectable must be biblical. A Christian theologian must find his base on this or that doctrine or set of doctrines; or what is the latest fashion, it may be liberal but it must be evangelical! Circular reasoning has been prominent: a philosophical basis must be had in the Scriptures because they are the pattern for Christian philosophy; and they are the pattern because they form the only true basis for a valid Christian philosophy. This is not ancient history. This is widely contemporary.

To answer the question, "What is Christianity?" philosophically, we may do one of two things: 1. We may build our interpretations upon and out of the matrix of what historically has been called Christianity, *i.e.*, the philosophical within the framework of the historical; or 2. we may sit in our armchairs and speculate what we would like Christianity to be, framing it much as a speculative architect would draw his plans of his dream house. This second view would be fundamentally the philosophical minus the historical as touchstone.

It is evident that most philosophies of Christianity have been built up after the first procedure. One takes certain doctrines and practices which have historically gone under the name of Christian and then proceeds to validate them. Some are made central while others are put out on the

periphery. There is no end to this variety. Jesus is the Messiah may be the chosen central doctrine, and around this are interwoven others. Or, the Sermon on the Mount, the ethical emphasis or the good life, may be made central. Or some Christological and soteriological combination has been set up: Jesus is the Son of God and he came to atone by his blood for the sins of the world. Or again, some theory of the church has been made central, and one's allegiance to a visible or representative kingdom is taken to be the highway of salvation. Or again, a more positivistic type has been developed in terms of a radical humanism in which it is asserted that Christianity is a life, not a set of doctrines, a spirit rather than a creed. And so on interminably. Each claims his as the truth, by virtue of a tradition, an affirmed revelation, an experience, or even by a special revelation given in the latter days.

There is one characteristic among all these interpretations: each claims the name Christian although each is a reflected experience by one living in another age, under different circumstances or of different temperament. The varieties of Christian experience and philosophy are as plural as were the gods of Greece and Rome.

Of late we have been getting a series of Christian affirmations: the Christian view of war; of Dumbarton Oaks; of labor; of economics; of this and of that. Such affirmations are plainly the philosophy of individuals. I suspect that if some other group met and proclaimed affirmations, we would still hear, "This is the Christian view of so and so," but it would be quite different. The philosophical apologists who seem to stand closer to the traditional ecclesiastical households get the best hearing. A Unitarian or a Universalist, for example, who may still be as much a Christian as those who make pronouncements with a good Protestant sounding board, stands outside the pale of the circle of the scribes. Modern ecclesiastical ecumenical movements in official statements appear not to have conquered the dragon of power politics. This, of course, is the defect which stalks like a ghost in the shadows of every organized effort and tends to defeat the ideal of ecumenicity. I suspect we shall have to admit forthright that Christianity and Christian ecclesiasticism are not necessarily synonymous terms.

Suppose, however, we take a different departure, that is, follow the second way, just frankly speculating what we would like Christianity to be, framing it like a speculative architect, affirming forthright a speculative rather than an historical approach. I admit this is a radical way, especially from the point of view of ecclesiastical apologetics. My own growing conviction, however, of the need for a fresh type of apologetic makes me bold enough to make the attempt and see where we come out. At least, we have here a bone upon which we may chew and perhaps give cause for some gnashing of our theological teeth.

At the start, we must make the assumption that we are speaking of religion, not ethics merely, nor philosophy as such, nor sociology. We must define what we mean, in general, by a religion. Such a definition must be descriptive to include all who ought to be included. Without giving my reasons (which I have discussed elsewhere at some length) I shall say very informally that a person is religious whenever something matters to him, that something being taken as affecting his destiny. This marks a religious person from one who is merely ethical or social or philosophical. Now, what is this that a person may take to affect his destiny? Descriptively, it can be anything—which the history of religions shows. Mythology and theology are such answers. Which one is correct? Which set of ideas or ideals ought to make this difference? The answer to this question lands one immediately into a discussion of what constitutes an ideal religion.

Consider what well may go into the formulation of an ideal religion. Our answers come from our own experience, from reason, from discussion with others, from life, from those who seem to us to be authorities—in fact, from anywhere. There is no special criterion of truth in religious matters. The tests of truth remain the same. When men talk about a religion, there is no special psychology involved; a man is everywhere the same old Adam.

Somewhat dogmatically—to save time—we set down the following criteria for a good religion: 1. An ideal religion ought to be reasonable; it should not go contrary to sweet reasonableness, but should make sense with what is in accord with the best in knowledge and the best in wisdom. 2. An ideal religion ought to be ethical so that an attempt to follow the gleam is morally sound and morally meaningful. 3. An ideal religion ought to be vital in the sense that it really makes a difference to the person here and now. We are not angels or cherubs; we are flesh and blood, and anything which should command our loyalty and devotion ought to be leveled where we are. And it may be well to add, neither are we rotten human beings as some theologies have suggested. 4. An ideal religion ought to reflect a valid proportion of values, with first things first and secondary things secondary, the greater goods at the top and the least at the bottom. 5. An ideal religion ought to promote practical virtues, such as good health, economic well-being, congenial social relationships, disciplined altruism, respect for truth, honesty, justice, tolerance, the advancement of man's possibilities and general well-being—and a hundred other virtues. 6. An ideal religion ought to give a perspective which will reach out far enough to furnish a person the necessary stimulus for optimism in the attainment of meaningful growth and development—not that all will be attained!—the conviction that he who fights for higher levels is fighting with the universe and not against it. 7. An ideal religion ought to move solidly upon universals rather than upon provincial perspectives in the conviction that

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values are not held to be external to reality but reflect the character of what fundamentally is.

There may be other virtues. This is only a sketch. I am, I confess, sitting in my armchair developing this ideal religion whether it exists or not. It will serve me as the pattern of my judgment and keep me on an even keel.

Now, some may, I think quite naïvely, ask, Why go to all this fuss when there is Christianity? To which question is the reply: *Which* Christianity? You have to make a choice no matter what you do. And to make a choice is to apply some norm, either dogmatically or philosophically.

One such philosophical attempt is the so-called essence approach. This received a classic treatment in the Bross Prize volume by Professor D. C. Macintosh under the title *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1925). Professor Macintosh set up a series of essences—from quintessence to the less essence; but he combined the philosophical with the historical. His thesis was: we shall take that as essence which it is necessary to retain from the historical, after sloughing off *adiaphora,* to realize the thing's distinct character. To use my own analogy: birds' nests in a tree may be taken down, and you still have a tree. The fruit may be picked, and you still have a tree. You may even cut branches here and there, and the tree still grows in Brooklyn. You may even pour cement into the fissures of the trunk and still have a tree. But there are some things you cannot do and still have the tree. Christianity, accordingly, is that from the life and teachings of Jesus plus that in the whole continuity of its development which it is necessary to retain to realize its character. A pristine type of essence was the view taken by Harnack; and a developing or expanding essence was the view taken by Loisy. Following his philosophical criteria, Professor Macintosh gave his earlier expression (in *Theology as an Empirical Science,* 1919) the title of "fundamental religion"; but unhappily, I think, went off toward an empirical theology and lost what was his greatest theological vision.

Suppose, however, we go back to our armchairs and take up again the criteria of an ideal religion, without considering the historical. I shall offer this as the second way and as a fresh approach to a Christian apologetic.

I have just finished editing a long book on religion, in the widest sense of that term. For three years, besides the usual routine of teaching, I have been doing little else than working upon its preparation, thus coming into contact with men and views of an almost hopeless variety. You cannot read such heterogeneous material, carry on an immense personal correspondence, edit manuscripts, and proofread, word for word, four times through without picking up some fairly solid impressions. The utter

variety of religious thought and expression strikes one who has had some hope of a religious unity among religious people that this latter is an altogether hopeless ideal. One follows denominational and cultistic and divisional testimonies of so-called Christians and one wonders how so many varieties can be called by one name. I asked one of my former students who comes from an Arabian background, if she would sum up for me the teachings of Mohammedanism, and her immediate reply was: "Which Mohammedanism do you mean?" Even Mohammedanism—like all the rest—has its denominations. If you want a vision of confusion, take a look at the religions of the Far East. I have become utterly convinced that the church fathers omitted one characteristic of God in their list of attributes (omnipresence, omnipotence, and the like) : I suggest that at the next meeting of an ecumenical council they add to the list: God's sense of humor.

Were this the only impression, that of confusion and hopeless variety, I should come away from these last three years with a headache and henceforth live on a bottle of theological Bromo Seltzer. But the fact is that another impression has been growing. The universality of so many doctrines, even ethical concepts and practices, has become more and more striking. Every doctrine I ever heard of in the Christian tradition crops out elsewhere: the sinfulness of man, the need of some kind of atonement, the incarnation of Deity, virgin birth of some anointed one from on high, the doctrine of grace, the salvation of the soul or spirit, the utter uniqueness of some Messiah, the dying and the rising god, the inspiration of some scripture, fundamentalists and liberals, the orthodox and cultists, the trinity in terms of triadic gods or triad-in-unity, baptism with or without water whether with milk, urine, or the laying on of hands, ceremonies of theophagy, conversion, sanctification, sacrificial living, the goodness and the wrath of God, the supernatural and the natural, hope and even assurance of another life, resurrections, a place or plane of purgatory, retribution, heaven and hell—there is no end. Virtues which have traditionally borne the trade name of Christianity are known and expressed in situations and places which have no connection with the historical Hebraic and Christian tradition. Even in biological nature—below the human level—we see many of these same virtues such as sharing, sacrifice, sacrificial atonement—although we give to them other names.

Well, on second thought, all this should be of no surprise. If a good God there be, if the world is fundamentally sound, if all men are brothers under the skin, and all that the historic Christian tradition has assumed to be fundamental be true, then evidences should be found everywhere—although perchance in some places more and some places less. I have never found palatable the doctrine that only in the Hebraic-Jewish-Christian

tradition is the living reality of God to be found. The studies of comparative religion have hardly begun to be assimilated into an adequate philosophy of religion. We still seem to treat other religions either as objects of scientific interest or as beautiful contrasts with our own supergood prejudices.

My thesis is: that the good and the true are to be found, if good and true possess any metaphysical objectivity, in unsuspected places and often in unrecognized ways. An ideal religion, if it includes the maximum of ideality and is based on human vision, will find expression to some degree in more than one way and one place. Nature cannot be foreign to the Divine Reality; the Divine must be reflected somehow in that Reality. There is a well-known passage in James Ward's *Realm of Ends* (1911) which is apt at this point. Speaking of creation in time Ward quotes von Hartmann, "It seems 'absolutely inconceivable . . . that a conscious God should wait half an eternity content without a good that ought to be .' " And, to turn the idea to our point: It is inconceivable that a good God should have left himself without strong witnesses, revelations, which have the widest circumferences in the experiences of men everywhere—although here strong and there weak.

Suppose, now, I take my chart with me, my chart of an ideal religion, and take a look at what men have said and done about that which they considered of ulterior concern and destiny. Suppose, mathematically, I find that one individual scores 75 per cent of this ideal; another 50 per cent; still another 95 per cent. Let us name names. We may think of Gandhi's score; Mohammed's, Confucius', Plato's, Tagore's, or even some nameless Hottentot's. From the *traditional* viewpoint, we would not call any of these people Christian even though they rated 100 per cent on the side of the pattern of the ideal. Why? Because they do not belong to the historical stream and they do not have the traditional doctrines in traditional forms. But, I ask, philosophically speaking, are they not Christian? Yes, if Christianity is the name for an ideal religion which, even on historical grounds, it has claimed to be. Philosophically speaking, ought Christianity not be the name for an ideal religion? Ought not an ideal religion properly carry the name Christianity? "Other sheep I have, which are not of this fold."

If one objects to such a label, I hasten to point out that labels are unimportant. Benzine is still benzine whether we call it by that name or call it QZT. A rose under any other name smells as sweet. Thus, there are Christian Jews, Christian Mohammedans, Christian Confucianists, and maybe Christian Ingersolls. If the objection be raised that no man attains to such an ideal religion, my answer is that this objection is not any more serious on this score than were one to say that the conventionally recognized

Christian is not a Christian because he has not attained the score of 100 per cent or that a rose is not a rose because it is not a prize winner at a national flower show.

Now that this affirmation has been made, *viz.*, that ideal religion and Christianity are one philosophically, I wish to turn back and make some comparisons with the historical viewpoint.

Many people date the beginning of Christianity with the birth of its Founder or with the Pentecostal event or some other point. Philosophically, this is not true. Historically, something may be said for it. If we take the Founder to be the beginning of Christianity and consider Christianity confined in essence only with him, we have on our hands the difficulties of history. Our only information comes by way of interpreters, and we must speculate on what lies between the lines. Whether Paul had the mind of Christ is both an historical and philosophical question. The historical approach to the problem of "What is Christianity?" has rested on the thesis that a certain group of interpreters whom we call biblical are normatively dependable. To me, it is significant that the Founder himself did not leave a written legacy under his own name. This, it seems, may not have been at all accidental, for a stylus surely could have been had and a parchment found. Writing was not unknown. My own good guess is that he himself may well have felt that he belonged to the category of the universal, and a universal can hardly be particularized by letters. There is this kinship with the Platonic universals. Again, he was a Jew, whatever else; and his ideology must necessarily be in terms of his immediate background and culture to be understood. Paul did seem to catch this note in the breadth of his viewpoint, in the controversy with those in Jerusalem; but Paul never escaped his Jewish background. Nor should it be expected of him.

What we have, then, in the biblical record is a Jewish cultural interpretation (with some Greek) of what the message and the mission of Jesus were. Hence, all the terminology associated with it. Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of the Father, the atoning Saviour, and the like. He then is made unique in that tradition, with the result that he becomes unique in all tradition, especially at the hands of later interpreters. He becomes the second person of the Trinity, before all worlds, the eternal logos, unbegotten, virgin-born, and altogether different. He possesses two natures (by the way, never really welded together even by the Council of Chalcedon), and a mythological Christology, undreamt by him, is cast about his person.

Suppose, however, we think of the Founder as one among other revelations of reality, alongside the prophets of Hebraism or any other faith. How does he stack up on the pattern of ideal religion? What is his grade? All are agreed that he stands high, very high. Many rate him

A plus. An A plus does not have the terminology of the fathers, but philosophically it carries as much weight—perhaps more in many modern ears. Are there not provincial Jewish and Greek elements retained in our theological terminology which need recasting?

To put it bluntly, if we say of him that he appears to be the epitomization of reality at its best, as we know it, would this be less sacred and less valid than to say he is the Son of God? To say that there is a marked crystallization of insight into the character of reality in him which provokes our reverence and even our worship is surely not less respectful than if we say that he was born of a virgin and supernaturally conditioned. Again, if we say that he matches the ideal pattern more impressively than others, this is not to say that we have here the phenomenon of discovery on the part of a great man but perchance another case of a disclosure in which reality breaks through in clearer light and more fundamental meaning. The approach here is not that of discovery *vs.* revelation; discovery and revelation are rather bipolar. I, for one, do not see how any longer we can keep the dualism between natural theology and revealed theology and maintain any kind of consistency. For, even those who claim a revealed theology appeal to a kind of rational discovery of it, or, if it be wholly irrational, then they become either dogmatic or inconsistent (inconsistent by a rational appeal to irrationality). My own impression is that a claim for a superrationalism is a case either of intellectual fatigue or indolence or a case of enthusiasm which outruns better judgments.

It has often seemed to me that there has been an undue premium set up by Christian theologians for those whom William James calls the sick-soul type as over against the healthy-minded. (I do not agree with James' selections as examples.) Perhaps Paul is to be blamed for this. Perhaps even Jesus himself was provoked by circumstances unduly to stress the world-weariness of his own countrymen or his own disillusionment. The fact is that orthodoxy has always seemed to follow the sick-soul interpretation as normative of the true Christian. Thus we come to admire and quote St. Augustine who had been a sort of immoral Dillinger with himself. And we think of torn-apart mystics who have achieved a fantastic and inexpressible unity as the true saints; and we praise Luther for his reëmphasis upon soul-sickness; and we emphasize the sacerdotal side which is plainly the embellishment of earlier mystical practices; and we come to think of the converted will and the surrendered personality and the supernaturally sanctified as the normative cases of real Christians; and in these latter days we see in Kierkegaard and Barth and in a neosupernaturalism the quintessence of it all.

I do not for a moment say that sick-souls are not Christians. But I am quite sure that they are not the only Christians. On the side of ideal religion, normality rather than abnormality ought to be underlined. Since sin and salvation have played so prominent a part in traditional Christian orthodox interpretations of Christianity and the sick-soul seems to be reëmphasized in much of neoörthodox type of thought, it would seem necessary to reconsider the whole notion of evil which traditionally has underlain theories of salvation.

Traditional theories of salvation, it seems to me, have been altogether too anthropomorphic in character. God is provoked by man's sin, and the day will come when he will forever separate the intransigent wills from those who by grace accept his grace and fit by grace into his purposes. To make certain that salvation is altogether possible God has provided as a free gift the necessary credits, and Jesus, his only Son, becomes the mediator and seal of the new covenant. And after the final day, all will be well in the universe of his heaven, for then the devil or forces of evil and the sinful sons of Adam will be put forever in their proper place of quarantine, and the saints will live apart from any temptation to taint. Sin will be no more, and men will bask in the heavenly sunshine of purity, and the new Garden of Eden will be better, far beyond man's dreams, than the original garden somewhere in Mesopotamia.

In other words, our theories of salvation have painted a picture highly anthropomorphic—even though we have made some substitutes here and there. The point is that man is a hopeless sinner. Salvation is provided by a definite technique; and sin will be no more.

Such a soteriological theodicy, it seems to me, needs a thorough overhauling. And it can be done successfully, only by a reconsideration of the nature of evil together with a less anthropomorphic conception of God.

The best recent solution to the problem of theodicy, in my opinion, is the one offered by Professor Brightman, which reconsiders God's personality and views the origin of evil as the outgrowth of an element of the given in the very nature of God. I think that Professor Brightman is on the right track and that he is to be commended for his boldness in attempting a theory which was destined to suffer a certain amount of malignant criticism for its utter honesty in dealing with a real problem. Now that the devil has quietly made his exit in most liberal pulpits and no one has cared to announce publicly his death or read his obituary, the way seems open, to liberals and traditionalists alike, to look around for another type of explanation.

I would go at the problem of theodicy in a somewhat different way from that suggested by Professor Brightman. What I have to say, I say on my own without contrasting it with any but the traditional views.

Evil, it seems to me, is not an entity but a relation. Whenever anyone gets frustrated or blocked in his attempts or intentions, he has the *situation* of evil. This is applicable not only to man; it goes for plants and animals. One fish is food for another and a good for another fish; at the same time it is frustrated as to itself and as food it is an evil. The good is the relation of promotion or fulfillment or self-realization. The situation of frustration is neutral value which may eventuate in either good or evil.

Are frustrations a part of the Divine creative Being; or, in other words, is the Divine Being frustrated? Well, either God is frustrated or God is not. If God were never frustrated, you have a situation in which God would be at a stalemate; nothing could be for him either good or evil. God would be as neutral as zero. Suppose God sat around all eternity without being frustrated or blocked. What could God ever do or accomplish? What could God ever get interested in? There would be only God's monotonous self, writing an autobiography so dull that it might well tempt him to extinction rather than to continued existence. The theory of a devil had at least one great merit: the devil furnished an interest for God, and probably an ultimate purpose.

Many people think that before creation God was in bliss, doing nothing because there was nothing to do. That sounds like hell to me. Again, many people still think of heaven as a place where there is nothing to do but sit around and bask. That, too, sounds like hell to me. For some, it is eternal rest, a state of semi- or unconscious twilight. Such a state seems to offer nothing better than extinction. And there are many who think of heaven as a kind of glorified Chautauqua with nice ladies and nice gentlemen and cherubim smiling at each other eternally and waving their programs in sweet greetings and approval of their mutual bliss. This sounds like hell to me.

No, the only way you can have interest, value, so far as we know (and we know only what we know) is to have a frustration. In other words, you never have a good, even as you never have an evil, without frustration. Good without bad is zero, even as bad without good is nothing. The two are always complementary. Extreme Calvinists (supralapsarians) were eternally right when they held that those who were predestined to hell did make a contribution; they at least furnished background for those who then in heaven could shout hallelujah over their own good luck.

Thus, it seems to me that evil will never be overcome. Nor, curiously enough, ought it to be. The only other alternative would be neutrality (in which there would be neither good nor bad) or else a state or condition of purposelessness or rest (the worst kind of hell).

The really good person is the one who has many frustrations to his purposes of self-realization and who emerges out of the valley of shadows.

He is never without opposition or pain. Even Jesus Christ became what he was through a flood of frustrations, of oppositions. And so it is with all the real saints. What would life be without temptations and the possibility to do evil?

Well, then, is evil a good? Yes, in the sense that it is a means of creating a better good. But in itself it is bad only so far as it is a frustration to realization. Thus, it is clear that many frustrations are good-in-the-rough, in the sense that they lead to a higher good. Like a segment of a circle which is both convex and concave at the same time, evils and goods coëxist.

Is there then an objective good (and evil) independent of humans? The answer, of course, is Yes. For God the absolute good becomes, in this argument, the kind of good and the only *real* kind of good that can emerge through the possibility of evil. This would be the answer to the question why God may be said to have created this kind of world which becomes the best possible. Will evil ever be overcome? Answer: No. Evil is always there as a possibility, as a frustration to the good. If a man is once saved, is he forever saved? Answer: No. How true it is from experience that every moment we live, we border on the brink of tragedy. I can say the one little word to a friend of long standing and kill the friendship forever. One little misstep can change a life. There haunts us everywhere the kind of frustrations which can break us—or make us. But this makes life interesting and really worth-while. If a man, by the grace of God, reaches heaven, is he there for good? Answer: No. For he can always make out of his eternal frustrations the evils which drag him down. Hell, in other words, is a condition open to all saints. It is even possible for God to experience hell. God is in hell each time his frustrations stand over against his purposes.

Is this view, then, a species of pessimism? Yes, from the point of view of the average orthodox Christian and Jew who think of heaven as a state of bliss in which there is nothing to do but to sit eternally and sing pæans of praise. But it is not pessimistic from the point of view of all creation, *viz.*, that creation is the name for all conditions of frustration that make it possible for God to have an interest in himself and to bring about the only real goods in the universe, goods which can come only through the possibility and the reality of evil. It was a wise and a good God who created the heavens and the earth and all that is contained therein—even though, from many angles, it is a mess. (One of my students asked in class, "Hasn't God gone a little too far in relieving the monotony?") The only other alternatives may have been to have created nothing and thus God to have been of zero value; or, to have created a world only of nice things and nice people which would then have been a kind of world of colorless

sentimentalism in which you have the C scale without sharps or flats, or a novel without anything ever happening. Such a world would be worse than hell.

This rather lengthy discussion of theodicy has been introduced into this paper for a purpose. I have tried to show that conventional interpretations of Christianity which have made so much out of man's sin, God's utter holiness and foreignness to anything associated with evil, God's wholly otherness, the terrific chasm between God and man—all fail to take into account the eternal character of evil. Salvation is not a matter of getting out of here into a zero-value existence but it is the name for attainment of higher levels which conquer the lower. There are ever new worlds to conquer, and each new world brings forth its own kind of frustrations for new kinds of goods and new kinds of evils. The only kind of salvation that is worth its salt is not that of escape but that of progress, much like the development from infancy to maturity.

God can no more save a man from evil than he can save himself from it. Nor should he. To do so, I repeat, would be to annihilate the values which make life meaningful and rich. Our soteriology needs reinspection in the light of all this. But so many people still think that to speculate on soteriological theory is to toy with the one basic essential to the Christian religion, forgetting that all our theories of salvation are ideologies of men who reflect the limitations of their age and perspective.

My original intent as stated earlier in the paper was to attempt a type of apologetic for Christianity which would appeal to the thoughtful masses rather than those of the traditional types. This I have tried to do by way of a philosophical rather than an historical approach, by which is meant the setting up of religious ideals which may be taken as universals.

Traditional apologetics has been of the type which I like to call the "river bed" apologetics, *viz.*, tracing the historical stream of Christian thought and practice like a great Mississippi back beyond the names and events of great theologians and churches (indeed including them as tributaries to the stream) to a biblical source and then on to an original spring on the mountaintop, Jesus Christ. In place of this, I have tried to suggest what I would call an "oceanic" type of apologetics, which sees religious ideals in terms of today without committing ourselves to questions as to previous course and source. An ocean just is. It is not traceable to something else. It has spread rather than length. It has sweep rather than a marked and traceable bed as from one point to another. It is majestic in its own right, and into it empty many rivers and streams. It is judged by its own immensity and validity. It touches many shores, and no one

people can claim it as their own peculiar possession. Great truths are universal and belong to the nature of things; they do not depend upon an authority any more than does any law of nature. They may be discovered, but they simply are. To me the ultimate criterion of real religion is to be had in what is truly a part of the world of nature (nature interpreted, of course, more than in physical and fully realized categories). Any conventional doctrine is to be judged right on the long-range view not because it is in some book or spoken by some great name; it should find expression in many situations which do not carry the usual labels. Gravity is not valid because of some scientific theory or because of some scientific authority; it is so because that is the way of our world.

If it be suggested in criticism that you here have a Christian religion without a historic Jesus, may I suggest that if Jesus was all that is so generously claimed of him, he ought not to be sensitive about his own name or himself but about that something which is represented by him, his cause or his own ideals. Stradivarius was not concerned to put his own name on his violins; nor did Raphael insist that his signature go on all his paintings. But that did not make those accomplishments less great. Indeed, no one is really great who is too self-conscious. A person is great only as he loses himself in his art, becomes a medium by which something greater gets expressed.

If it be said that this position is rationalistic, I must confess that such a charge does not seem to me significant. For the only apologetic that one could ever set up would be essentially rationalistic unless it be purely dogmatic. If it be said that this position is not evangelical Christianity, I remind you that the term evangelical is a term open to serious question. Protestants call themselves evangelical and they do not wish to call Roman Catholics by the same term, nor Unitarians. Such a term is too wishy-washy and broods a Pharisaic spirit of "Thank God I am not like the others." It should be redefined or dismissed from any respectable apologetics. If the term means the good news of God's grace, I remind you that other Christians hold such a view, even those classified under a rationalistic theology.

This paper has tried to justify the healthy-minded type of person to a place of respectability. Too much emphasis, it seems to me, has been placed upon the sick-souls. Surely, you do not have to feel spiritually sick to be a Christian. There are a lot of people who will admit their failures both before God and man but who are not the type that some theologies demand to make them real Christians. Justification of this type, the sick-soul type, it seems to me, has rested upon a view of God, a view of theodicy, and a view of the nature of evil. It was for that reason that I spent some considerable part of this paper in reëxamining the questions

of theodicy and evil, which should dispel an undue emphasis in traditional Christianity.

Moreover, Christianity is not something to join up with. Too much emphasis has been placed upon the supernatural side, forgetting that if the world be God's world God cannot be too far away. Too much stress has been laid on the divorcement of the sacred from the secular. Such lines are altogether too artificial. Too much of the music of Christianity has been set in the minor key. Aren't we ever going to have some fun in heaven? Too much has been said for the uniqueness of Christianity; if it is ideally valid, the emphasis should be turned around and the doctrine of universality emphasized. Too much has been of the river-bed variety; and not enough of the oceanic emphasis.

Whether Jesus ever lived is a historical question that is interesting; but it is not fundamental to ideal religion or ideal values. At best, the historical Founder of historical Christianity must be said to have been a medium rather than an originator. To make more out of this is to make a new kind of God superimposed upon all that has gone before and prevaricators out of those prophets in other places who have, rightly, claimed to know something of the Divine Being. Christianity no longer seems to me to be a kind of business transaction unless we need that kind of theology to bolster an ecclesiasticism. Values are not business transactions. They are relations and quite unofficial and ofttimes unconventional and irregular.

My own estimate of Jesus has grown by this type of apologetic, rather than diminished. But I have come to see him in terms of oceanic values rather than as confined to a particular stream of thought and practice. The philosophical has become much more important than the historical. When, as I have, I meet a liberal Jew, who tells me that he goes right along with the liberal Christian except in the matter of a few particular traditional doctrines, *e.g.,* the doctrine of incarnation, I no longer hesitate to call him, other things being equal, a Christian, even though his own faith does not follow the Christian Mississippi. I do, because he belongs to the oceanic spread of values. And it is my guess that the historic Jesus would concur in this judgment. At any rate, names are not important.

I do not lack the feeling for the historical; I admit the historical stream has affected all of us in our philosophical judgments. But I do say that the historical does not fence me in, as the new popular song goes. I belong rather to the wide open spaces where the air seems clearer and the lines men have set up appear so artificial. Divine reality is much bigger to me than the vision I formerly held. You don't fence in any ocean; nor do you inhibit the spirit of God. This, it seems to me, is the kind of theology needed for the new day and for tomorrow's tomorrows!

THE HEBREW THEOLOGIAN AND HIS FOREIGN COLLEAGUES

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It is not the purpose of this paper to claim a superiority for the Hebrew theologian over his colleagues in Babylonia and in Egypt. Such a claim is gratuitous. Yahweh, the object of the labors of the Hebrew theologian, is a living factor in Western culture while his one-time rivals live only as subjects of historical research. It is the task, rather, of this essay to illustrate the service which a knowledge of the foreign theologies may render toward a better understanding of the concepts which are our own religious heritage.

The theological significance of the Old Testament cannot be grasped fully by those who approach it equipped merely with a knowledge of Hebrew roots—essential as that knowledge is; the ripe fruits of insight can be garnered only by those who immerse themselves in the sources of ancient Near Eastern theology. For only when one sees the possibilities which were available to the Hebrew theologian does he correctly appraise the original contribution which the prophet or the priest made. The danger to the current revival of biblical theology[1] is that it may content itself within the narrow confines of the canonical scriptures and thus fail to evaluate the Hebrew genius in its proper historical setting. It is much easier—and considerably safer—to work within the bounds of a restricted literature, the bounds of which were set arbitrarily centuries ago, than it is to ask the larger questions of relationship of biblical ideas to those found in surrounding literatures. A hundred years ago the student was not challenged by this more difficult task; comparatively little was known of ancient heathenism. Today it is the abundance, rather than the lack, of material which is the embarrassment of the student of the Old Testament. It is the application of the method of historical study of ancient Near Eastern religions to the study of biblical theology which I wish to commend and to some small extent illustrate. First, let us review briefly some of the steps by which we have arrived at our present stage of understanding of the Hebrew theologian.

With but few exceptions the activities of scholars before the nineteenth century were confined to matters of lower, or textual, criticism. The prodigious amount of labor and money expended upon the publication of biblical texts is to be seen by looking at the edition of the London Polyglot published in 1657 under the direction of Brian Walton, a one-time political

[1] *Journal of Religion*, XXIII, pp. 1-11, 125-136.

prisoner. These six volumes contain over 5,700 pages of text. A glance at any double page of the Pentateuch will reveal the Hebrew text, the Septuagint, the Targum of Onkelos, the Samaritan text in the old Semitic script, the Syriac, and the Arabic texts; each of these six versions is accompanied with a Latin translation for the convenience of the illiterate. In addition the Latin Vulgate is given. This monumental edition of texts was but one of four polyglots published within a century and a half. Interest in matters of text has continued down to our own day, and the results of the labors of textual critics, Jews and Christians, liberals and conservatives, have been incorporated into dictionaries, commentaries, and technical journals—an enduring monument to the industry and devotion of generations of scholars.

With the beginning of the nineteenth century criticism took a different turn. Until that time there had been a few sporadic attempts at literary criticism, or what has been called higher criticism, but no schools of the critical method had developed. Efforts were now made to differentiate the sources of the biblical material, and one sees the appearance of the beginnings of the famous documentary hypothesis. Between 1812 and 1828 B. G. Niebuhr published his famous *Römische Geschichte,* making use of the newer historical methods. This work served as a model for Heinrich Ewald's history of Israel, published from 1843 to 1852.[2]

Students of the Old Testament were not infrequently stimulated by sources quite outside the field of their immediate interest. Some of its most successful interpreters have been those who approached the task from a point of view other than its own. As early as the end of the seventeenth century John Spencer, in his work on Hebrew ritual,[3] sought to interpret the Hebrew laws in the light of relevant material from Egypt, Greece, and Rome. So profitable was this method that two hundred years later, W. Robertson Smith could refer to this work of Spencer as yet "by far the most important book on the religious antiquities of the Hebrews."[4] Julius Wellhausen, the name so widely associated with higher criticism, is also known in connection with his important study of the religion of pre-Islamic Arabia.[5] W. Robertson Smith contributed an important work on Arabian customs,[6] and four years later produced his better-known work, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites,* on the proposition that "the doctrines and ordinances of the Old Testament cannot be thoroughly comprehended until they are put into comparison with the religions of the nations akin to the

[2] See quotation from Dean Stanley in preface to H. Ewald, *History of Israel* (ed. of 1869), Vol. I, p. v.

[3] *De Legibus Hebræorum Ritualibus et Earum Rationibus,* 2nd ed., 1686.

[4] *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites,* 2nd ed., p. vi.

[5] *Reste arabischen Heidentums,* 1887.

[6] *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia,* 1885.

Israelites."[7] Thus the phase of criticism represented by Wellhausen and Smith drew no small part of its inspiration from the study of Arabian heathenism and its relationship to the religious ideas of the Hebrews.

The interpretation of the Old Testament was to receive another important impetus—again from the outside. As a starting point of this movement, one might well take an incident from the autumn of 1845, exactly one hundred years ago. A young Englishman, then but twenty-eight years old, went to Sir Stratford Canning in Constantinople to seek his aid in a proposal to excavate a mound on the Tigris, seventeen miles below Mosul. Austin Henry Layard, for this was the young Englishman's name, obtained £60 from Sir Stratford and set out as fast as he could for Mosul. There, fearing the local governor, he found it necessary to hide his intention to excavate. Wrote Layard, shortly afterward:

> On the 8th of November, having secretly procured a few tools, and engaged a mason at the moment of my departure, and carrying with me a variety of guns, spears, and other formidable weapons, I declared that I was going to hunt wild boars in a neighboring village, and floated down the Tigris on a small raft constructed for my journey.[8]

By sundown that day he had arrived, found shelter in a native hut, but he could not sleep for excitement. He later described his thoughts this night:

> Hopes, long cherished, were now to be realized, or were to end in disappointment. Visions of palaces underground, of gigantic monsters, of sculptured figures, and endless inscriptions, floated before me . . . . Exhausted, I was at length sinking into sleep, when hearing the voice of Awad [his host], I rose from my carpet, and joined him outside the hovel.[9]

On that day there began a series of excavations, the results of which were to exceed in wonder even the wildest dreams of Layard. In but a few years there was discovered the great library of Ashurbanipal, material which has played such an important part in the course of the interpretation of the Bible.

In the past century there has come from the mounds of Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, and Syria an embarrassing wealth of cuneiform tablets. Its publication is widely scattered, and few have yet been able to grasp the whole of it sufficiently to attempt a synthesis either of the history of Babylonia and Assyria, or of the spiritual concepts which were the genius of that culture. Mention should be made of the work of B. Meissner in German,[10] which remains the standard work on Babylonia and Assyria. In

[7] *Op cit.*, p. vi.
[8] *Nineveh and Its Remains*, 1849, Vol. I, p. 41.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[10] *Babylonien und Assyrien*, 2 Vols., 1920-1925.

the second volume of his work one may get a picture of the Babylonian theologian and of some of his theological concepts. In the field of Sumerian literature the recent work of S. N. Kramer[11] will serve as a good introduction to Sumerian theology. For knowledge of the Hittite theologian one may rely upon the work of Albrecht Goetze in this new field, published in 1933.[12]

The systematic exploration of Egypt antedates that of Babylonia and Assyria. The scientific study of the antiquities of that land began in a most spectacular way. It was none other than Napoleon I who began the exploration of Egypt, when he entered Alexandria in 1798 with almost a hundred eminent scholars and artists. From that day to this the science of Egyptology has grown and developed into such a mass of material that again few are able to deal adequately with the whole. The works of Erman[13] and of Breasted[14] upon the religion of Egypt deserve special mention as the most available sources.

Texts from the ancient orient which have special significance for a study of the Old Testament were edited in 1926 by Hugo Gressmann with the help of three distinguished scholars, Ranke, Ebeling, and Rhodokanakis.[15] This volume remains the best collection of material for a study of the foreign colleagues of the Hebrew theologian. Unfortunately, three important neighbors of the Hebrews are not adequately represented there: the Sumerian, the Hittite, and the Ugaritic theologians. While at present there exists an abundance of material for a study of the religions and literatures of the many neighbors of the Hebrews—the Sumerians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, the Egyptians, the South Arabians, the Phœnicians, the Aramæans, the Hurrians—convenient syntheses of the material are yet to be made available to the nonspecialists in these highly technical fields of study. Let us now turn to a specific problem to illustrate what possible light the inscriptional material from the foreign sources may throw upon one theological conception of the Old Testament. The subject of creation will serve as an illustration.

I

The theologians of Mesopotamia did not always see eye to eye on the question of origins. That they differed in their views can easily be detected despite the fragmentary character of our knowledge of them and of their dogmas. As one might expect, the theology of one city differed from that

[11] *Sumerian Mythology,* 1944.
[12] *Kleinasien* in *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft,* edited by W. Otto.
[13] *Die Religion der Aegypter,* 1934.
[14] *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt,* 1912.
[15] *Altorientalische Texte zum alten Testament.*

of another, particularly when the chief god of the one was but a lesser god in the other. Since each city tended to have its own favored deity, it was inevitable that the theologians of a particular city should so construct their systems that honor might be done to their own god and not to another. It was also true that the political successes of one city over its neighbors were not without marked repercussions in the theological realm. It is this correlation between the ascendancy of a particular city-state and the consequent popularity of its god in the contemporary theologies that we shall examine in more detail. It is not too broad a generalization to affirm that when a particularly energetic people of one city reached out in conquest to engulf its neighbors into an empire, the chief god of the successful state was carried along upon the crest of the wave. Limited as we are by the available sources, we may be bold to assert that the power of the god in such cases was the result and not the cause of the conquest. This, however, we shall want to illustrate with specific examples.

The habit of ancient theologians of attributing to their most important god the work of creation as one of the most complimentary attributes will serve us well here. Creation was a favorite theme. Observation and reason offered little help in solving the riddle of origins. Freed from these limitations, the theologians might exercise their imaginations in the realm of phantasy and at the same time further the fortunes of their favorite gods.

Best known among the accounts of creation is the *enuma elish.* This Babylonian story of creation is preserved upon fragments of seven tablets, the significance of whose contents began to become apparent just seventy years ago.[16] The poem in its present recension is primarily concerned with the exaltation of the Babylonian god, Marduk. The explanations of the origin of the universe are given, not to satisfy the inquiring mind, but to exalt Marduk as the creator and lord of all the gods. In this respect the purpose of the poem is apologetic rather than scientific. A very brief summary of this well-known myth will suffice.

At the beginning there existed the primæval sea composed of male and female principles, Apsu and Tiamat. From these sprang a number of younger gods. The latter eventually aroused the anger of the primæval father to such an extent that he determined to destroy all of them. In the nick of time, however, the younger gods discovered the plot of their ancestor against them; one of their number, the god of wisdom, thwarted the evil purpose of his ancestor by murdering him. The wife of the mur-

[16] George Smith described the fragments in a letter to the *Daily Telegraph,* published March 4, 1875. For the most recent publication of the *enuma elish* see A. Heidel, *The Babylonian Genesis,* 1942, and reviews by S. N. Kramer in *Journal of American Oriental Society,* LXIII, pp. 69-73, and by W. F. Albright in *Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXII, pp. 366-370. Heidel's monograph gives translations of other Babylonian material on the subject of creation as well as many references to the more recent literature on the subject. While some of his arguments for the relationship between the Babylonian and Hebrew creation accounts remain unconvincing (*Crozer Quarterly,* XIX, pp. 323-324), Heidel's work is an extremely useful collection of material.

dered father considered it a point of honor to avenge the death of her husband. There follows the major conflict of heaven between Tiamat, mother of the gods, and the younger gods, who have now dared to challenge the ancient authority. Who will become the champion of the gods against Tiamat? The former champion against Apsu is unable to engage in this conflict. Another powerful god, Anu, finds himself too weak for the task. Who then will go for the gods? Marduk, the son of the former champion, is chosen by the assembly of gods and given every authority, including that of destruction and creation, by the gods for his willingness to undertake such a task. He tries his newly designated power by speaking a word which instantly destroys a garment and another word which recreates it.[17] In true epic style the Babylonian poet describes the battle between Tiamat and Marduk. Marduk kills Tiamat; after splitting open her body he makes of one half the heaven and of the other the earth. From this beginning the process of creation proceeds step by step and culminates in the creation of man. The epic ends with a long hymn to Marduk, the hero of the gods, the creator of heaven and earth. Now the once-powerful gods do homage to their new master. In the end Marduk, the youngest of the gods, comes into possession of the age-old authorities of his fathers. He is truly the king of the gods.

Who is this god Marduk? The answer of the Babylonian theologian is clear. He is the son of Ea, god of wisdom; the vanquisher of Tiamat; the creator, to whom all gods did obeisance out of respect and gratitude. But the answer of the historian is quite different. Marduk was the local god of the provincial city of Babylon in northern Babylonia in the third millennium B.C. At about the beginning of the second millennium a new dynasty established itself in Babylon, where Marduk was patron. The sixth king of this dynasty, Hammurabi, conquered all of Babylonia and pushed his empire as far as the shores of the Mediterranean. The fortunes of the one-time insignificant god of Babylon rose with the political successes of its famous king. Babylonian theologians of the first half of the second millennium expressed their gratitude to Marduk for the political successes of their rulers by ascribing to Marduk the attributes of the powerful gods worshiped in neighboring—but now subordinate—cities. The political successes of Hammurabi had found a counterpart in the advances which Marduk made in the heavenly realm.

It has long been recognized that the epic which we have just described was put into its present form during the first part of the second millennium, but composed out of more ancient sources. The rôle of creator, so dramat-

[17] This test recalls to mind that given by Yahweh to Moses in the case of the rod becoming a serpent when cast upon the ground and a rod again when taken up (Exod. 4: 1-5).

ically played by Marduk, was anciently occupied by quite a different deity.[18] Some sixty miles southeast of Babylon was the ancient Sumerian city of Nippur. Its patron deity was Enlil, the god of air. Enlil it was, in the earlier sources, who created heaven and earth. Now, thanks to the work of Kramer upon Sumerian mythology, we are in a position to know the main lines of the Sumerian cosmogony. According to the ideas which were current in the third millennium it was this same Enlil, the god of Nippur, who, as the air god, separated heaven from earth. While his father, An, carried off heaven to its place, Enlil carried off the earth to its quarter and there played an important rôle in the subsequent acts of creation.[19] Enlil was the leading god of the Sumerian pantheon of the third millennium, and Nippur was the spiritual centre of the land.[20] In this new material we have a clearer picture of Marduk's predecessor in the part of creator of the world.

Fortunately we may go one step further and see Marduk relieved of this rôle and the part given to another. The tradition concerning the creation, so artistically embedded in the *enuma elish* and prescribed to be recited in its entirety upon the fourth day of the New Year's festival in Babylon, was to undergo another important modification—this time at the hands of the less creative and less imaginative theologians of the mighty Assyrian empire. From the remains of the Assyrian capital itself we have fragments of the *enuma elish* dating from the ninth century. Upon these fragments it is not surprising to read on line 80 of the first tablet the name of Ashur (Anshar), the chief god of the Assyrian military régime, where Marduk should appear. The Assyrian theologians had brazenly inserted Ashur for Marduk as the creator of the heaven and the earth.[21] The new honors now acquired by Ashur were due to the success of the cruel kings of the Assyrian empire.

The fragments which have been preserved for us of the Babylonian tradition concerning the creation of man present an even more complicated picture. In the *enuma elish* Marduk punishes the evil vizier of Tiamat by shedding his blood; this blood of a rebellious god he then uses for the creation of man. The creator laid upon man the obligation to serve the gods.[22] While other traditions vary as to the person of the creator of man,[23] there persist the general assumptions that some sacrifice of divine

[18] See M. Jastrow, "On the Composite Character of the Babylonian Creation Story" in *Orientalische Studien Theodor Nöldeke . . .*, Vol. II, pp. 969-982.

[19] *Sumerian Mythology*, chapter 2.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[21] Further is the evidence on a building inscription of Sennacherib describing a bronze door upon which was pictured Ashur drawing near to Tiamat to do battle with her. For text see Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte*, pp. 132-133.

[22] *Enuma elish* VI, 25-27.

[23] In another text (*Altorientalische Texte*, p. 134 A) it is the mother goddess Ninhursag who mixes the flesh and blood of a nameless god with clay to form man. Yet another tradition preserved upon a tablet from Ashur (*Ibid.*, p. 134 B) names as the divine victims the two Lamga divinities. Elsewhere this important act of creation is attributed to Anu; to Enlil; to Ea, the god of wisdom; to Mama, goddess of birth; to Aruru, who begets and protects children (Meissner, *Babylonien und Assyrien*, Vol. II, p. 182).

blood was necessary, that man shared divine nature by virtue of the material of which he was made, and that there was an earthly component to his nature.

One important variant to this general tradition is of interest. According to a tradition contained in a much later, Greek source, that of Berossus, but a source which is trustworthy in some other respects where it can be tested by cuneiform texts, Marduk finished the work of creating the earth to find that it was uninhabited and unfruitful. He proceeded, then, to offer himself as a divine sacrifice; from the creator's own blood mixed with earth men and animals were created.[24] Man, according to this view, shared the divine nature of the great and friendly god Marduk, rather than of the villain Qingu. This was the more optimistic view of man's nature.[25] Earlier, Sumerian tradition differs from the Babylonian in that man was fashioned out of clay, just as in one of the biblical traditions; but his creation was for the purpose of supplying the gods with their food and drink.[26] The responsibility for the fashioning of man is divided between Nammu, the primæval sea; Ninmah; and the Sumerian water god, Enki.[27]

Despite this rather complex picture of Mesopotamian traditions of creation one fact emerges clearly: Enlil's place as creator was taken over by the one-time parochial god Marduk, and Marduk's place was usurped later by Ashur, when he had led the Assyrian armies to victory.

II

In ancient Egypt the popular conception of the origin of the world is beautifully naïve and bears unmistakably the local color of the Nile valley.[28] Each year the fields of the Egyptian farmer were covered by the inundation of the Nile; as the river gradually receded, the farmer saw a small hill which appeared as a token of the fertile farm, vitalized with moisture and rich soil, soon to be his to cultivate. In the very same manner, he fancied, had the world itself first appeared as the primæval waters had subsided. At first, the universe was in confusion and its parts were not yet properly fixed. The popular mind fancied that the goddess

[24] See *ibid.*, p. 104, note 4, and P. Schnabel, *Berossos und die babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur*, 1923, pp. 76-77 for discussion and pp. 254-256 for text.

[25] One might suspect that this view is a later addition, were it not for the fact that we have a late Babylonian source which pictures Marduk as dead, lying bound and wounded (*Altorientalische Texte*, pp. 320-322). The text is extremely difficult to understand. Bel, or Marduk, is imprisoned in the "two mountains," the realm of the dead. He has been carried away with a "sinner," he has been wounded, and his disappearance from the earth is the occasion of great confusion. He is apparently called back to earth by the intercession of his wife who went and stood at the door of the grave (see Meissner, *Babylonien und Assyrien*, Vol. II, p. 98, and Gadd in S. H. Hooke, *Myth and Ritual*, p. 58). Further to support the authenticity of this late tradition of Berossus there is a recently published text which tells of Marduk in the grave (E. Ebeling, *Tod und Leben*, 1931, pp. 24-26).

[26] *Sumerian Mythology*, p. 69.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[28] For an outline of the following see Erman, *Die Religion*, pp. 61-63.

of heaven was lying upon her husband, the god of earth. The god of air, called Shu, pushed himself between the two deities of heaven and earth and raised the heavenly Nut so that she stood, arched over the earth, upon her feet and the tips of her fingers. The sun-god, whose authority seems unquestioned, designated the earthly Keb as his representative below and placed Nut in authority above. Thus far we seem to have the product of natural reflection, in which observation and reason had played the more important part. It was upon this lore that the priests of various places seem to have imposed their systems of theology. Let us examine three of the theological schools, situated as they were in three prominent cities of Egypt. Fortunately sufficient fragments of each of them have been preserved to enable us to reconstruct a skeleton of their theological concepts of origins.

At Heliopolis, a city in Lower Egypt, the popular creation story served as a starting point.[29] Here the story was told that when the sun-god, Atum, appeared in the primæval water and could find no place upon which to stand he mounted the revered *benben* stone in Heliopolis. Finding himself alone and in need of companions, he miraculously produced a divine pair, Shu and Tefnet. They, in turn, bore the gods of heaven and of earth, and from this latter pair sprung four well-known deities, Osiris, Seth, Isis, and Nephthys. These nine gods the theologians named "the great nine of Heliopolis." This habit of forming enneads of gods, not unlike the habit in other parts of the Near East of forming trinities, spread far from Heliopolis; Abydos and Thebes, not to be outdone by their Heliopolitan colleagues, formed their "nines."

Not far from Heliopolis was the ancient city of Memphis, where the god Ptah was worshiped as the central figure. In an ancient text, now dated in the Pyramid Age,[30] Ptah is pictured as the creator of all things. He is said to have fashioned the gods and to have made the cities. The theologians of Memphis created their ennead,[31] at the head of which stood Ptah, the fashioner.[32]

The theology of Thebes, a city-state which came into political prominence at a late period, was built upon at least two threads of ancient tradition. In Thebes Min and Month had originally played an important part as local deities.[33] The theologians of the rising city-state, not content with their hereditary, parochial gods, imported an ancient god, Amon, to serve their purposes.[34] In his new home Amon was allotted some of the

[29] Erman, *Die Religion*, pp. 89-90; for a recent translation into English of the Papyrus Bremner Rhind see R. O. Faulkner in *Journal of Egyptian Archæology*, XXII, pp. 121 ff.; XXIII, pp. 10 ff., 166 ff.; XXIV, pp. 41 ff.

[30] Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought*, p. 46, note 1.

[31] Actually eight gods plus the primæval Ptah.

[32] *Altorientalische Texte*, pp. 5-6.

[33] Erman, *Die Religion*, p. 103.

[34] Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought*, p. 318.

features of the local Min and was launched upon his career as one of the greatest of Egyptian deities. He soon yielded to the ancient habit of identifying the local god with the sun-god and took to himself the name of Re. We thus see how the course of political events in the breakdown of the Old Kingdom and the establishment of the Middle Kingdom was responsible for the elevation of an obscure, local deity to the head of the Egyptian pantheon under the name of Amon-Re.

Throughout the Hyksos interlude Amon-Re managed to hold his place as the chief god of the kingship and as "king of the gods." By the fifteenth century B.C. Amon-Re had become the creator of all things, men, animals, plants, *et cetera.*[35] In the theology of Thebes, the capital of the New Kingdom, Amon-Re rose to the pinnacle of greatness and came near to becoming a universal deity. But in this splendid conquest, paralleled only by the magnificent political empire of the kings of the New Kingdom, Amon-Re lost those characteristics which he had appropriated from the local god, Min, of Thebes. The theologians had created another creator of heaven and earth.

Another important theological development in the tradition of Amon-Re is to be seen in a document from the thirteenth century.[36] This document, written in a time when the futile monotheistic revolution of Ikhnaton had not been forgotten, pictures Amon as the creator of all things, the one original cause. As powerful as was this Theban Amon of the thirteenth century, he yet found it necessary to reckon with the cosmogony of Memphis, in which Ptah was the creator. The conflict was neatly overcome by asserting that Amon had transformed himself into Ptah in order to construct the original gods.[37] In this way the Theban theologians of the thirteenth century engulfed the Memphite theology, as they had previously incorporated the Heliopolitan, to claim the three great gods of Egypt, Amon, Ptah, and Re.[38] For this conquest Amon had paid dearly; he had lost most, if not all, the characteristics of the local god of Thebes. As he had arisen to become the supreme creator, he had lost his own identity.

From these struggles which continued for more than a thousand years among Egyptian theologians it is apparent that they were more concerned with the advancement of their own particular deity than with the question of origin in itself. They were influenced to no small extent by those strong currents of political fortune which are apparent in most of their constructions. From this brief, but somewhat involved, survey of the myths of

[35] *Altorientalische Texte,* p. 13.

[36] For a translation of the "Thousand Songs" from the time of Ramses II see Erman, *Die Literatur der Aegypter,* 1923, pp. 363-373.

[37] Erman, *Die Literatur,* p. 368.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 371.

creation which were transferred from Enlil to Marduk and from Marduk to Ashur in Mesopotamia, and of the stages of theological development in Egypt represented by Atum, Ptah, and Amon-Re, let us turn our attention to more familiar ground, the dogmas of the Hebrew theologians.

III

The oldest story of creation in the Old Testament is that found in the second chapter of Genesis. While it is thought that this myth was put into its present form in the tenth or the ninth century, it clearly betrays a more primitive origin. It is not primarily concerned with the creation of the world but with the origin of man. Here Yahweh formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life; woman was made from one of the ribs taken from the first man while he was asleep. Such naïve and simple conceptions point to an origin in the folklore of the distant past.

Hundreds of years later, in a more contemplative age, there appears as the product of Hebrew theology a doctrine of creation in Deutero-Isaiah.[39] Here the poet of the Exile claims for his god, Yahweh: "I, even I, have made the earth, and created man upon it; I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens; and all their host have I commanded."[40] In this passage, written in the sixth century, Hebrew theologians for the first time explicitly claimed for their national god, Yahweh, the responsibility for the creation of heaven and earth. As Pfeiffer has pointed out,[41] they made the equation of the almighty creator, of the book of Job, with Yahweh, the god of Israel. Thus it was in a period of political defeat for Israel that its theologians seemed to have made the first definite formulation of the doctrine of their god, Yahweh, as the creator of the heaven and of the earth. This was a bold assertion, indeed. Had not Yahweh been defeated and his weakness against the Babylonian conquerors been conclusively demonstrated in the tragedy of 586? But a generation afterward, when Yahweh had done little to demonstrate his political power, Hebrew theologians could audaciously assert that this seemingly impotent Yahweh was the original cause of heaven and earth. Marduk's fortunes rose and fell with the successes and the failures of the kings of Babylon; but Yahweh rose to his greatest stature in a time when Jerusalem was desolate. Indeed, the Hebrew theologians were men of great faith to proclaim the power of their god when the odds were so heavily against them. Out of the nation's darkest hour there was formed a conception of the grandeur of its god who still reigned,

[39] For a good summary see T. K. Cheyne's article, "Creation," in *Encyclopædia Biblica*, Vol. I, col. 952.

[40] Isa. 45: 12.

[41] *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 475.

even amid the humiliating defeat of his people, to work out his purposes and his plans in the world. This, indeed, was one of the great contributions of the Hebrew theological genius to mankind. Here, certainly, the Hebrew theologian proved himself to be far more creative than had any of his foreign colleagues.

In the century which followed, the most famous of all stories of creation took its present form. While not so original a contribution as that of the Second Isaiah, this story in the first chapter of Genesis has become the better known. It seems to be dependent for its major assertion upon the Second Isaiah;[42] that it displays a framework which was borrowed from the Babylonian *enuma elish* is now no longer questioned. The theologians of the Priestly school accommodated their dogma to the pattern of the then most scientific account of origins. They supplied to this framework, however, the content of their own religious tradition derived from the Second Isaiah. The result was a dignified picture of contemporary belief concerning the origin of the heaven and the earth, of man, and of one of their cherished institutions, the Sabbath. In fact, the climax of the story is the divine institution of the day of rest, one of the cornerstones of the priestly religious structure. While this famous story of origins stands at the opening of the Pentateuch, it actually belongs to the latest phase of the composition of these books.

Finally we return to the Hebrew theologian and to his foreign colleagues. It should be by now apparent that the Hebrew theologian did not stand alone, isolated from the rival schools in Babylonia and in Egypt; he remained susceptible to the theological trends, some of them subtle indeed, which were felt in the contemporary world. In many ways he was like his neighbors. For an understanding of the Hebrew theologian a knowledge of his foreign colleagues is indispensable. Research upon the subject of ancient Near Eastern theology is today one of the most challenging tasks awaiting students of the Bible. Its dangers and its difficulties must not be underestimated; they are legion.

From this survey of the relevant material on creation it becomes apparent that there was one great difference between the Hebrew and the foreign theologian. It lies in the fact that the makers of dogma in Egypt and in Babylonia displayed generally a compromising tolerance toward other gods. This was apparent particularly in the habit of incorporating foreign gods into the pantheons of local deities. The conquering city would generously incorporate the leading deity of its conquered neighbor into its own pantheon, careful, of course, to give the deity of the now subject city an inferior place. As a result there arose the pantheons, the enneads, and the compound deities such as Amon-Re and Bel-Marduk. Exchanges seem

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

to have been made without much difficulty by the theologians, particularly when political conditions warranted these changes in the divine household. In this respect the Hebrew theologians were generally different. They maintained, for a considerable length of time, a stubborn exclusiveness, an incorrigible jealousy for their god Yahweh. He would tolerate no rivals. Said he: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me."[43] Later a theologian of the sixth century maintained for Yahweh: "I am Yahweh, and there is none else; beside me there is no god."[44] This uncompromising spirit, this resistance to political expedient—a temptation to which Egyptian and Babylonian theologians constantly yielded—remains as one of the cherished possessions of our faith. And perhaps it was this exclusiveness, so apparent in the work of the Hebrew theologian of the later period, that has accounted for the persistence of Yahweh, "the jealous god," as the creator of heaven and earth and the oblivion of Marduk and Amon-Re, the more compromising deities of Babylonia and Egypt.[45]

[43] Exod. 20: 3.

[44] Isa. 45: 5.

[45] See remarks of A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. VI, pp. 39-40.

WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH AND HIS INTERPRETERS

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Walter Rauschenbusch has had many interpreters. Over and over again enthusiastic friends, bitter foes, and more or less objective historians have painted his portrait and appraised the social gospel in terms of hopeful thinking or lack of perspective or resentment against his denial of supernaturalism or damage to big business.

In what follows only four aspects of the man and his work will be examined to round out previous studies. His apologists have rather underestimated the criticism directed against the social gospel. A few of the many lacunæ in the presentation of his attitudes have long needed rethinking. The setting of the American social gospel, its place in the total social emphasis of Christianity, has hitherto lacked perspective. This defect may be noticed even if it cannot be remedied. Finally, a word will be said concerning the survival value of the American social gospel.

I

When Rauschenbusch's first major work, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* appeared, Dr. I. M. Haldeman made a "keen analysis of a college professor's new Book in the light of The Old Book" in a 42-page pamphlet. The passion in this description of the new heresy is a good sample of the hundreds of attacks by fundamentalists:

> Let us inquire, then, what was the actual relation of our Lord to the world and the society in which he lived.
>
> He saw corruption in government, but never called upon men to rebuke it as such; on the contrary, he commanded the people to pay the taxes which a corrupt government had imposed upon them.
>
> He saw an empire founded on force and living by the sword. He never rebuked a soldier or uttered a word against the sword; on the contrary, he said that he himself came to send a sword upon earth—and history has amply fulfilled his prophecy. Thousands have died fighting each other in his name.
>
> So far from announcing an era of peace, he declared in the most definite and unmistakable terms, that war and conquest should continue till his return. He himself would come back with military display at the head of an immense army with thunder of judgment and gleam of lightnings. Instead of bearing an olive branch in his hand he would burst upon the earth like Noah's flood, sweeping the ungodly and the sinner away.
>
> So far from intimating that this age would widen into areas of spiritual and industrial peace, little by little, gain by gain, until the divine presence should be felt and an unseen Christ enthroned, until every man in love profound should call his

neighbor brother, he testifies the age will end in storm, in violence, the heavens and the earth in commotion, the waves of the sea roaring, the nations running to and fro and men's hearts failing them for fear, for looking after the things that are coming on earth.

So far from intimating that social conditions should be redeemed and righteousness rule in men, he declares that lawlessness shall be multiplied and love wax cold.

So far from assuring us that the truth shall prevail, he says false teachers shall come in his name and deceive many, iniquity shall clothe itself as the anointed of God, and in the livery of righteousness lead many to destruction.

In none of these things did he hold out the hope of social betterment.

He saw the saloon, the wine shop and the drunkard at every corner; he organized no campaign against them and was never crowned and hailed as a prohibitionist.

He saw slavery; not a word did he speak against it.

He knew men toiled for stipends and that the wages of the laborer were kept back by fraud; he raised no protest, never suggested a strike, or counselled a revolt.

He saw poverty, wretched, terrible, appealing. Did he intimate that by application of the principles he taught wealth should be divided and every man at last sit under his own vine and fig tree, none daring to molest nor make afraid? Not at all. He rebuked those who would have sold the ointment Mary poured on his feet and who would have given the proceeds to the poor instead. He rebuked them for their suggested economy, their offered benevolence, and assured them personal relation and devotion to himself were the preëminent virtues, and added, in striking phrase, that poverty should continue till the day of his return; that there never would arrive a time during his absence when the social condition would be, or could be, otherwise classified than as rich and poor; as those having much and more than enough, and those having little and not enough.

It is true, he went about doing good. He alleviated human sorrow, he healed the sick and raised the dead, but he did these things, always, by the exercise of such powers as to place his action entirely outside the category of example.

To follow that example actually has never been possible. To attempt to follow it spiritually minimizes its value and renders the result nil.

If compassion for the condition of society prompted his action, if it led him not only to preach alleviation but to practice it, why did he limit the range of his work? There were multitudes of others who were sick, and others beside the young girl, the widow's son and Lazarus, who were dead.

The truth is, his work was limited, because it was never for a moment socialistic, but always Messianic. It had a limited and definite object—the demonstration that he was the Messiah, Israel's anointed king. He was reporting himself as such through his works. When John the Baptist in dire perplexity sent to inquire whether he really were the Christ, the "Coming One," Jesus simply drew the attention of John's messengers to the fact that he was healing the sick, giving sight to the blind and preaching the Gospel to the poor. He bade them take these facts as credentials of his Messiahship, his right to be Israel's king.[1]

The eloquent pastor of the First Baptist Church, New York City, closed his tract for the times with the indictment that Rauschenbusch had taken his data from church history instead of relying upon the New Testament. "Church history is, and always must be, a peril to the student for the ministry. . . . However earnest Professor Rauschenbusch may be,

[1] I. M. Haldeman, *Professor Rauschenbusch's Christianity and the Social Crisis*, pp. 24-28.

he has a light and easy way of dealing with the Bible as a whole, and fashioning it to his use, leading us, as we read, to believe that it has been, more than anything else, a hindrance to the progress of humanity and the unfolding of genuine Christianity."[2]

For forty years American fundamentalism has been ambushing the social gospel, completely rejecting it because not derived from the New Testament.

A second major type of criticism of the social gospel and much more intelligent than that of the premillenarians has come from Roman Catholicism, Anglo-Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, friends, historians, and church historians in magazine articles, in chapters in volumes devoted to the story of social Christianity and in well-documented theses. A synthesis of all this material yields the following counts in the indictment of the American social gospel:

Within a brief time after the publication of *Christianity and the Social Crisis,* Charles R. Henderson, a leader in American social Christianity, was pointing out that the argument of the volume had not been sustained, that the defenders of capitalism were neither fools nor knaves, and that this discussion of the social gospel was courageous but not practical; armchair, theoretical, and academic, unlikely to issue in any feasible program of reconstruction.

A second count against the social gospel has been lack of perspective. It was an American discovery! It is something new. But such claims demonstrate, it is said, ignorance of the social tradition of Christianity. The Christianization of the social order has been the task of the church from ancient times. "The gigantic attempts to Christianize the social life by Roman Catholicism in the Middle Ages and by Calvinism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are rated only as distortions of the genuine religion of Jesus and not understood as great historical expressions of the desire for a Christian social order."[3] The social gospelers, it is alleged, know little about the mediæval social-economic synthesis or the attempts of Calvinism to turn Geneva and Massachusetts into thoroughgoing bibliocracies. Courses in Troeltsch, Weber, and Tawney are prescribed for this cultural astigmatism.

The third count in this indictment against the social gospel is concerned with its rejection of the supernaturalism of traditional Christianity. From the theological point of view, the social gospel was indeed radical and brand-new. It secularized the apocalyptic hope. It turned the kingdom of God into American democracy and secular utopianism. It eliminated the transcendental elements from Christianity. It degraded

[2] *Op. cit.,* p. 41.

[3] W. A. Visser 't Hooft, *The Background of the Social Gospel in America,* p. 38.

"otherworldly" into "next worldly." It exchanged the dualism of the original gospel for the "monism of modern philosophy." It accepted humanism. It "adjusted theology to the notions which had become essential to American life." It converted man's social satisfaction into God's plan for the world. It subordinated theology to social science, making religion a "barren moralism and a utilitarian ethics." What mattered to the social gospelers was the kingdom of man of which God was the inspirer! Hence the demands of the social gospel became the specifications of its new "God-denying" theology. The eschatological, mystical, and sacramental aspects of the Christian tradition were discarded, and religion was secularized from within. Sacramentalism became a "parasitic growth on the body of Christianity." Paul and his one and only gospel were effaced. A late nineteenth-century interpretation of the gospel of Jesus was enthroned. Not only Roman Catholicism, but Anglo-Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, Barthianism, any modern Christian group representing the "historic faith," can therefore have no desire to coöperate with this "Anglo-Saxon activism."[4]

A fourth count against the social gospel stems from its naïve and pathetic attempt to Christianize economic determinism. Rauschenbusch finally stated that the social gospel was essentially different from Marxism in the following respects:

> (1) It sets a positive religious faith against the materialistic philosophy which Socialism has inherited from its European beginnings. (2) It believes in the value and social possibilities of the churches. (3) It lays stress on religious regeneration as a factor in the salvation of society. (4) It accepts "economic determinism" as a chief factor in social evolution, but asserts the reality and independent power of spiritual forces. (5) It recognizes the influence of social environment, but still asserts the moral responsibility of the individual. (6) It stands for the sanctity of the family and the radical Christian attitude on the question of intoxicants.[5]

The social gospel, its opponents contend, accepted "formed socialism" and thereupon assimilated it to the Christian ethic instead of beginning with the social-ethical implications of the gospel and then constructing their blueprints in detail. Or to cite the caution of a much earlier leader in the Anglican Christian social movement, F. D. Maurice: "Christian socialists should be prepared to prove that they have not imported their doctrines into the Bible"!

The sixth count in this indictment of the social gospel is its degradation of Christianity into a "new Puritanism." By this is meant intolerance, exclusiveness, and the prohibition or XVIII Amendment attitude toward

[4] See Arthur Titius, "Der Angelsaechische Aktivismus und Luther" in *Christliche Welt*, July 22, 1926; and Maurice B. Reckitt, *Faith and Society*, especially Chap. VI.

[5] "Christian Socialism" in the *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, edited by Matthews and Smith, p. 91.

life, the imposition of ethical standards by force upon the community, the rejection of individual moral responsibility, the acceptance of the Nordic authoritarian method. This trend will breed "fatal misunderstandings": "The identification of religion in the public mind with restrictions, with fear of life, with negative standards rather than with positive affirmations and glowing revelations of human potentiality as a vehicle of God's grace" would be calamitous. The youth of America will therefore look elsewhere for leadership and the "more respectable elements in American religion" will continue their complacency and social apathy toward urgent social problems.

Another count in the indictment of the social gospelers is that they have always compromised with traditionalists. They have tried to make biblical literalists believe that the American social gospel is Jesus' view of the kingdom of God. They should have admitted that the thinking of Jesus was within the framework of his day. But that framework resembles the structure of the twentieth century as little as a Manhattan skyscraper does the tiny cottage in Galilee in which Jesus was born and reared. Honesty requires the acknowledgment that Jesus of Nazareth knew nothing about the social-economic issues of the power age. Twentieth-century economic constructions cannot be grafted upon the simple life of first-century Palestine. The confusion resulting from this blunder has been very disastrous.

The eighth count, then, in the indictment of some of the leaders of the American social gospel movement is directed against their selective use of historical method.

The fatal error of the American social gospelers was the search for an ancestry, the refusal to take an historical attitude toward Jesus, and this, at the very time when historical method as applied to the New Testament was in the ascendency and they were using it elsewhere. They accepted evolution and science but refused to be scientific in their interpretation of the kingdom of God. They reaped immediate advantages and won the battle against millenarianism but lost the war to fundamentalism. To press for consideration of facts in one area of life and deny them in another signifies final defeat. The social gospel was exceedingly modern. It was without support in the tradition of the church. The idea of organic development cannot be discovered in the New Testament. Then the seed cast into the earth died; today the life within the seed germinates. These two interpretations of life are a sun's diameter apart. *The primary concern of Jesus was religious not social,* and no twentieth-century proposals are contained in his simple parables.

But how could leaders of such extraordinary culture, insight, and historical ability fall into so fatal an error? How could the ancient idea

of the kingdom of God be converted into a nineteenth-century synthetic product? Because the social gospelers desired to be practical and get on with the job, they neglected history and the ancient admonition, "he that believeth shall not be hastened."

Historical selectivism ultimately comes to grief. Someone has thus characterized Gilbert Keith Chesterton, "a certain intellectual recklessness that made him indifferent to truth and reality . . . fundamentally—perhaps I should say subconsciously—he was a thoroughgoing sceptic and acted on the principle that, since we cannot really be positive about anything, we had better believe what it pleases us to believe." But *sic itur in Tartarum.*

The first major type of criticism of the social gospel was by fundamentalism; the second by churchmen. A third major type of attack upon the American social gospel is met with in the modern business world. The social gospel failed to appreciate, it is said, the values in economic liberalism and the weaknesses inherent in coöperative movements. In the former there is a "close connection between religion and morality; a high evaluation of personality; a devaluation of the sacramental; a secularization of nature; an exaltation of law; a religiously inspired intra-worldly activity." Or to quote Harnack, "without wealth, there cannot be culture." In all utopianism, the problem of the family proves unsolvable; individual liberty must be surrendered; cultural aspirations must be suppressed; economic inadequacies soon emerge; and the selfishness of man persists. Socialism is no exception. The social gospel is no exception.

When *Christianity and the Social Gospel* appeared, the president of the board of trustees of the Rochester Theological Seminary, a Cincinnati businessman, wrote a letter to President Strong demanding the resignation of Professor Rauschenbusch. Fortunately, President Strong came to his professor's defense. But of course there was not the remotest chance for him ever to become the president of the school.

In two compilations by Henry B. Joy of Detroit, one the *Green Book* and the other the *Yellow Book,* both dated 1936, are found over two hundred pages of rather sour tirades against the social gospel and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

What impresses the reader of the many apologies for the American social gospel is their failure usually not at all to face up to these criticisms of their faith. Even when they do, perspective seems to be lacking to make an effective reply.

It is true, the author of *The Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch* does attempt to defend his apostle against Visser 't Hooft's pointed remarks upon Rauschenbusch's theism but elsewhere remains rather silent,[6] while

[6] V. P. Bodein, *The Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch and its Relation to Religious Education,* New Haven, 1944, pp. 127-130.

D. R. Sharpe in *Walter Rauschenbusch* hopes to dispose of Visser 't Hooft's charge of pantheism by quoting from statements made by Rauschenbusch between 1894 and 1900. But the Rauschenbusch of the 1890's and of 1917 are incommensurable.

The fundamentalist rage against Rauschenbusch deserved some attention. The Reverend W. D. P. Bliss's disinclination to go along with the Brotherhood of the Kingdom movement was for other reasons than that mentioned by Sharpe on p. 125.[7] So much critical attention has been given to the derivation and contents of the system of Karl Marx since Rauschenbusch spoke before the Rochester Labor Lyceum in 1901, that it is a pity the biographer did not bring the discussion down to date.[8] Since Sharpe represents Rauschenbusch as a "convinced socialist," how does he account for his hero's denial of that statement, after asserting that Rauschenbusch could not "hold unrelated and contradictory ideas in his mind at the same time"?[9]

II

After noting some twenty-five lacunæ in the latest studies of Rauschenbusch, it seemed more pertinent to comment upon only five. The first of these was a controversy which provoked endless debate for years within the German American Baptist body and issued in hard feelings which continued until long after the social leader's death. But since the biographer has ignored it, four will be considered.

His biographer appreciates the significance of the social prophet's attitude toward Germany, and one must bear in mind that the earlier Germany is not the contemporary Germany at all. His interest in Germany and Germans in the United States continued to the end. He owed much to German scholarship. Such intimate connections with Germany and its scholars naturally made him see things from the German point of view.

One Sunday afternoon in Detroit in 1896, I picked up the *Jugend Herold* of which Rauschenbusch was editor at the time and discovered an article entitled: "Shall I Join an English Church?" If any of his biographers has called attention to it, the reference has escaped me. A few years ago I read the article to all the members of our faculty. Only one even remotely recognized it as a possible Rauschenbusch composition. It is propaganda for maintaining one's membership in a German church and was probably one reason why he never joined an English-speaking church. It deserves complete reproduction, but only short excerpts follow:

> Stick to the old [German] church. Greater luxury in a church does not prove that the life there is more wholesome. All is not gold that glitters. The organ sounds grander and the paid choir does not flat the notes like the old sister that sits just

[7] See M. B. Reckitt, *Faith and Society*, pp. 174-226.
[8] D. R. Sharpe, *Walter Rauschenbusch*, pp. 203-216.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

back of you in the German church, but where is the sincerest praise of God? Ah, that is another question.

Our American friends [in the churches] are skillful in administering "taffy" but for steady diet recommend me to German "Schwarzbrot."

A larger percentage of our people attend the prayer meetings; we pray more, sing more heartily and give more liberally; and all these are standards by which to measure the spiritual life. There is not so much worldliness in our German churches yet; not so much dancing, theatre-going and frivolity. Taking it all together, while the life of the German churches is plainer, more homespun, less exciting and interesting, there is just as good a chance to keep your soul healthy and to grow in grace and the knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, and if you are a Christian, that is what you want.

We German American Baptists are a picked company of Christ's soldiers, selected for special duty, and we throw away our chance when we forget our German mother tongue and talk English only, like the great mass of people about us.

Stick to the old German church. Take up your cross patiently for Jesus' sake. Take pains to keep up your knowledge of the German language and to increase it. And don't be fooled by the idea that a man who talks English is necessarily smarter and better than a man who talks German. That's nonsense.

This slight section from a very long editorial is sufficient to indicate the aim of the propaganda. It helped to develop a sense of superiority in many young German Americans. Their descendants paid the penalty in 1917 when they became shining marks for accusations of being pro-German. The assimilation of American-born Germans to American life was greatly retarded by this kind of suggestion. It is the bane of most foreign-language churches in the United States to develop a superiority complex due to this kind of taffy pulled by home mission societies.

In 1899, Rauschenbusch published an article in *The Watchman* which might well have received full quotation in his biography (p. 188). It was on "England and Germany," a criticism of the former, an apology for the latter. There is no other article which reveals his love and approval of Germany with the same intensity. It is preserved in full in one of his scrapbooks in the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School library. The following two excerpts will give its flavor:

Religious life, in so far as it affects political life in England is the humanitarian democracy begotten by Puritanism. German religion has been taught to confine itself to the inner life, the family and the personal calling. When religion affects political action in Germany, it is by ecclesiastical considerations rather than by an ethical spirit. It does not appreciate a nation getting angry about Bulgarian or Armenian atrocities or enthusiastic about universal peace especially if the same nation uses these popular excitements to slip its foot a little farther forward in Turkey.

Here Rauschenbusch reveals that he knows the ruinous weakness of Christianity in Germany, the separation between the religious and the ethical. Had this clue been followed, his interpretation might have helped in the regeneration of a Germany moving so swiftly toward 1914 and

Hitler. What is so strange is that he has apparently not discovered the terrible anti-Semitism introduced into Germany fifty years earlier, promoted by Lagarde and Wagner, already published in the volumes of Houston Chamberlain known as the *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* and then being considered by Kaiser Wilhelm.

Instead, the article concludes with

> As for Germany, if a common war with England would draw Russia to her side, cause France to forget her older feud, *and hold out the promise of the world empire which can be gained in no other way, would it not be worth while for Germany?*[10]

Well, I wonder whether even Hitler on the eve of his forty-sixth birthday did not wish that Germany had never been so terribly deceived!

Rauschenbusch knew in 1899 what he put down in 1918,

> . . . the Russian [the old Czarist], Austrian, and Prussian governments *have long been the chief reactionary and anti-democratic forces in European politics.* Their breakdown would certainly release the pent-up energies of liberal aspirations for large classes. . . . This will free the world of one malign force in diplomacy. . . . Germany, by reason of her rapid growth of population, her dangerous geographical position, her successful social organization, and her scientific intelligence has become the chief exponent of the philosophy of expansion and of the anti-democratic idea.

If the friends of Germany who in 1900 knew she was on the path to 1914 and 1939 had warned her instead of making her case so plausible, would Berlin have come to her doom in the spring of 1945?

The second matter requiring comment is Rauschenbusch's attitude toward American education. His biographer informs us that "Vernon Henry Bodein titled a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Yale University, *The Relation of the Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch to Religious Education.*"[11] By 1944, this had, it seems, been reduced to the final chapter in *The Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch and its Relation to Religious Education.* But at the very beginning of the chapter, it is admitted that "Rauschenbusch never worked out in any organized fashion the consequences for religious education of his concept of the Kingdom of God." Only too true. He wrote a volume on social prayers, one on a theology for the social gospel, had prepared a manuscript on hymns of the social awakening, and published a popular commentary on *The Social Principles of Jesus.* What occasions surprise in this exposition of "consequences of Rauschenbusch's thought for religious education" is the brevity of the discussion, the reference to only one article in *Religious Education* by Rauschenbusch, and the failure to make more extensive use of *The Social Principles of Jesus.*

Sharpe adds to this paucity of materials on religious education in the writings of Rauschenbusch his address before a meeting of the Religious

[10] *Watchman,* Nov. 16, 1899, pp. 9-11.

[11] D. R. Sharpe, *op. cit.,* p. 159.

Education Association in Rochester in 1907. But the social prophet's subject was "What Is a Christian Nation?" where part of one sentence might be considered a reference to religious education.

"Secular" education fares better in the amount of emphasis it receives, and the prophet's encounter with the Rochester public school system is played up. The biographer seems to be writing with unction. For me the quotations from Rauschenbusch's report were saddening. For they apparently are subconsciously comparing the German system with the American system to the disadvantage of the latter. The children in America "disrespect authority." American children forty years ago in Rochester "lacked the power of concentration, application, and memorizing." "There are no real standards." It is almost impossible to believe today that one pleading for something like radicalism in the social-economic field made no synthesis between his objective there and in public education. Here there was little appreciation of the American way, no full acceptance of the principle of separation of church and state, slight consideration of the rights of American minority groups, and no recognition that acknowledged membership in all the religious groups taken together still constitutes a minority of the American population. When a ratio of .002 between what a child has learned in Sunday school and his development exists and one of .545 for home-child influence, it is difficult to understand the biographer's pessimism with reference to the greatest glory of the American way, public education. If Rauschenbusch had lived to read Thorndike's *Your City* or the Hartshorne-May investigation or the United States Census of Religious Bodies, 1936, we are convinced he would have written across this criticism of public education in Rochester, "mostly wrong."[12] At any rate we recommend a reading of Ziemer's *Education for Death* and Caldwell-Courtis' *Then and Now* to the biographer and a thoroughgoing revision of pp. 147-150 for the next edition.

Sit down and calculate how many young American lives have been sacrificed to the "discipline" of the German educational system and then prefer it to our American way!

A middle-aged Nazi teacher spoke thus to girls six to fourteen, according to Ziemer:

"Poles," she shouted in utter disgust. "Poles! Czechs! Frenchmen! *Die Englaender!* All equally ugly. They all hate Germany because it is again strong and powerful. But let them hate us. We will show them. They should all be wiped off the face of earth. Beasts. That's what they are. Beasts!"[13]

University and research students in Hitler's day:

His voice rose as he said:

"To prove how we despise [*verachten*] all the cults of the world except the

[12] The author's pamphlet on *Rethinking Released Time*, 1945, contains the facts regarding and the history of this experiment.

[13] Gregor Ziemer, *Education for Death*, p. 92.

ideology of Hitler, we will close the semester with a rite. It will impress on us all that fire and destruction will be the end of those who do not think as we do."

Dramatically he lifted a series of books from his knapsack. He announced their names. The first was a Talmud—"despicable book of a despicable race." He spat on it, and passed it around the circle of students. They spat on it. When the book came back to Franzen, he placed it on a small pile of pine branches, and poured gasoline over it out of a bottle.

Next came a Koran. It received similar treatment. Then followed a copy of the works of Shakespeare; a copy of the Treaty of Versailles; a life of Stalin. The last book was a Bible.

It grew very still there in the forest. Franzen lifted his voice in the Hitler salute, and shouted, "Thus we treat everything that defies us!"

He snapped a cigarette lighter and applied its flame to the heap. Thick black smoke curled into the darkening sky. The group rose and burst into the Deutschland Lied, and the Horst Wessel song.

The semester was ended. So was my desire to see further evidence of the education for death in the Nazi State.[14]

Rauschenbusch as an historian was probably included in Visser 't Hooft's statement, "although the leaders of social thought [in the United States] include many of the foremost Church historians of the country, in this respect [knowledge of the agelong social emphasis in Christianity] they display very little historical insight."

Here is the social prophet's demonstration that the United States is a Christian nation:

> What is a Christian nation? A nation that shows merciful and intelligent helpfulness to the weak and the suffering; that punishes in love and with the purpose to save; that exerts an educational and bracing influence on the individual by its common industrial and political life; that sets men above property and values spiritual and ideal forces as its highest possessions; that founds its community life on the principle of love and solidarity, equality and service; and that is penetrated with a consciousness of God in its national outlook on past, present and future.[15]

But what is specifically Christian about this? Judaism taught it centuries before Christianity was born. The Stoics were thinking in these terms. One can find it in Confucianism. Non-Christian groups in Christian countries have fought for these things against Christian denial of them.

It is very difficult to believe that Walter Rauschenbusch supported the "spiritual kinship theory" of the origin of Baptists. Historically speaking, the Baptists derive from English Congregationalism and originate early in the seventeenth century. Rauschenbusch knew this. Speaking as an historian, he wrote that "Baptists are an offshoot of English Congregationalists." But the economically tame English Congregationalists and Baptists did not have sufficient revolutionary blood in their veins to help much in

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

[15] W. Rauschenbusch in an address before Religious Education Association, 1907; *Proceedings* p. 25.

the propaganda for the American social gospel. Hence, Baptists must be connected with the sixteenth-century Anabaptists of Muenster millenarianism and Moravian communism fame:

> If we consider the Baptists as exponents of a great historical movement, we must go back to the time of Luther and the upheaval of 1525. In Switzerland and Germany they were called Anabaptists. . . . No other religious body has shed so much blood as did these Anabaptist pioneers of *our faith*. . . . *But* beyond that there were forerunners of the Baptists for several hundred years more.[16]

But the Baptist *Philadelphia Confession of Faith* is very closely related to the *Westminster Confession of Faith. Kinship in spirit takes the modern American Baptist back not to Zurich and Hubmaier but to Geneva and Calvin.* The doctrinal affinity of the Baptists is with Dort more than with Denck. The Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Baptists use the *Westminster Confession of Faith* as basis of their theology not the shibboleths of sixteenth-century continental Anabaptists. For that matter, the writings of Martin Luther abound with more of the fundamentals of modern Baptists than do the utterances of Grebel.

As McGlothlin has pointed out, the sixteenth-century Anabaptist leader *who had not previously been a Roman Catholic has not yet been found.* If a social ancestry is necessary for a modern social interpretation of the gospel, why not draw upon the splendid social passion of the mediæval church? Why not be broad enough to include all the glorious souls from Jesus and Clement and St. Francis to Maurice and Washington Gladden and Graham Taylor in the Baptist kin? Indeed, why not begin with the eighth-century Hebrew prophets? As a matter of fact, modern Christian social prophets ultimately begin with Amos and Hosea and Micah of the long ago. Rauschenbusch does!

The spiritual kinship theory is so all-inclusive that it becomes meaningless in its application. It permits every denomination to select its ancestry. In 4241 B.C. there was undoubtedly a rainbow. In 1945 there were hundreds of rainbows. In all instances they resulted from the presence of light and water in the proper relation to each other. But the spray of a city fountain is not the rain from the clouds of heaven and the ancient sunlight is not the modern incandescent light! There is no historical succession between the rainbow of six thousand years ago and the rainbow of today. All genealogical lines are obliterated by arbitrary selection of denominational ancestors on the basis of some similarity in emphasis. Everyone happens to be the son or daughter of his father and his mother, and no amount of wishful thinking can make it otherwise. Investigation might reveal more affinity between immersing Baptists and some nonimmersionist groups. When the church historian abandons denominational

[16] *Baptist Centenary,* Pittsburgh, 1912, p. 77.

genealogy and continuity, he is liable to turn merely remote and offside relatives into great-grandfathers of the family.

The reconstruction of history in the interest of the faith cannot be pardoned even when undertaken by one's dearest friends. Henri Seé in *The Economic Interpretation of History* has pointed out that some of Karl Marx's "history" is "metaphysics" and wonders how one can alter what has been predetermined. Hegelian dialectics and historical process refuse to mix. Philosophy cannot cancel out the facts of history.

The crowning illustration of historical heresy is the social gospel's attempt to fasten a nineteenth-century interpretation of kingdom of God upon a peasant of Galilee.

On p. 22 of Bodein's volume and again on pp. 158 and 159, we are informed that Rauschenbusch's address entitled *Die Geschichte der Idee des Reiches Gottes* has never been published, just as we were informed in *Current Religious Thought* in November, 1943, that "How Rich Have I a Right to Be?" had escaped publication. But the former was published in *Der Sendbote* in September, 1902, and the latter first in the *Examiner* of May 10, 1894, and then elsewhere.

The former address implies that Rauschenbusch felt how modern his interpretation of the kingdom of God was:

> *On the other hand* there was at that time no possibility of a sound work of reformation which would progressively apply the ethical principles of Christianity to the ethical reconstruction of society.
>
> *Then* the coming of the kingdom of God was expected in a sudden catastrophe, in a mechanical jolt of the machine of divine world direction. *Today* the teachings of Jesus, the course of world history, and the observation of the divine elements in nature have taught us that all which is grand *originates in organic process* and that catastrophe only has value in burying what is dead or in bringing one period of development also to its external end.

This essay was published in the official paper of the German Baptists in the United States, *Der Sendbote,* and sometime later Rauschenbusch's intimate friend, F. W. C. Meyer, wrote a series of articles in defense of this very radical reconstruction of the New Testament idea of the kingdom of God. But he was ably answered by an apologist for the original interpretation. The rank and file of ministers of the German Baptist churches never accepted the social gospel reconstruction of Jesus' view of the kingdom. But that did not prevent the social prophet from continuing to insist that "the idea of growth and development of the kingdom of God *is peculiar to Jesus; if I may say so he expresses himself as a modern man.*" The idea of process in the organic sense is as foreign to Jesus as it is axiomatic to even the below average modern man.

III

The study of the American social gospel will reach maturity only after its connections with social Christianity are traced historically. And with Hudson and Reckitt's three-volume work on *The Church and the World* and Reckitt's *Faith and Society* available, one is puzzled by the biographer's neglect of perspective. Only when the Christian mediæval economic synthesis has been discovered and its disintegration by the powers of the modern age studied, only when it is appreciated that Christianity lost control over wealth about 1650 with the rise of economic liberalism, only when we realize how Calvinism fought so hard at Geneva and in Massachusetts to base its economic system on the Old Testament, has one taken the kindergarten course on the background of the social gospel.

Indeed, if one continues in blissful ignorance of how economic liberalism was married to the machine resulting in nineteenth-century industrialization, of how historical method ruined the idea of the inspiration of the scriptures, of how the rise of sociology, the natural sciences, and the psychological and scientific approach to religion played havoc with the older Christian postulates, how can he discern that the American social gospel could not rise until all this had been accomplished?

For when nineteenth-century revivalism and Methodist piety vanished, relief was sought by religious men in the Student Volunteer Movement and the traditional social Christianity on the one hand, but on the other in the attempt to compromise with the spirit of the times through a new synthesis soon known as the American social gospel.

The background of this gospel includes also the English anticapitalist movement, the beginnings of Christian socialism there, and passing over to France some familiarity with the French predecessors of Karl Marx. After that the European Catholic social development needs investigation. Von Ketteler, Bismarck, and Leo XIII cannot be passed by in silence if Rauschenbusch is to be understood. *Rerum Novarum* appeared in 1891, a decade and one half before *Christianity and the Social Crisis.* Rauschenbusch was so influenced by Heath's *The Captive City of God* that he distributed copies to his classes.

A thoroughgoing examination of the files of religious journals in America, 1731-1830, has established interest in peace, slavery, prison reform, improvement of the lot of seamen, temperance, "but the goal of all was the rescue of the individual by an emotional conversion experience rather than any definite application of the teachings of Jesus to a social order."

Channing, Bushnell, Theodore Parker, to mention a few, discussed social issues in very emphatic ways. Moreover, the preamble to the Con-

stitution of Brook Farm Association, 1841, contained: "In order more effectually to promote the great purpose of human culture; to establish the external relations of life on a basis of wisdom and purity; to apply the principles of justice and love to our social organization in accordance with the laws of Divine Providence; to substitute a system of brotherly cooperation for one of selfish competition . . . ."

But the social gospel cannot come to birth until after economic determinism and Darwin's *Origin of Species* have appeared. What is gained by attempting to ignore all this? If Bodein, of the Yale Divinity School, and Abel Burckhardt and Kurt Naumann, of the Union Theological Seminary, arranged for a Dumbarton Oaks conference maybe the main roots of the social gospel could be laid bare.

IV

What, then, is the survival value of the American social gospel?

It seems condemned to isolation from the main movements of twentieth-century Christianity. In England and in Europe the issue is settled. There the social gospel was never accepted by social Christianity. Neither Catholicism nor the historic Protestant churches have adopted Rauschenbusch's concept of the kingdom of God. The majority of the adherents of the popular American churches has never graduated from the fundamentalist kindergarten and has consistently been opposed to the social gospel, awaiting the return of the departed Lord on the clouds of the sky to establish the millennium. Such books as Ernest Gordon's *The Leaven of the Sadducees* should convince any social gospel optimists that there is no hope for the conversion of fundamentalism. The American representatives of the Barthian cult are violently antisocial gospel. American industrialists have now made up their mind. Indeed, even mild social Christianity is on the sidelines. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ has been quite "practical" in its attitude toward social problems and yet under constant attack.

We have alluded to the fact that with the closing of the American geographical frontier about 1890, revivalism rapidly disintegrated. The Moody trend gave birth to the eschatologically based Student Volunteer Movement, whose slogan was "the evangelization of the world in this generation," with the proof text found in Matthew 24: 14, "And this gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations; *and then shall the end come.*" All Japan was to have been converted by 1900, becoming the spearhead of the Christianization of all Asia. The leaders of this movement have gone social now, but the various Protestant denominations insist upon continuing upon the older basis. Hence,

the foreign support for social Christianity that seemed assured a decade and one half ago may be slight.

And pleas for a "regenerated social gospel" are appearing. Petersmann, for example, urges the social gospelers to return to the eschatological interpretation of history by adopting the "justificational view of human life."

> If what Rauschenbusch saw is true, namely, that modern Christianity has lost its sense of the social factor in Christian ethics, it is no less true that all Christian activity, social as well as private or individual, must come forth from the solitary act which the Bible calls regeneration. This is the presupposition of a new social order.[17]

It is an illusion to believe the world can be made over! The new social gospel will be a synthesis between Lutheran conservatism and Calvinistic activism! Preach the Word! Convert the world to Christianity! Do they ever learn anything?

One of the leaders in the American social gospel movement was George D. Herron, for years a very prominent and influential Middle West preacher, popular with college and divinity-school students, churches, forums, covering the country from the Atlantic to the Pacific, preaching that the kingdom was at hand, and courageous enough to join the socialist party. Exceedingly serious and interpreting himself as a kind of Messiah, Herron profoundly influenced Charles Sheldon whose *In His Steps* ran to over twenty-three million copies, was translated into twenty-one foreign languages, and attained motion picture recognition, and Ralph Albertson who established the Christian Commonwealth Community of Georgia and the propaganda magazine, *Social Gospel.* Herron also founded the Rand School of Social Science and played a significant rôle in connection with Woodrow Wilson's efforts during the world war, as well as at the peace conference, and finally propagated his views abroad after that war.

Through the years he had become convinced that it was unfair to Jesus to transform him into a twentieth-century man. In 1910, Herron therefore abandoned Christian phraseology, stating very honestly that "Jesus' view of life was inadequate to the social revolution" of the twentieth century. Believing intensely in the objectives of the social gospelers, he knew they could not sincerely be based upon the New Testament concept of the kingdom of God, because for the early church the kingdom of God was "principally in the future and wholly in the realm of miracle," and simply could not be identified with the twentieth-century developmental theory. Organic evolution was utterly alien to the thinking of the early church. Symbolic interpretations may produce new affections with great expulsive power which last a while, but the subsequent internal disintegration dooms all such evangelism to utter failure.

[17] *Bibliotheca Sacra,* January, 1931, p. 17.

At this late date, however, the social gospel could hardly retrace its steps and begin *de novo* on an historical interpretation of the kingdom of God. Moreover, the moment it did, the cry of "secularization" would be raised, dooming it to oblivion.

Could the social gospelers be satisfied with this conception of social Christianity: "We stand in humility before the unsearchable judgments of God. We look in hope for the final triumph of His purposes beyond the vicissitudes of this earthly life. We know the infinite love of God revealed in *His present Kingdom, the church.* We labor for that society which is more in harmony with justice and the good life"?[18] To do so would mean apostasy from the original social gospel.

Writing a decade after Rauschenbusch's death, a European analyst concluded:

> The social gospel as an aggressive movement setting out to change the fundamental structure of society has (as yet) little progress to record. The hopes of the first generation of social Christians have to this extent been disappointed. But the social gospel as a movement of religious thought has made a most amazing progress and found its ways into all realms of the intellectual and spiritual life of American Christianity.[19]

Has the social gospel thus fulfilled its mission? Will it be remembered for its inspirational power? Will its shibboleths continue to summon youth to the task of reconstruction?

Since the word *gospel* as early as 1652 acquired the meaning of something serving as "guide to human action"; by 1790 had become "a doctrine preached with fervor as a means of social and political action"; and was used by Carlyle as "gospel of economy," its application to the social-economic area of life will probably survive. Since Christianity has always had a social emphasis and must increasingly have one if it is not to vanish before the social reconstruction twentieth-century governments must practice, the failure of the attempt to fasten a twentieth-century scientific idea upon the teachings of Jesus need not cause too much pessimism. The ethical principles of the Hebrew prophets, of Jesus, and of Christianity matter, and they are in the stream of American life.

[18] C. C. Richardson, "Christian Understanding of History," in *Christendom,* Autumn, 1941, p. 548.

[19] Visser 't Hooft, *The Background of the Social Gospel in America,* p. 31.

A DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT FOR THE MODERN WORLD

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IN DEALING with this subject, on which I was asked to prepare a paper,[1] I have adopted the following method. After a general historical introduction I shall give a brief account of a few significant and comparatively recent treatises, representing views different from my own, and then utilize them in the exposition of the theory that seems to me best adapted to meet the needs of the modern world.

Under the influence of Calvin it was for a long time customary for Protestant theologians to distinguish three different phases of the work of Christ, his work as prophet, priest, and king. These three phases of his work were called his threefold office or his three offices. His priestly office coincided with what we call his atoning work. There is, however, a question whether the word "atoning" as well as "priestly" would not better be dispensed with insofar as they apply to a special phase of his ministry or mission. His work as a whole was a unit. The threefold division of it is artificial and of little pedagogical value. Then, too, the word "atoning" and its corresponding verb and noun have misleading associations and are the source of much confusion in popular religious thought. If other less disputable terms could be substituted for them, the situation might be improved. But since this would hardly be practicable, there is urgent need of moralizing, spiritualizing, and clarifying the idea of atonement.

In thus reinterpreting the term it is important to distinguish between what is called the "fact" and the "theory" of the atonement. By "fact" is, of course, not meant the bare physical fact of Jesus' death. This in and of itself would constitute no atonement. It is the spiritual interpretation of the fact that alone gives to it religious significance. By the fact of the atonement, then, is meant its basic truth, its simple, immediate religious import. We mean by it the gracious work of Christ on our behalf, the revelation of the redeeming love of God in and through the life and death of Christ, the self-sacrifice of Christ as a divine act expressive of the divine forgiving grace. In this sense of the term the fact of the atonement is the very heart of the gospel. It differs from the theory of the atonement in much the same way as Emil Brunner's "Word of God" does from his "doctrine of the church." It is the vital and essential part of the atonement, and in the case of the great body of Christians is held without any clearly defined theory. The doctrine or theory of the atonement is quite secondary.

[1] This paper was prepared for the American Theological Society.

But it has often received undue attention and has been regarded by many as essential to any real belief in the atonement. Fact and theory have been identified with each other, and the result has been much misunderstanding and needless controversy.

The distinction between the atonement as fact and as theory is, it is true, not absolute. More or less theory is implicit in what is called the "fact" of the atonement. But the distinction between the "factual" or religious interpretation of atonement and its theoretical or doctrinal interpretation is sufficiently clear for practical purposes; and from this point of view it is important, no matter what one may think of the use of the word "fact" in this connection. Theories of the atonement have usually sought to explain and justify the traditional Christian belief, but in doing so they have often complicated the subject in such a way as to render it still more obscure and dubious.

In the history of the doctrine of the atonement it is customary to distinguish three different periods or three different types of thought. And for the benefit of readers who may have forgotten their history of doctrine, it may be well to say a word about each of these periods or types of thought before taking up the main theme of the paper. The first period, that of the early church, covered a thousand years and is usually referred to as the Greek or patristic period. With reference to its teaching there is some difference of opinion. The common view is that we owe to it no significant theory or type of thought with respect to the atonement. The so-called *ransom* theory had wide vogue, but its notion of a bargain with Satan was so crude that it has been generally repudiated since the eleventh century. It impresses the modern mind as mythological rather than theological. The *recapitulation* idea of Irenæus, it is true, represented a much higher intellectual level and exerted a profound influence on the theology of the early church. But it was vague and mystical, and so closely bound up with the doctrine of the incarnation that it did not constitute a favorable soil for the development of a distinctive and independent doctrine of the atonement. The prevailing opinion, consequently, is that reflection on this doctrine in the early church was relatively unimportant. But in recent years it has been argued that this is a serious mistake, and that back of the crude dualism and vague mysticism of Greek-Christian thought there was a conception of the atonement, which "has a clear and distinct character of its own," and which is entitled to be called the "classic" type. Of this we shall have more to say later.

According to the generally accepted and, I believe, correct view the great creative period in the history of the doctrine of the atonement was that inaugurated by Anselm in the eleventh century. The theory of the atonement then achieved for itself a place comparable in importance to

that accorded the Trinitarian and Christological theories of the early church. It assumed three main forms: the Anselmic theory of satisfaction, the penal theory of the Reformers, and the governmental theory of Grotius. These three theories differed from each other in some important respects, but they represented the same general point of view insofar as they were forensic in character and found the primary obstacle to man's redemption, not in Satan and other evil spirits, but in the nature of God or in his function as Ruler. This point of view was characteristic of the Latin, as distinguished from the earlier Greek, theories. It was not in any of its main forms officially sanctioned as an article of faith, but it became virtually the orthodox doctrine of both the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches and is still widely held to be such.

Opposed to this Latin or forensic type of theory is the moral or personal type with its emphasis not on the Godward but on the manward side of the atonement. First formulated as an independent theory by Abelard in the twelfth century, it was rejected by the church. But in modern times it was revived, and under the influence of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and others gained wide currency, becoming the dominant theory in progressive theological circles, so that it is frequently referred to as the modern theory of the atonement. The older type of theory, however, continued in vogue in conservative circles and of late has undergone something of a revival. Various attempts have also been made to combine it with some form of the moral theory. This situation has lent a new interest to the doctrine of the atonement, and given a certain timeliness to its discussion.

The Dualistic Type

Turning now to our main objective, that of defining a doctrine of atonement for the modern world, I begin with a process of elimination. And first no doctrine in my opinion can meet contemporary needs, which finds the meaning of the atonement in the triumph of Christ over cosmic powers of evil such as Satan, sin, and death, to which man is subject. This dualistic view, insofar as it involved the crude idea of a bargain with Satan, was rejected by Anselm and quite generally by later theologians. But divested of the notion of a transaction with Satan the idea of a conflict between Christ and superhuman powers of evil lingered in the church and in recent times has gained some currency in theological circles. The most explicit and significant development of it in connection with the doctrine of the atonement is that by Bishop Aulén in his book entitled in its English translation *Christus Victor.*

Aulén contends that the conception of Christ as victor over Satan, sin, and death was the basic and dominant idea in the soteriology of primitive Christianity and in that of the church for a thousand years thereafter. It

was supplanted by the Latin or forensic theory in the theology of the Middle Ages and of scholastic Protestantism, but it continued to have a place in the hymns and liturgy of the mediæval church and was revived by Luther with greater vigor and depth of treatment than it had previously received. In view of this long history and especially in view of its conspicuous place in the New Testament, it has, according to Aulén, every right to the title which he has given it, that of "the classic Christian idea of the atonement." It may be incidentally noted that he speaks of it as an "idea," not a theory, though he occasionally applies the word "doctrine" to it. As compared with this "classic" idea or doctrine the Latin or legal type, we are told, is "really a side-track in the history of Christian dogma—admittedly of vast importance and influence, but still only a side-track" (p. 31). Between it and its rival, the subjective or moral theory, a war of attrition has been going on for upwards of two centuries "with no prospect of victory on either side." "And now," Aulén adds, "it is becoming clearer with every year that passes that they both belong to the past " (p. 162).

In expounding the "classic" or patristic idea or doctrine of the atonement, Aulén emphasizes its dualistic background, its objectivity, the superhuman reality of sin, death, and Satan, its own cosmic range and "dramatic" character, the conception of the atonement as primarily "a movement of God to man," the continuity of the divine operation in the atonement without any intervention even of Christ as "man," the representation of God as both reconciler and reconciled, the spontaneous and unmotivated character of the divine love, and "the contrasts or opposites which defy rational systematisation" (p. 172), and make it next to "impossible to construct a rationally consistent theory of the atonement" (p. 75). To these points of interest others might be added, but that is unnecessary for our present purpose. In substance the doctrine is this, that "God in Christ combats and prevails over the tyrants which hold mankind in bondage," and that "God thereby becomes reconciled with the world, the enmity is taken away, and a new relation between God and mankind is established" (p. 72).

Two things in particular, it seems to me, disqualify this doctrine for any wide acceptance in the modern world. One is its professed dualism, and the other its self-confessed irrationalism. Its dualism is out of harmony with a thoroughgoing Christian theism and with modern metaphysical individualism. Such abstract and impersonal universals as sin and death cannot be objectified in such a way as to become concrete realities to the modern mind. The age of Platonic or pseudo-Platonic realism belongs to the past. And as for theological irrationalism, if it were to be generally adopted, it would, in my opinion, mean the bankruptcy of Christian theology. A theology that feeds on philosophical skepticism will perish

thereby. For the doctrine under consideration I see, therefore, no future except as a metaphorical expression of the Christian's victory over the world. And for this a more concrete and realistic mode of expression would, I think, as a rule be preferable.

The Forensic Type

Another elimination that I find it necessary to make in the present connection is that of any theory which bases the need of atonement, not on a cosmic dualism, but on a dualism within the divine nature. This dualism takes the form of a conflict between the divine love or mercy, on the one hand, and the divine honor or justice or rectoral responsibility, on the other hand. It is assumed that along with the divine mercy there is a resisting element in the divine nature which stands in the way of the forgiveness of sin and which must be removed by an atoning act before the redemption of man can be effected. Indeed, the atoning act is itself man's redemption, though its application to or appropriation by the individual is regarded as conditioned in one way or another. The fundamental idea underlying this type of theory is the absolute sanctity and authority of the moral law as law. The administration of the law is differently conceived. Some regard it as implying strict retributive justice, punishment commensurate with the gravity of the offense. Others look upon it as fulfilled by some act of "satisfaction" which is accepted in lieu of the full punishment. And still others hold that the requirements of the moral law are to be determined by considerations of public welfare. But in each instance it is the sanctity of the moral law that is to be maintained. And hence this type of theory is called forensic or legalistic.

This forensic type is so well known that I need not further elaborate it. It will suffice if I point out two or three familiar and fundamental objections to it. One is the abstract, mechanical, and impersonal way in which it deals with the ideas of merit, guilt, and punishment. Merit is acquired by Christ and transferred to others; and the guilt of others and the punishment due them are transferred to Christ and borne by him. All this, taken literally, is fictitious. Merit and guilt are inalienable from personality. They cannot be detached from one person and transferred to another. Nor can one person morally be punished in place of another. The whole idea of ethical substitution is immoral, and so also is the idea of a penal example.

In the next place, it is obvious that in its strictly objective and substitutionary form the forensic theory leads logically to antinomianism. If Christ by his life and death paid the full penalty of sin, there is no valid ground for requiring anything further in the way of repentance or moral obedience as a condition of forgiveness. Indeed, there is no longer any

need of forgiveness at all. The debt is paid; the penalty is exacted, and there is, consequently, nothing to forgive. So the atonement instead of being necessary to forgiveness makes forgiveness logically unnecessary.

Again, it may be noted that the forensic theory assumes a sub-Christian conception of Deity. It represents God as a kind of feudal Overlord, or as a stern Judge, or as Governor of a state. In the first instance his free personality is limited by his supposed dignity or honor, in the second by abstract justice, and in the third by the exigencies of public policy. All three conceptions fall short of the fully personal and Christian conception of God as Father.

Despite these and other criticisms, that would seem logically decisive, the type of theory under consideration has persisted down to the present and has been ably defended over against the various forms of the moral theory. Perhaps as well known and representative a defense of it, as we have had in recent years, is that by Emil Brunner in *The Mediator* (1927; English translation, 1934). Brunner endorses the objective "transactional" conception of the atonement in essentially its "classic" or patristic as well as its Latin and forensic form. The cross, he tells us, is both "the vicarious endurance of the penalty of sin" and "an expiatory sacrifice." It is "the expiatory and substitutionary sacrificial oblation." As such, it presupposes an "impassable gulf" between God and man, a mutual "enmity" between them. Sin is "an attack on God's honor," and hence "provokes the wrath of God." To remove his wrath punishment in some form is necessary. "The divine law requires that sin should receive its corresponding penalty from God. God cannot approach man as though there were no block of stone, as though no block of stone had made the way impassable between us and him" (p. 446). For "the Law is the backbone, the skeleton, the granite foundation of the world of thought" (p. 458). And Law calls for punishment, not forgiveness, from God. To say that man ought to forgive is ethical; but to say that God ought to forgive is "in the highest degree nonethical," indeed "impious." In taking this position Brunner does not mean to exclude love or mercy from the essential nature of Deity, but he does think he finds in the divine law or justice a basis for the belief in the necessity of an "objective" atonement. And in so doing he falls in line with the Anselmic tradition.

He differs, however, in one important respect from Anselm. The latter based his theory on logical argumentation, which he believed would be convincing even to Jews and pagans. Brunner's position, on the other hand, is almost the direct reverse of this. He denies the possibility of a rational theory of the atonement. For him the last word in the doctrine of the divine grace is the sovereign and inscrutable will of God. The cross of Christ defies human understanding. It is "the fulfilment of the scriptural

revelation of God in its most paradoxical incomprehensible guise." It is "the unfathomable mystery of God." What began as a rational theory with Anselm is thus an irrational and unintelligible mystery or paradox with Brunner.

Irrationalism is thus added to the false abstractions, the inconsistencies, the dualism, and other defects of the traditional forensic theory to make it all the more "intolerable to the modern mind," to use Brunner's words. The cross, he says, is "the nonmodern, antimodern gospel of the Bible." This change from Anselm to Brunner illustrates the common course of dogmatic Christianity. The rational becomes in a later age irrational, the irrational becomes a sacred mystery, and the sacred mystery becomes the refuge of a reactionary theology, no longer able to maintain itself in the open court of reason and of conscience.

A Mediating Theory

We are not yet, however, through with the Anselmic type of theory. Many have felt that despite its serious defects it had permanent values that can be combined with some form of the moral theory. Various mediating theories have, consequently, been developed. Of these the most noteworthy is probably that associated with the names of J. McLeod Campbell (*The Nature of the Atonement,* 1856) and R. C. Moberly (*Atonement and Personality,* 1901), and accepted in principle by Vincent Taylor in his three recent treatises: *Jesus and His Sacrifice* (1937), *The Atonement in New Testament Teaching* (1940), and *Forgiveness and Reconciliation* (1941).

The novel and significant thing in this mediating theory is the substitution of the idea of vicarious penitence for that of vicarious punishment. Jonathan Edwards had said that atonement for sin required either an equivalent punishment or an equivalent sorrow and repentance.[2] The latter alternative he did not himself take seriously, but about a century later it commended itself to McLeod Campbell "as higher and more excellent" than the first, "being a moral and spiritual satisfaction." So Campbell developed the theory that the essence of Christ's atoning work consists in his "expiatory confession of our sins." This phrasing did not quite satisfy R. C. Moberly, who substituted for it "the vicarious penitence" of Christ on the ground that the latter expression brings out more clearly and unequivocally "the identity of Christ with humanity and of humanity with Christ." The difference between the two men, however, at this point and in general is not significant. Along with their common emphasis on the subjective aspect of the atonement they both conceived of Christ as in a realistic sense representative of or identical with mankind. They also maintained that by virtue of this unique relation to the race the perfect confession or penitence

[2] *The Works of President Edwards,* Vol. VIII, pp. 500-503.

of Christ was a vicarious offering or sacrifice to God. In this way they conserve the "objective" aspect of the atonement.

Vincent Taylor accepts in the main this theory and supports it by a thorough study of the relevant biblical material. There are, he argues, vicarious, sacrificial, and representative elements in the New Testament teaching concerning the atonement which cannot be disregarded or explained away and which are best interpreted in the light of such a fusion of the subjective and objective points of view as Campbell and Moberly have given us.

Their synthesis, however, seems to me untenable for two main reasons. First, it is involved in serious moral confusion by attributing vicarious penitence or vicarious confession of sin to a sinless person. If the penitence is personal and real, it implies the guilt of the penitent. To attribute penitence to a sinless person is as irrational as it would be to punish such a person for the guilt and sins of others. On the other hand, if by penitence is meant simply the reproduction in imagination of what one believes the penitence of sinful men in general ought to be, we no longer have true penitence. We have merely a sympathetic substitute for it, and this is totally different from New Testament repentance. It would constitute no ground for the forgiveness either of one's own sins or the sins of others. The perfect and vicarious penitence ascribed to Christ is, therefore, as much of a fiction as his vicarious endurance of punishment.

Equally untenable is the identification of Christ with humanity, "not generically but inclusively," an identification akin to that of a logical universal, so that it might be said of him that he was not only *a* man but Man. This sort of metaphysical identity of an individual man with the universal of humanity has for me no intelligible meaning. The idea of "a race man" is a fiction, and if applied realistically to Christ, would depersonalize him and destroy his moral individuality. The vague talk we hear about "the solidarity of the race" and "the solidarity of Christ with the race" does not relieve the difficulty at this point. The only intelligible solidarity or identification of Christ with humanity is that of sympathy and love; and this leaves his personality metaphysically distinct and individual, as all true personality must be.

The theory of vicarious penitence as a synthesis of the rival forensic and moral theories, consequently, fails. And the same may be said of every other mediating theory which retains any essential and distinctive feature of the objective and transactional type. Mediating theories that combine mutually inconsistent points of view may in an age of transition serve a practical purpose. They may cushion the change from the old to the new. But they are in danger of leading to verbal jugglery and serious confusion of thought. There has been and still is a great deal of this in

works on the atonement. In reading many of these one is reminded of a remark once made by Abelard concerning Anselm. Anselm, he said, "kindled a fire, not to give light, but to fill the house with smoke."

The Moral Type

Having eliminated the patristic, Latin, and mediating theories as in principle invalid, we turn now to the one remaining type, the moral or personal. Here we have a change of method, a change from the abstract to the empirical.

The theories thus far considered have to a large extent been abstract and artificial creations, unrelated to our concrete moral life. Take, for instance, *justice.* It has been conceived as an abstract something which demands full punishment or satisfaction for violation of the moral law and persists in this demand despite the violator's sincere repentance and reformation. Past sins, it is said, cannot be cancelled by later obedience. They stand as a permanent charge against us on the books of justice. Then, too, *sin* has been defined in such an impersonal and abstract way that it corresponds very imperfectly with the moral experience of mankind. "You have not yet," said Anselm, "fully weighed the gravity of sin." But its gravity, as he conceived and grounded it, finds no spontaneous response in the unsophisticated Christian conscience. In the abstract, sin may be described as the love of unrighteousness and as hostility to God. But to ascribe to morally imperfect men in general a conscious and deliberate love of evil and hatred of God would border on hysteria. *Penalty,* also, has been turned into something so abstract that it may be transferred to an innocent person and may justly be exacted twice, once from the Redeemer and then again from the sinner. The traditional theories of the atonement have thus been constructed out of illicit abstractions. Mechanical relations have taken the place of personal relations. Moral persons have been treated as though they were nonmoral things. The result has been a series of "frigid juristic speculations, lifeless and life-destroying, the despair of reason and the opprobrium of faith."[3]

Some of these speculations might conceivably have a measure of justification, if applied to superhuman beings of perfect knowledge and complete self-control. Among such ideal angelic beings sin might possibly imply such a fixity of evil purpose as to exclude the possibility of forgiveness except through some supermoral or nonmoral intervention of Deity. What the implications of justice would be under such conditions, we do not know. And there is no reason why theology should concern itself with them. Nor is there any reason why it should concern itself with such evil cosmic powers as sin, death, and the devil are at times represented to be, except

[3] B. P. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 140.

to disprove their objective reality or dispel the fear of them. Our present concern is with the human world, with weak, wayward, ignorant, and sinning men, with their moral education, with their salvation from sin, and with their membership in the kingdom of God. It is from the standpoint of this imperfect and developing world, from the standpoint of humanity as the growing family of God, that the atonement is to be understood. The proper approach to it is, therefore, practical and empirical, not abstract and speculative.

This is a point of fundamental importance. It vacates all attempts to ground the necessity of the atonement in abstract justice or abstract government or abstract penitence. There is nothing in concrete and truly moral justice or government or penitence that implies the existence of a superhuman obstacle to man's redemption. As I have said elsewhere,

> The only real barrier to human salvation has always been in man himself, and the barrier has been one that could be removed only by spiritual means. No ransom, no appeasement of the divine anger, no satisfaction of the divine justice, no vicarious punishment, no penal example was ever necessary to open the way to man's forgiveness. The theology of the past, in so far as it busied itself with theories of this kind, was beside the mark. It was engaged with fictitious problems. Man's redemption, so far as God himself is concerned, has always been possible. No change in the divine nature or will was ever necessary. There never was any need of reconciling God to the world. The only restraint ever imposed upon the divine redemptive purpose was that growing out of the wayward will of finite spirits, and the only real problem connected with man's redemption has been that of his moral transformation. How can man be reconciled to God and his wayward will changed? This is the only question of vital import in connection with the atonement; and it is from this point of view that the death of Christ should be interpreted. We should approach it from the standpoint of moral and spiritual dynamics; and if we do so, we shall find in it two great sources of regenerative power: the perfect revelation of the divine love and righteousness and a profoundly moving example of absolute faithfulness to duty. It is here that we have the key to the cross. Not its Godward or Satanward but its manward side is the all-important thing.[4]

The theory, thus summarily stated, is to be distinguished from the "moral influence" theory and what is sometimes called more or less disdainfully "exemplarism." The words *influence* and *example*, when taken by themselves, suggest a more or less external and impersonal relation between Christ and the believer. And what is more serious, they contain no direct reference to the revelation of the divine love and righteousness, which is the chief source of the inspiring and redeeming power of the cross. "God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us" (Rom. 5:8). "The love of Christ constraineth us; for we thus judge that . . . he died for all, that they who live should no longer live unto themselves but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again" (II Cor. 5:14 ff.).

[4] A. C. Knudson, *The Doctrine of Redemption*, pp. 369 f.

It is this aspect of the death of Christ that alone gives to it profound moral and religious significance. No theory of the atonement, whatever it may be called, is adequate that does not give due recognition to this fact. The atonement must be interpreted in the light of the incarnation, whose "purpose and cause," as Abelard said,

> was that he might illuminate the world by his wisdom and excite it to the love of himself. . . . Our redemption, therefore, is that supreme love of Christ shown to us by his passion, which not only frees us from slavery to sin, but acquires for us true liberty of the sons of God . . . so that kindled by so great a benefit of divine grace, charity should not be afraid to endure anything for his sake.[5]

This may be called the classical form of the moral theory. It stands midway between the mythological and legalistic theories, on the one hand, and the superficial humanistic theories, on the other.

Underlying this type of theory there are three fundamental truths that may here be noted. One is that God, since he is the Creator of the world and of mankind, is, as Bowne used to say, "the most deeply obligated being in the universe." He is the chief of burden bearers. It is his duty to be such. It is his duty to take account of the natural limitations of men and deal with them accordingly. It is his duty to judge them by the main direction and tendency of their lives instead of by their actual achievements viewed from the standpoint of the moral ideal. It is his duty to take the will for the deed and to forgive the truly penitent. Any other conception of his character would be unworthy of the Christian faith.

A second truth underlying the moral or empirical theory is that the morally good and the morally evil cannot be permanently treated alike. A distinction must be made between them. If this were not done, there would be no moral order, no moral universe. The moral nature demands that a different attitude be taken toward the wicked from what is taken toward the righteous. No legal or mystical device can alter this fact. The wicked, who persist in their wickedness, cannot in God's sight be treated as though they were righteous. He cannot forgive them. The problem of forgiveness resolves itself, therefore, into the question as to how the unrighteous can be made righteous. This is the only way that God can forgive, namely, by the moral transformation of the sinner.

A third truth to be noted in the present connection is that forgiveness has to do with the removal of the divine displacence rather than with the cancelling of the natural organic consequences of sin. This fact has often been overlooked. Many people have seen in forgiveness an assurance of salvation from the penalty of sin rather than from sin itself. The result has been that they have come to think of the atonement as relaxing the stringent necessity of personal righteousness and encouraging them to "sin

[5] Quoted by H. Rashdall, *The Idea of the Atonement in Christian Theology*, pp. 358 f.

bravely." Insofar as this led to moral indifference, it was obviously a perversion of the divine grace. True forgiveness means moral earnestness, not moral laxity. It means salvation from sin, not from its organic consequences. These consequences are rooted in the divine order, and cannot be canceled either with or without atonement. They may in many instances be overcome through discipline and the healing and restoring processes of God. But the future will never be wholly free from the effects of one's sinful past; and it ought not be. The divine displacence may be removed; it is removed by the divine forgiveness. But the evil effects of sin persist in one form or another as a solemn warning that "God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." In the light of this law of the moral order it is doubtful if credence can be accorded the theory, suggested by Josiah Royce, that the "atoning work of Christ was for Christian feeling a deed that was made possible only through man's sin, but that somehow was so wise and so rich and so beautiful and divinely fair that, after this work was done, the world was a better world than it would have been had *man* never sinned."[6] Whatever may be true of "Christian feeling," there certainly is no empirical evidence to support such a theory, and its speculative basis is at least precarious. It suggests the Calvinistic idea that sin like suffering has an instrumental and beneficent function in the divine plan.

It is commonly said that the doctrine of the atonement presupposes the doctrine of the Trinity. In the traditional theology this was obviously true. But it is not at present quite so self-evident. The doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ have been undergoing revision, and this has affected to some extent the relation of the doctrine of the atonement to them. The social interpretation of the Trinity, for instance, is less commonly held. It tends too strongly toward tritheism. More emphasis is being placed on the unity of God. It is the personality *of* God rather than personality *in* God that is now enlisting the interest of the church. The three Persons of the Trinity are, consequently, less distinctly a presupposition of the atonement than heretofore.

The two-nature doctrine of the Person of Christ has also been gradually giving way to a more unitary conception of his personality. At first this took the form of the kenotic theory. According to it the incarnation was an act of supreme self-sacrifice on the part of both Father and Son, and as such its "wondrous nature and subduing magnitude" made a powerful appeal to many minds. But further reflection has cast doubt on the metaphysical possibility and ethical justification of such an act of self-depotentiation. Indeed, the whole idea of a depotentiated deity has with many come to savor of mythology rather than theology. So the tendency

[6] Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 320.

has been to transfer the ego or personal centre of Christ's personality from his divine to his human nature and to find the ground of his divinity not in his *substantial* unity with Deity but in his filial consciousness and in his unique dependence upon God. This is what I call "the consciousness and dependence theory" of the Person of Christ. In conformity with this theory, which has its roots in the teaching of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, the death of Christ is a revelation or symbol, though not merely a symbol, of the eternal sacrificial love of God. And as such its theological significance is not dependent on the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas, as traditionally formulated. But it is nevertheless true that the essential *religious* idea underlying these dogmas is virtually the same as that expressed by the doctrine of the atonement. The Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement are all from the practical point of view symbols of the eternal and holy love of God, in which the Christian hope for mankind is grounded; and in this respect they are all involved in each other.

The special point to be here noted with respect to the sacrificial love of God is that it does not imply suffering due to any resisting element in the divine nature or in the superhuman or subhuman world. The suffering of God has its source in love itself, in sorrow over the waywardness of his own children, not in any limitation of his own being or power. In this sense of the term he may be said to be "impassible," as the early church fathers affirmed him to be. His suffering is not conditioned by metaphysical necessities either within or without him. It is inherent in the divine love itself and is, therefore, as eternal as God himself. The divine love, in short, is sacrificial in its nature. This truth was symbolized, as we have said, by the death of Christ and symbolized by it immeasurably more effectively than by any other martyr's death because of his own moral perfection, because of his unique relation to God, and because of the providential historical circumstances under which his death occurred. It took place "in the fullness of time."

In thus emphasizing the eternity of the divine sacrificial love and the revelational or symbolical character of the atonement I do not mean to leave the impression that the sacrificial, substitutionary, and "representative" language of the New Testament should be discarded and that the traditional forensic theories had no value. The latter were based on the profound conviction that sin is so serious a matter that it cannot be arbitrarily forgiven; certain moral conditions must be met. But they expressed this conviction so imperfectly that we can no longer accept them as literally true. They may, however, continue to be employed as metaphors.

The same is to be said of the sacrificial and substitutionary ideas in scripture. How these ideas came to be applied to the death of Christ is not difficult to understand. The conception of a crucified Messiah was so novel

and scandalous, when it was first proclaimed, that it required explanation. And the most natural explanation under existing conditions was that he died, not for his own sins, but for the sins of others. It was also inevitable, in view of contemporary religious life and thought, that the language of sacrifice should be applied to his death. Then, too, the representative character of his death was naturally suggested by the belief in his Messiahship. These and other biblical ideas, taken literally, have led to serious errors and much confused thinking. But like the forensic and other transactional theories they may be retained as figurative descriptions of the actual moral and spiritual ministry of Christ. In his sense of divine mission and in his vicarious, as distinguished from penal, suffering they find their true meaning. Hence no radical change is necessary in the traditional language of Christian worship and in the accepted liturgy of the church.

When, however, the language of emotion and devotion gives way to that of precise exposition, it is of prime importance that the doctrine of the atonement be presented in an unmistakably moral, spiritual, and personal form. This applies also to Christian theology as a whole. Theology needs to be released from its long bondage to Platonic or pseudo-Platonic realism with its misleading abstractions, and be reinterpreted in the light of a concrete, empirical, and moral personalism. It is in this direction that the main stream of progressive Christian thought has been moving during the past century and a half, and it is in this direction that I believe it will continue to move.

There will be reactionary currents every now and then, as at present; and they may serve a temporary purpose as correctives of a one-sided moralism and rationalism. But in the long run reason and conscience will have the right of way in theology as well as elsewhere. And this will mean a moral and rational theory of the atonement. None other, I am persuaded, can meet the needs of the modern world.

A CYLINDER OF NEBUCHADREZZAR FROM BABYLON

ALBRECHT GOETZE

Yale University

I

The cylinder here published forms part of the small collection of Babylonian antiquities owned by Crozer Theological Seminary and bears the number 6. Thanks for the permission to publish it are due to President E. E. Aubrey and Professor J. B. Pritchard.

About half of the original cylinder has survived. Its present height is 143 mm. and its largest diameter about 90 mm. In its original condition it contained two columns of script. The second column is largely preserved, of the first only scant fragments remain. The original length of the cylinder was about 220 mm.

No exact duplicate of the Crozer cylinder has been published so far.

II

From the following it will become evident that the cylinder was inscribed by Nebuchadrezzar II, king of Babylon (605-562 B.C.), the same who captured and destroyed Jerusalem. The text of the surviving part of the cylinder is given on plates 1 and 2.

Here a transliteration and translation are offered on opposite pages.

[Introductory remark: The following abbreviations are used in this paper: *AJSL=American Journal of Semitic Languages; An.Or.=Analecta Orientalia; BASOR=Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research; CT=Cuneiform Texts in the British Museum; JNES=Journal of Near Eastern Studies; JRAS=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society; MAOG=Mitteilungen der Altorientalischen Gesellschaft; MDOG=Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft; OIAS=Oriental Institute Assyriological Studies; Or.=Orientalia; OLZ=Orientalistische Literatur Zeitung; RA=Revue d'Assyriologie; VAB=Vorderasiatische Bibliothek; VS=Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler; WVDOG=Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichung der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft; YBT=Yale Oriental Series, Babylonian Texts.* The transliterations follow Thureau-Dangin and avoid the positing of new values.]



PLATE 1

PLATE 2

I 1 [^{d}*Na-bi-um-ku-du-úr-ri-ú-ṣú-ur šar Bāb-ili*]^{ki}
2 [*ru-ba-a-am na-a-dam i-tu-ut ku-un li-ib-bi*] ^{d}*Marduk*
3 [*re-é-a-um ki-i-num mu-uš-te-ši-ir aš-ra-a-ti* ^{d}*Na-bi-um mu-ṭi-*]*ib li-ib-bi-šu-un*
4 [*iš-ša-ak-ku ṣi-i-ri ša a-na zi-in-na-a-ti É-sag-il*]*a ù É-zi-da*
5 [*u$_4$-mi-ša-am ti-iṣ-mu-*]*ru-ú-ma*
6 [*da-am-qá-a-ti Bāb-ili*^{ki} *ù Ba-ar-sí-pa*^{ki} *iš-te-ni-i'*]*-ù ka-a-a-nam*
7 [*e-em-qá mu-ut-né-en-nu-ù za-ni-in É-sag-ila ù É-zi-d*]*a*
8 [*aplu reštû ša* ^{d}*Nabû-apla-ú-ṣu-úr šar Bāb-ili*^{ki} *a-na-ku*][1]
(rest of column I lost)

II 1 *ša ma-na-ma šarru ma-aḫ-ri la i-pú-šu ab-ni-ma ú-uš-zi-iz*
2 *a-na ki-da$_4$-a-nim Im-gu-úr-*^{d}*Ellil i-ta-a-at ka-a-ri a-bi ik-ṣú-ru*
3 *21 a-gur-ri ka-a-ri dannata i-na ku-up-ru ù a-gur-ri ab-ni-ma*
4 *it-ti ka-a-ri a-bi ik-ṣú-ru e-sè-ni-iq-ma*
5 *i-ši-id-su i-na i-ra-at er-ṣé-tim ú-ša-ar-ši-id-ma*
6 *re-e-ši-ša ú-za-aq-qí-ir ḫu-úr-sa-ni-iš*
7 *ka-a-ri a-gur-ri bal-ri erēb šamši dūr* TIN.TIR.KI *ú-ša-al-mu*
8 *i-ta-a-at ka-a-ri* ^{nar}*A-ra-aḫ-tim ša a-bi i-pú-šu*
9 [*ka*]*-a-ri dannata i-na ku-up-ru ù a-gur-ri ša-da-ni-iš ab-nim*
10 *dūru ša i-ta-a-at ālī*^{ki} *a-na ni-ṣi-ir-tim Bāb-ili*^{ki}
11 *a-bi ba-nu-ú-a i-pú-šu-ma la ú-ša-ak-li-lu ši-pí-ir-ša*
12 *dūra ša-a-ti ú-ša-ak-li-il-ma ú-ul-la-a re-e-ši-ša*
13 *ḫi-ri-su eḫ-re-e-ma šu-pú-ul mé-e ak-šu-ud*
14 *36 a-gur-ri 3 ka-a-ri dannātim*$^{ti\,m}$ *ab-ni-ma*
15 *it-ti ka-a-ri a-bi ik-ṣú-ru e-sè-ni-i*[*q-ma*]
16 *dūra danna ša ki-ma ša-di-im* [*la ut-t*]*a*[*-aš-šu*][2]
17 *i-na ku-up-ru ù a-g*[*ur-*]*ri i-na ki-ša-di*[*-ša ab-ni-ma*][3]
18 *re-e-ši-ša ú-za-aq-qí-ir ḫu*[*-úr-sa-ni-iš*][4]
19 *abullē-ša ša-*[*ad*]*-la-a-tim ú-ra-ak-ki-is-ma*
20 *dalāti* ^{ti}*erinni ta-aḫ-lu-up-ti siparri e-er$_4$-te-et-ti-ši-na-a-ti*
21 *ì-nu-mi-šu ni-ṣi-i*[*r-ti*] *É-sag-ila ù* TIN.TIR.KI *aš-te-'e-e-ma*
22 *i-ta-a-at Ni-mi-it-ti-*^{d}*Ellil ša-al-ḫe-e Bāb-ili*^{ki}
23 *iš-tu kišād* ^{nar}*Puratti a-di tu-úr-ri ša-ap-li-i*
24 *ša Ni-mi-it-ti-*^{d}*Ellil ša ti-ib* ^{sar}*šadī*
25 *335 ammat qá-qá-ri ul-tu mu-úḫ Ni-mi-it-ti-*^{d}*Ellil a-na ki-da$_4$-a-nim*
26 [*1*]*-en ka-a-ri 32 agurri*
27 [*š*]*a-na-a ka-a-ri 23 agurri*
28 [*2 k*]*a-a-ri dannātim*$^{ti\,m}$ *1-en i-na ma-aḫ-ri ša-ni-i*
29 [*i-*]*na kupri ù agurri ab-ni-ma*
30 [*i-š*]*i-id-su-un mi-ḫi-ra-at ap-si-i*
31 [*i-*]*na šu-pú-ul mé-e bé-e-ru-tim ú-ša-ar-ši-id-ma*
32 *re-e-ša-šu-nu ḫu-úr-sa-ni-iš ú-za-aq-qí-ir*
33 *i-na bé-e-ri-šu-nu pí-ti-iq a-gur-ri ša-da-ni-iš e-ep-t*[*i-iq-ma*]
34 *ku-um-mu gi-gu-na-a-tim ra-b*[*a-a-am*]
35 .....[.....][5]
(small gap)
38 [^{d}*Marduk be-lí ra-bí-ù li-pí-it qá-ti-ia*]
39 [*a-na da-mi-iq-tim ḫa-di-iš na-ap-li-is-ma*]

[1] *Cf.* Langdon No. 7, I 1 ff. [2] *Cf.* No. 4, I 23. [3] *Cf.* No. 1, II 21. [4] *Cf.* II 6.
[5] Undecipherable traces.

I 1 [Nebuchadrezzar, the king of Babylon],
2 [the exalted prince chosen by the affection of] Marduk,
3 [the good shepherd who follows the advice of Nabû, he who pleas]es their hearts,
4 [the renowned ruler who of the care of Esagil]a and Ezida
5 [is daily thin]king, and
6 [who] constantly looks toward the welfare of Babylon and Borsippa,
7 [the pious sage who provides for Esagila and Ezid]a,
8 [the eldest son of Nabopolassar, the king of Babylon, —I—]
(rest of column I lost)

II 1 What no king before me had ever done, I built and erected.
2 Outside Imgur-Ellil, alongside the wall which my father had constructed
3 I built a mighty wall of baked brick and bitumen—21 bricks (thick)—and
4 joined it tightly to the wall which my father had constructed;
5 I sank its foundation to the bosom of the netherworld, but
6 I raised up its top like a mountain range.
7 I had a wall of baked brick encase the city wall of Babylon on the western bank (of the Euphrates).
8 Alongside the Araḫtu wall which my father had made
9 I built a mighty wall of baked brick and bitumen like a mountain.
10 The enclosing wall which alongside the (inner) city for the protection of Babylon
11 my father, my begetter, had made, but had not completed the work thereon—
12 I completed that enclosing wall and made high its top.
13 I dug its moat and reached the water level.
14 I built 3 mighty walls—36 bricks (thick)—and
15 joined them tightly to the wall which my father had constructed and
16 a mighty enclosing wall which like a mountain [was unshakable]
17 I constructed of baked brick and bitumen upon its shoulder and
18 raised up its top like a mountain range.
19 I arranged wide gates and
20 provided them all with cedar doors with bronze fittings.
21 At that time I was constantly anxious (further) to protect Esagila and Babylon;
22 hence alongside Nimittī-Ellil, the fore-wall of Babylon,
23 from the bank of the Euphrates to the lower sector
24 adjoining the east front of Nimittī-Ellil
25 for a stretch of 335 cubits outwardly against Nimittī-Ellil
26 one wall 32 bricks (thick)
27 (and) a second wall 23 bricks (thick),
28 two mighty walls, one in front of the other,
29 I built of baked brick and bitumen,
30 I sank their foundations till opposite the apsû
31 at the level of the deep waters and
32 I raised up their tops like a mountain range.
33 In between I packed baked bricks like a mountain and
34 a large pavillion
35 [..... I made high upon it.]
(small gap)
38 [Marduk, my great lord, upon the work of my hands,]
39 [so pleasing to thee, look with favor!]

40 [*dam-qá-a-tu-ú-a li-iš-ša-ak-na ša-ap-tu-uk-ka*]
41 [*i-na pi-i-ka el-lu š*]*a l*[*a n*]*a*[*-ka-ri*]
42 [*i-bí a-ra-ku u₄-mi-ia qí-b*]*í li-it-tu-ú-ti*
43 [*mi-im-mu-ú e-te-ep-pú-š*]*u li-ku-un-ma*
44 [*qá-du ú-ul-lu li-bu-ú*]*r-ma la-la-a-šu lu-uš-ba-am*
45 [*i-na qí-bi-ti-ka ki-i*]*t-ti ša la šu-pé-e-lum*
46 *a-a i-ši na-ki-ri mu-ga-al-li-ti a-a ar-ša*[6]

III

In justification of transliteration and translation a few philological remarks are necessary. I limit myself to points where I find myself at variance with the standard edition of Neo-Babylonian inscriptions, S. Langdon, *Die neubabylonischen Königsinschriften* (*VAB* 4, 1912).

I 3: The spelling *re-é-a-um* for *rē'ū* "shepherd" is odd. The *é* may be due to an attempt at a sharper differentiation between *e* and *ä* (<*a* by "Umlaut"[7]); the word more commonly occurs in the spelling *re-é-um*. The *a* is probably due to a carry-over from the normal accusative *re-é-a-am* (probably pronounced *rē'ā*).

I 3: *muštēšir ašrāti* is to be translated in accordance with Kramer's observation (BASOR 79, 25, fn.25) that *aširtu* corresponds with Sum. n a - r i "guidance, advice"; hence, "who lets himself be guided by the advice of Nabū." In Babylonian, *aširtu* must be kept strictly apart from *ešertu* "sanctuary"; in Assyrian both words are homonymous.

I 8: For the interpretation of the initial phrase see A. Poebel, Das appositionell bestimmte Pronomen der 1. Pers. Sing. (*OIAS* 3).

II 2: (*ina/ana*) *kīdāni*(m) belongs to *kīdu* "open country, (place) outside (a walled city)" which Thureau-Dangin was the first to posit (Hilprecht Anniversary Volume, 162, fn.4).

II 2: The proper understanding of Neo-Babylonian building inscriptions depends to a large extent on the correct interpretation of the two terms *dūru* and *kāru*. The standard work of Langdon-Zehnpfund distinguishes them as "Mauer, Wallmauer" and "Böschungsmauer, Quaimauer." This coincides with the practice of the excavators who in their various publications[8] translate *dūru* with "Stadtmauer" and *kāru* with "Ufermauer" (of a river or a moat)." The correct solution, namely, *dūru* "Mauerring" and *kāru* "Einzelmauer", *i.e.*, "enclosing wall" and "individual wall," had been offered by Fr. Delitzsch as early as 1903 in a discussion with the excavators on the topography of Babylon (*MDOG* 19, 33). With respect to *dūru* his interpretation is confirmed by the etymology as

[6] *Cf.* No. 7, II 23 ff.; No. 21, II 39 ff.
[7] See for the time being Haupt, *Am. Journal of Philology* 8, 265 ff.
[8] See particularly R. Koldewey, *Das wiedererstehende Babylon* (1913), English translation by A. S. Johns under the title *The Excavations at Babylon* (1914); F. Wetzel, *Die Stadtmauern von Babylon* (WVDOG 48, 1930); E. Unger, *Babylon* (1931).

40 [Good things for me may be put upon thy lips!]
41 [With thy pure word which is irrevocable]
42 [ordain long days for me and orde]r offspring for me!
43 Let [everything I am doing] last and
44 [till the distant future let it endure], and let me participate in its permanence!
45 [By thy just order] which is unalterable
46 let me have no enemy, let me acquire no rebel!

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well as the pictograph (Sum. reading b á d). Sum. k a r, from which Akk. *kāru(m)* is a loan, signifies originally "bulwark along the water" (the meaning of the pictograph), "jetty, quai, pier." In Neo-Babylonian *kāru* has become the name for a wall, the extension of which is limited; it does not necessarily refer to walls along water courses. In Assyrian *kāru* seems to have taken over, at least in part, the meaning of *dūru*. In Babylonian one has names like *Dūr-Rīmuš, Dūr-Samsuiluna, Dūr-Kurigalzu,* etc.; in Assyrian there correspond *Kār-Šulmānašarēd, Kār-Šarrukīn,* etc.

II 4: The verb form *e-sè-ni-ik/q,* 1st sing. of a preterite, is commonly listed under *sanāqu* "press." This practice originates with Delitzsch (*HW* 504) who bases his statement on *e-is-ni-ik/q* (V 51) in the so-called East India House inscription (Langdon No. 15) and dismisses the parallel passages with a "so oder ähnlich." In fact, all the other inscriptions exhibit in the same phrase *e-sè-ni-ik/q.*[9] An exception is BM 85965 (*CT* XXXVII 5 ff.) rev. 29, 33, 52, which shows *a-sa-ni-ik/q.* Furthermore, Nebuchadrezzar himself employs elsewhere (Langdon No. 5, I 25) *ás-ni-iq* as 1st sing. pret. of *sanāqu.* There is hardly any doubt that *e-is-ni-ik/q* must be considered a mistake of the ancient stonecutter.

This compels a reconsideration of the interpretation of *e-sè-ni-ik/q.* It will have to account also for the Umlaut. This leads necessarily to an infinitive *sēqu(m)* of which *essenik/q* is Btn. One may at least ask whether this word might not be identical with **sāqu(m)* "become tight" and "tighten," "affect in an adverse way" and related to *sīqu(m)* "narrow," "short."[10]

II 23: For *turrum* "sector (of a wall)" see below p. 77.

II 34: The expression *kummu gigunnāti* "structure[11] consisting of or situated in *gigunnū* (pl.)" is noteworthy. It seems to shed new light on

[9] The reading *e-še-ni-iq* which according to *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute* 18, 168 a British Museum copy of the Marad cylinder offers in II 19 is certainly faulty. This is proved by line I 30 of the same inscription and by the numerous duplicates (*e.g., Or.* 26, 67 ff.; *CT* XXXIV, 19 ff.; *Ex Oriente Lux* No. 6, pl. VII; *YBT* IX, 141 f.).

[10] Delitzsch, *HW* 492; Muss-Arnolt, *Concise Dictionary* 780; cf. Goetze, *An.Or.* 12, 189. Etymological connection with Arab. *dīqun* hardly accounts for the Akkadian *e.*

[11] Nebuchadrezzar uses *kummu* in connection with palaces (*e.g.,* No. 21, II 28) and temples (*e.g.,* No. 20, III 76).

the much discussed *gigunnũ*.[12] Some scholars[13] have identified the *gigunnũ* with the *ziqqurat*, the temple tower; others[14] maintain that the *gigunnũ* is intimately connected with the *ziqqurat* and an essential part of it. In this connection it is important to note that our text does not mention any *ziqqurat* or any temple with its *kummu gigunnãti*. Moreover, the archæological evidence (see section V below) makes it absolutely certain that none can be involved. The statement, then, of Thureau-Dangin, "tous les *gigunû* ne sont pas des *ziqqurat*" (*RA* 22, 103, fn.1), proves true and can even be carried a step further: there exist *gigunnũ* that have no religious significance whatever.

The fact is well known that the *gigunnũ* may be connected with planted trees and groves.[15] This does not justify, however, the translation "grove." It would not fit the instances where *gigunnũ* is in apposition to *ziqquratu*,[16] and is directly contradicted by the testimony of the ancients themselves[17] that the *gigunnũ* is a *bītu* "house." With A. Schott[18] I believe that the line of the Ištar hymn AO 4479 (*RA* 22, 169 ff.), *i-ge-e-gu-un-ni-im šu-ba-at re-ša-tim* "in the *gegunnũ*, the dwelling of joy," contains an allusion to the meaning of the term. The second part of the ideogram *GI.UNU*[19] actually equals *šubtu* "dwelling"; unfortunately the explanation of *GI* (g i, older g i g ?) by "joy" is so far not attested to. However, a translation "joy dwelling" (*cf.* German "Lusthaus"), "pavillion (for merrymaking)" would, I think, fit all occurrences of the word.

IV

For a full understanding of the new text a discussion of the probable content of the missing parts of the first column is necessary.

The supplementation of the lost parts is possible with the help of related texts. Closest to the Crozer cylinder is the other cylinder Langdon No. 21, which came to light during the excavations at Babylon.[20] Of this text most of column I is likewise destroyed. Column II coincides with the

[12] The older literature dealing with this word is conveniently collected and criticized by K. Tallqvist in *Sumerisch-Akkadische Namen der Totenwelt*, 25, fn. 4.

[13] Notably Gadd, *JRAS* 1925, 94, fn. 1.

[14] Thus in particular Sidney Smith, *JRAS* 1928, 849 ff.; F. M. Th. Boehl, *ZA NF* 5, 93.

[15] This was stressed by Landsberger, *OLZ* 1931, 128, who translates by "(heiliger) Hain." See moreover Zimmern, *ZA NF* 5, 253, fn. 3.

[16] *E.g.*, date 18 of Samsu-iluna.

[17] B. Meissner, *Ass. Studien* 3, 8.

[18] *ZA NF* 6, 11.

[19] The statement of the Chicago Syllabary (*OIAS* 7) l. 149 that the sign *UNU* in *GI.UNU* is to be read g u n u may be artificial.

[20] The number assigned to it on the excavators' inventory is BE 15379. No complete publication is available. The most significant lines (II 21-46) are published *MDOG* 11, 6 ff. A transliteration and translation of them was given in *OLZ* 1902, 425 by Meissner, and in *MDOG* 19, 23 ff. by Weissbach. For the rest of the text one depends on Weissbach's transliteration which Langdon was able to include in his book *Die neubabylonischen Königsinschriften*. The excavations yielded more fragments of the same text of which nothing has been published (see *MDOG* 21, 8).

Crozer texts, the *inūmi-šu* section (see presently) excluded. This justifies the assumption that the first columns likewise coincided. The preserved part runs as follows:

18 [*Im-gu-úr-*^{d}*Ellil ù*] *Ni-mi-it-ti-*^{d}[*Ellil dūrē rabūti ša Bāb-ili*^{ki}]^{21}
19 [*ša* ^{d}*Na-bi-um-apla-*]*ú-ṣu-úr šar Bāb-ili*^{ki} *a-bi ba-nu-ú-a*^{22}
20 [.....] *la uš-te-ši-ru te-me-en-šu-un*
21 [.....] *ka-a-ri ḫi-ri-ti-šu*
22 [..... *iš-tu abulli* ^{d}*Iš*]*ta-ar a-di abulli* ^{d}*Uraš*^{23}
23 [*ka-a-ri A-ra-aḫ-ti i-na ku-u*]*p-ri ù a-gur-ri ik-ṣú-ru-ma*^{24}
24 [*ma-ka-a-at a-gur-ri a-bar-ti* ^{ná}*Pura*]*tti ú-ra-ak-ki-su?-ma*^{25}
25 [*la ú-ša-ak-li-lu*] *se-ei-ta-a-tim*^{26}
26 [*ša* ..... *ma-na-ma*] *šarru la ib-nu-ú*
27 [.....] *i-pú-šu*
28 [.....] *Bāb-ili*^{ki}
29 [..... *i-t*]*a-a-at Bāb-ili*^{ki}
30 [*iš-tu kišād* ^{ná}*Puratti e-la-an āli*^{ki}] *a-di kišād* ^{ná}*Puratti ša-aṭ-la-an āli*^{ki}^{27}
31 [*dūru dannu bal-ri ṣīt* ^{d}*šamši B*]*āb-ili*^{ki} *ú-ša-al-mu-ú*^{28}
32 [*ḫi-ri-is-su iḫ-ri-ù-ma i-na ku-up-ri*] *ù a-gur-ri ik-ṣú-ru ki-bi-ir-šu*^{29}
33 [*ia-ti apal-šu re-e*]*š-ta-a na-ra-am li-ib-bi-šu*^{30}
34 [..... *ú-kal-*]*li-mu-nim*
35 [..... *aš-te-*]*'e-e-ma*
36 [..... *ú-š*]*a-ak-li-il*

18 [Imgur-Ellil and] Nimittī-Ellil, the great city walls of Babylon,
19 [which Nabu-apla]-uṣur, the king of Babylon, my father, my begetter,
20 [had .....], but had not got straight their foundation;
21 [who .....] wall of its moat,
22 [.....; (who) from the gate of Iš]tar to the gate of Uraš
23 [the Araḫtu wall in bitu]men and baked brick had constructed,
24 [the *makāt* of baked brick across the Euphra]tes had fitted,
25 [but had not completed] the rest of it;
26 [(who) what before him] no king had built
27 [.....] had made,
28 [.....] Babylon
29 [..... alongs]ide Babylon
30 [from the bank of the Euphrates above the city] to the bank of the Euphrates below the city
31 [a mighty city wall on the eastern bank] had made around Babylon,
32 [had dug its moat and with bitumen] and baked brick had constructed its embankment—
33 [I, his]first-born [son], the beloved of his heart,
34 [..... they show]ed to me.
35 [..... I sou]ght and
36 [..... I com]pleted.

[21] *Cf.* Langdon No. 14, IV 66 ff.
[22] *Cf.* No. 14, IV 70 f. For Nabopolassar's inscription dealing with the inner wall see R. Koldewey, *Das wiedererstehende Babylon* 132; for that dealing with the revetment *ibid.* 139 and figs. 89 and 90.
[23] *Cf.* No. 13, II 9.
[24] *Cf.* No. 13, II 10 f. See R. Koldewey, *l.c.* 138 and fig. 88.
[25] *Cf.* No. 13, II 12 f.
[26] *Cf.* No. 13, II 14.
[27] *Cf.* No. 19B, VI 50 f.
[28] *Cf.* No. 19B, VI 52.
[29] *Cf.* No. 19B, VI 53 f. No inscription of Nabopolassar from the outer wall is known.
[30] *Cf.* No. 15, V 21 f.

The reconstruction of the rest of column I in both inscriptions is likewise possible. The following comparison enables us to see what is missing:

Nos. 1/2	13	15	19B	21	Crozer	Subject
I 16-22	I 54-60	IV 66-73	V 4-11	[.....]	[.....]	Inner city wall
I 23-32	I 61-II 5	V 1-4	V 12-21	II x-5	II 1-6	Revetment
I 33-34	II 6-7	V 34-36	V 22-24	II 6	II 7	Wall of western city
I 35-45	II 8-18	V 5-11	V 27-50	II 7-8	II 8-9	Araḫtu wall
II 12-21	II 25-34	VI 22-56	VI 46-59	II 9-20	II 10-20	Outer city wall

It can be concluded that the end of the first column in the Crozer cylinder and also in Langdon No. 21 was devoted to a statement concerning the inner city wall. This is confirmed by the middle third of the first column as just reconstructed. The closing lines of column I most likely had the same (or at least a very similar) form as in Langdon No. 13.

54 *Ba-bi-lam*^{ki} *ma-ḫa-zi bēli ra-bi-im* ^{d}*Marduk*
55 *āl ṭa-na-da-a-tu-šu*
56 *Im-gu-úr-*^{d}*Ellil ù Ni-mi-it-ti-*^{d}*Ellil*
57 *dūrāni-šu rabūti ú-ša-ak-li-il*
58 *i-na sippi abullē-šu*
59 *rīmē erē e-eq-du-tim ù mušḫuššē še-zu-zu-tim*
60 *ab-ni-ma uš-zi-iz*

54 Babylon, the cult centre of the great lord Marduk,
55 the city of his glory—
56 Imgur-Ellil and Nimittī-Ellil,
57 its great walls I completed.
58 At the chambers of its gates
59 fierce bronze bulls and awe-inspiring *mušḫuššū*
60 I fashioned and put up.

There remains a gap between the prologue and the beginning of the middle third (line "18" above). It may be filled in with a text parallel to Langdon No. 7 (which also yielded the supplementations for the prologue) I 15-II 2:

15 *ì-nu-um* ^{d}*Marduk be-lí ra-bí-ù i-lu ba-nu-ú-a*
16 *ki-ni-iš ib-ba-an-ni-ma*
17 *da-am-qá-a-ti āli-šu Bāb-ilī*^{ki}
18 *ra-bi-iš ú-ma-'i-ir-an-ni*
19 *a-na-ku a-na* ^{d}*Marduk be-lí-ia*
20 *ka-ia-na-ak la ba-aṭ-la-ak*
21 *ša e-li-ša ṭa-a-bu*
22 *ud-da-ak-ku la na-pa-ar-ka-a*
23 *i-ta-ma-am li-ib-ba-am*
24 *i-na kaspi ḫurāṣi ni-si-iq-tim abnē šu-qu-ru-ú-tim*

25 *e-ra-a* ^{ú}*musukanni* ^{ú}*erinni*
26 *mi-im-ma šu-um-šu šu-qu-ru šu-un-du-lam*
27 *la ba-ša-a ḫi-ši-iḫ-tim*
28 *é-sag-ila az-nu-un-ma*
29 *ša-aš-ši-iš ú-ša-pa-a ša-ru-ru-ú-šu*
II 1 *é-zi-da ú-ša-ak-li-il-ma*
2 *ki-ma ši-ṭi-ir-tim ša-ma-mi* <*ú-ba-*>*an-nim*

15 When Marduk, the great lord, the god, my creator,
16 had properly called me
17 and with the welfare of his city Babylon
18 had solemnly charged me,
19 I with regard to Marduk, my lord,
20 constantly (and) uninterruptedly
21 what is pleasing to him
22 daily without let-up
23 pondered in my heart.
24 With silver, gold, the choicest of precious stones,
25 bronze, *musukannu* wood, (and) cedar,
26 (with) everything precious so that there was no possibility
27 of making it more splendid, of the needs
28 of Esagila I took care
29 and made its splendor shine like the sun.
II 1 Ezida I completed
2 and made it beautiful like the firmament.

Since the first fourteen lines of No. 7 occupy only eight lines on the Crozer cylinder, it is quite possible that the quoted seventeen lines were accommodated there on nine lines.

The Crozer cylinder, then, in its original form contained all the essential parts of a Neo-Babylonian inscription: a prologue which introduces the king; the *inuma* section which summarizes his main achievements; the *inūmi-šu* section devoted to the undertaking which the inscription commemorates; and finally a concluding prayer.[31]

V

There remains the task of identifying the various buildings and walls mentioned in the inscription with the results of the excavations. This will best be done by the inclusion in this paper of a sketch map on which the respective buildings and walls are numbered in the order of the following summary.

The Crozer inscription in its reconstructed form mentions the following:

1. Esagila and Ezida. The former is the main sanctuary of Marduk in

[31] For the literary form of the inscriptions see S. Langdon, *Die neubabylonischen Königsinschriften*, 5 ff.; S. Mowinckel, *Eucharisterion für H. Gunkel*, I, 278 ff.; W. Baumgartner, *OLZ* 1924, 313 ff.; B. Landsberger, *OLZ* 1931, 122.



The City of Babylon

PLATE 3



The Northern Front of the Inner City

PLATE 4

Babylon.[32] The latter, the main sanctuary of Nabû, is situated in Borsippa.[33]

2. The inner city wall ([I 39-45]).[34] It consists of the main wall (*dūru*) called *Imgur-Ellil* ("Ellil granted favor") and the fore-wall (*šalḫû*) *Nimittī-Ellil* ("Ellil is my support"). The name of the main wall is sometimes used (as seems the case here) for the whole fortification.[35]

3. The revetment (II 1-6) belongs to these same walls.[36]

4. The western city wall (II 7). This part of Babylon was not excavated, but its general location is known.

5. The Araḫtu wall (II 8-9) runs along the waterfront of the inner city.[37]

6. The outer city wall (II 10-20) was traced by the excavators.[38]

7. The *inūmi-šu* section, the most important part of the inscription (II 21-38), deals with the northern front of the inner city. This follows from a comparison with the texts which were found to be most closely related, Langdon's Nos. 7 and 21.

No. 7 deals with the "western outwork"—the text calls it *ḫalṣu rabītu* ("great fort")—which the excavators localized[39] west of the "southern citadel." When it was planned, it was meant to include an area also north of it. For this reason No. 7 can state that the "great fort" was erected *ina turri elī ša abulli Ištar ištu kišād Puratti adi miḫ(i)rat abulli* ("in the upper *turru* adjoining the Ištar gate from the bank of the Euphrates to opposite the gate"). It should be clear from this passage that *turru* cannot mean "tower"[40] or "edge";[41] it must be something of considerable extension in space. I would translate it by "sector (of a wall)." I have marked it by (a) on the second sketch map.

No. 21 relates in its main part the construction of the "main citadel" and of the "eastern outworks." The location of the former is described by the words *ištu kišād Puratti adi sippi šumēli ša abulli Ištar* ("from the bank of the Euphrates to the left chamber of the Ištar gate"). This accords perfectly with the findings of the excavators.[42] The part of the "western outworks" that lay in front of this sector of the outer wall was sacrificed to the new project. The "main citadel" sits astride the wall which was designed to form the northern limit of the outworks.[43]

[32] The main publication dealing with it is F. Wetzel and F. H. Weissbach, *Das Hauptheiligtum des Marduk in Babylon* (*WVDOG* 59, 1938).

[33] See R. Koldewey, *Die Tempel von Babylon und Borsippa* (*WVDOG* 15, 1911) 50-56.

[34] F. Wetzel, *Die Stadtmauern von Babylon* (*WVDOG* 48, 1930) 38 ff.

[35] Delitzsch, *MDOG* 19, 35. The cylinder whose main part is concerned with the construction of Imgur-Ellil (*Stadtmauern* 83) is unpublished.

[36] Brick inscription Langdon No. 32; *cf. Stadtmauern* 83.

[37] See *Stadtmauern* 44 ff.

[38] See *Stadtmauern* 70 ff. The original cylinder is Langdon No. 4.

[39] Koldewey-Wetzel, *Die Königsburgen von Babylon* II (*WVDOG* 55, 1932) 27 ff.

[40] This is Langdon's translation.

[41] B. Meissner (*MAOG* XI/1 50 ff.) considers this as the clear meaning of the word; I cannot agree. It may be added that the semasiological development from "(piece of) string," "wire" (this is well attested) to "sector of a wall" seems easier than that from "string" to "rim," "edge." The Akkadian word is demonstrably a loan word from Sumerian; Aram. *tūrā* ("rim") may be genuine Semitic.

[42] See Koldewey-Wetzel, *l.c.*

[43] *Ibid.*, 25 ff.

The "eastern outworks" extend *ištu sippi imitti ša abulli Ištar adi turri šaplī ša Nimittī-Ellil ša tīb šadī.* This wording must be interpreted in the light of the excavations.[44] The outworks cover only part of the distance from the Ištar gate to the corner of the main wall. One must therefore translate "from the right chamber of the Ištar gate to the lower sector adjoining the east front of Nimittī-Ellil." The distance in question is marked by (b) on the sketch, (c) being "the lower sector adjoining the east front of Nimittī-Ellil."

Inscription No. 21, then, is necessarily younger than inscription No. 7.

The Crozer inscription is still younger. It refers to an additional enlargement of the fortification in front of both the "main citadel" and the "eastern outworks." The strange thing about it is that it does not mention the Ištar gate at all. And yet, the distance *ištu kišād Puratti adi turri šaplī ša Nimittī-Ellil ša tīb šadī* ("from the bank of the Euphrates to the lower sector adjoining the east front of Nimittī-Ellil") is clearly that covered by the two distances of No. 21 together (*i.e.*, (a) + (b) on the sketch map). This becomes intelligible only on the assumption that the area covered by the new undertaking was some distance away from the gate. Nevertheless it remains surprising that the procession street that extended from the gate toward the north is likewise passed over in silence. The fact that both the "main citadel" and the "eastern outworks" were at one time enlarged toward the north has been ascertained by the excavations.[45] The thickness of the two northernmost walls which delimit the newly added area was measured as 11.20-11.35 m. and 10.00-10.90 m. respectively. This accords well with our inscription which gives them thirty-two and twenty-three bricks.

Nothing of the *kummu gigunnāti* has survived.

The report of the Crozer cylinder is nowhere repeated in Nebuchadrezzar's inscriptions.[46] Compared with the "main citadel" it was of too small import.

To sum up, then: it can be assumed as certain that the Crozer cylinder relates this latest enlargement of the northern fortifications of Babylon. It must have been taken out from its walls by illicit diggers, or picked up in its ruins by natives hunting for antiquities.

[44] *Ibid.*, 33 ff.

[45] *Ibid.*, 30 ff. and 35.

[46] The later inscriptions no longer record the steps by which the north front was gradually enlarged. For them, all appears as one building operation that ends with the lining of the northernmost wall with limestone blocks. Thus No. 14, II 22-56 and No. 15, VIII 40–IX 44. But the distance from the inner wall to the northernmost line of fortifications has been increased from 360 cubits in No. 21 to 490 cubits in Nos. 14-15. It is true that this distance of 490 cubits is not the sum of the original 360 cubits of No. 21 and the 335 cubits of the Crozer cylinder. But the area is of irregular shape and there is no way of knowing what distances were actually measured.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

In theory there are two ways to regard the Bible. The first sees it as the complete and entire revelation of God. God has revealed his whole will; everything that men are to do God has revealed to them. The way men are to worship him, the notions they are to hold about him and the world, their moral conduct, their relation to their fellows—all this has been revealed and is man's for the knowing. God, not man, is thus the author of the Bible; it may seem to consist of sixty-six books and to have been produced by different authors. This is fictitious. It is one book, written by one author—God. The so-called "authors" are that by courtesy only, for "no prophecy came by the will of man: but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit." In fact, God was everything, men nothing. Under the influence of the Spirit—and the "Spirit" was vastly different from what is popularly understood by that overworked term today—they were scarcely more than the fingers of God. It was he who thought and spoke; they were simply his amanuenses. Thus there could be no errors, no contradictions, no omissions. Everything man in any age needed to know or do stood therein revealed. To be sure, it was often implicit rather than explicit; written, so to speak, in invisible ink. Thus not everyone was competent to unlock the treasure. As the author of II Peter phrases it: ". . . knowing this first, that no prophecy of scriptures is of private interpretation"; that is, "no prophecy can be understood through one's own powers." It was announced by God through prophets whom he had specially inspired for that purpose; it can be understood only by God-inspired teachers or apostles. This view has through the years greatly appealed to many men, as it did to the author of this epistle: convinced that they are inspired by him, they are sure that they are able to interpret with finality and to rule out of court the views of those who disagree—for the latter have not, as they, the spirit.

In essence this was the view of orthodox Judaism and led to the minute and labored study of the law to find the answers for life's questions, which the world knows as the rabbinical literature. This view was adopted and developed by Christianity, even though the latter insisted that the Judaism which had so treated the Scriptures had degenerated into an arid legalism.

And this view of Scripture required a tremendous ingenuity and straining to find explicit answers to all the demands of life as it grew increasingly complex. Allegorical exegesis was a wonderfully convenient tool. Words and sentences did not mean simply what they seemed to say: they were freighted with a secret, esoteric significance which when

properly discovered answered all questions. In short, all the answers to all our questions—regardless of their nature—in A.D. 1945 as well as in 250 B.C. are here to be found. As a correspondent wrote me recently: "We must not be broader than God's law. And anything which He did not command us to teach [not, mark you, "nothing which He commanded us not to teach"] should not be embraced by His people and incorporated into His church." If those who hold this view were consistent, they would disregard all other books, be they cookbooks or dictionaries, and, after a prayer for guidance, open the Bible to the proper page. And there are still plenty of people who do precisely that thing.

The other way is very different. The Bible is not God's complete revelation. There are many subjects which are not hinted at, directly or indirectly; thousands of problems for which no ready-made answers lurk in invisible ink. It is a library of many books written over a period of a thousand years by men who can properly be termed authors, not automatic dictaphones. It contains errors and contradictions. When Matthew quotes "And they took the thirty pieces of silver" as spoken "through Jeremiah the prophet," he was wrong. It was Zechariah, not Jeremiah, who said it. The two accounts of the Flood cannot both be correct. In one account the waters prevail for 150 days; then gradually decrease, remaining on the earth for apparently one year and eleven days. In the other account they increased for forty days and forty nights; then after twenty-one days more they disappear. In the one account one pair of each kind of animals is taken into the ark; in the other, one pair of unclean, but seven pairs of clean. If the Holy Spirit announced at the baptism of Jesus, "*Thou art* my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased," as Mark and Luke record, it did not say, "*This is* my beloved Son, in whom . . ." as Matthew records. And these contradictions and errors are not to be regarded as deliberately done to intrigue men to discover spiritual truths or to veil mighty mysteries. They are of very ordinary nature, and no book written by several authors has ever been—or will ever be—free from them. The Bible is of the profoundest value as it reveals men and women for many centuries striving to meet the problems and demands of life, their successes and their failures. In this quest, again and again they made discoveries which are of the most lasting value to us; but they are values, not because they give us ready-made answers for our questions, but because they guide and quicken us to make fresh search. The Bible is worthless as an aid in solving a cubic equation or in discovering when the next train will leave Philadelphia for New York; it is priceless as an incentive to us to meet our problems as honestly and courageously as did many of those of whom it speaks.

To men who hold this second view the Bible is not a cryptic or magical

book of answers or a ready reckoner which frees the student from the responsibility of solving his problem. He will not find the solution for the education of women in Paul's word, "If they would learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home," nor for divorce in the tradition of Jesus' word in Mark, Luke, and Paul, or in the decidedly different version provided by Matthew. He will realize that both Paul and Jesus were talking to men of their day, not to us; and that the truest follower of Jesus is not the one who blindly repeats his words or apes his ways but the one who tries in his own day to meet his own problems—often very different problems—in the same spirit of uncompromising loyalty as did his Lord and Master in his. And he believes that he is as loyal and devoted to his Lord, that he loves and prizes the Bible as highly as does his neighbor, who, as it seems to him, twists and perverts the very writings which he so vigorously claims to be implicitly believing and following with childlike faith. Again and again, he finds in the ancient stories precisely the light he needs to illumine his path; he follows it gladly. At times, as he reads the pages from the past, an insight comes to him. He does not think that that was what the early author meant; nonetheless it seems to him tremendously important and he gladly uses it. He does not try to force the Bible to sponsor his view. He states the case with complete frankness. He does not toy with the notion that God in a magical way had hidden that insight there, knowing that in the fullness of time (A.D. 1945) it would be revealed. To him that smacks of magic. Rather he believes that the mind of the one he calls God is too vast to be included between the covers of any one book; that he is revealing himself today as certainly as he did in Palestine even during the wondrous months when Jesus lived and taught. He believes, it seems to him, even more wholeheartedly than do some of his neighbors in the Incarnation. He believes that Jesus had both feet on earth, not one on earth and one in heaven. Thus when he hears Jesus speaking about men being possessed by devils, he believes that Jesus thought that that was the case. But he himself does not believe that that is the real explanation of insanity, and he has no slightest intention of turning back to this ancient explanation. On the other hand, he would be equally scandalized to try to manipulate the words of Jesus so as to form a buttress for his own views. He has no slightest desire to "defend the Bible," for he believes the Bible quite able to defend itself, should any such unlikely need arise. He has also read with interest and approval the story of Uzzah, and heartily wishes the story were more widely known.

Thus he views with genuine alarm what seems to him a menace to both the Bible and genuine religion, namely, the attempt by men who, he is very sure, know enough to know better, to turn back the hands of the clock by talking about the Bible being a book which recounts "not

history, but *sacred* history," and that it is to be approached in a manner different from that in which any other book is approached. He is greatly concerned when he reads that the proper interpretation of II Peter 1:20 is that "no prophecy of scripture carries with it its own interpretation," that is, that you can't tell by reading it, however well you may be acquainted with the life and times—actually this knowledge may be a hindrance!—how it will ultimately turn out; that only in the light of its fulfillment can you be sure what God had meant by it. He deplores the constant and repeated attempt to set "revelation" in contrast to "reason," and "worthless and sinful natural man" over against "atonement" and "sacrifice" and "regenerating spirit." He shivers when he reads approving words about allegorical interpretation; when he is told that modern critical biblical scholarship has gone to seed, and that "true" exegesis must interpret "symbolically, sacramentally, and typically." To him it seems a reinstatement of Kant's cynical suspicion of the Bible, which led him to argue that while the literal meaning was all right for scholars, it must be given a moral metamorphosis for the unlearned; that is, that the Bible must be interpreted according to morals. This frightens him, for, while he believes wholeheartedly in morals, he does not want them pitchforked in that way; it seems to him desperately dishonest. He is quite ready to agree that by present-day standards Samuel's hewing asunder of Agag or Samson's morals in general are reprehensible; but he sees no justice or need of appraising ancient men on the basis of modern standards, and he feels it utterly dishonest and illegitimate to interpret those stories "symbolically or sacramentally or typically" in such a way as to suggest that that is what the Bible means; that that is what God actually wrote in invisible or sympathetic ink. He sees that there is no end to that road except stark disaster; that if "biblical research is becoming increasingly useless for systematic theology," it is a terrific indictment of systematic theology; that the floodgates are being flung wide to fanciful and edifying exegesis and that the only criterion for judging what the original author meant, if this be tolerated, is the particular view—be it good, bad, or indifferent—of the theologian, who thus can buttress his every notion with a portentous, "Thus said the Lord." He is convinced, and nothing can shake him on that point, that if systematic theologians wish to use the Bible—as it seems to him they very properly should—they must expect to pay the price of research, so that the results of biblical research will not be "increasingly useless." Let them know the nature of the Bible well enough that they can choose its wheat from its chaff—if both such appear to them contained in its pages, when honestly interpreted. Then they can speak out with authority, using the wheat and warning against the peril of using the chaff. But to toy with its pages, assuming that since it is a *"sacred"*

book it can be treated in an irresponsible way, tolerated with no other literature or history, so that by the introduction of "spiritual insights" black becomes white—this is perilously close to playing with strange fires.

"This is what Paul seems to have thought about ———, but it seems to me that while that may well have been a point of view entirely understandable, even admirable, in Corinth in A.D. 55, it would be unwise to try to apply it in Philadelphia in A.D. 1945; rather the facts of life, as we are coming to know them, seem to suggest that a very different course of procedure is necessary; and that it is by no means improbable that were Paul alive today, that is what he would say since . . ." appears to him an honest and worthy and constructive statement. "This is what Paul *seems* to have said, but really his words, when interpreted symbolically, reveal that what God really meant was ———" is dishonest and perverse. It has been said that the Bible has little to fear from its enemies but that it needs to be on its guard when it comes to some of its friends. Insofar as its friends have the disquieting and uneasy fear that the Bible needs to be tinkered up and rewritten, it has a right to fear.

Ezekiel had a pointed word about the value of watchtowers and the responsibility upon the watchmen. That is one word which very definitely does not need to be allegorized or interpreted "symbolically, sacramentally, or typically"—but it does need to be read and heeded.

From Off the Campus and On

The Crozer Quarterly extends cordial greetings and good wishes to all its readers, new and old, for the coming year. We wish it were possible to make these personal; we can, however, express our appreciation for the many statements of support and approval of our effort to publish a journal of value and interest to both the professional student of religion and the layman, and to keep the subscription price within the reach of all. We think that we can promise that the coming year will see the same high quality of articles and reviews—for in these pages thought will continue unregimented and unrationed.

Professor Ferm is a graduate of Augustana College and Seminary and of Yale University. After several years in the pastorate—he is a Lutheran minister—he taught for a year at Albright College, going to Wooster in 1927. Since 1938 he has been head of the department of philosophy. His many books and articles have made him too well known to require lengthy introduction—and he is no newcomer to our pages. Recently he has completed the arduous task of editing the *Encyclopedia of Religion,* reviewed in this issue. We are happy to present once again this penetrating and honest thinker to our readers.

Dr. Pritchard is professor of Old Testament at Crozer, to which position he came after several years in the Methodist ministry. He is a graduate of Asbury College, Drew Theological Seminary, and a doctor of philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania. During his four years at Crozer articles and reviews by him have appeared frequently in our pages. His book, *Palestinian Figurines,* has been well received by the scholarly press, as a distinct contribution to learning.

The name Conrad Henry Moehlman, in the by-line of an article assures its immediate reading. The list of books and articles by this indefatigable writer is long and impressive. His recent *School and Church* is now in its third printing; a new volume, *The Church as Educator,* is scheduled for release early this year. He is a frequent and ever-welcome contributor to the Crozer Quarterly. It is particularly pleasant to publish this present essay by one who was literally Walter Rauschenbusch's successor. Dr. Moehlman joined the faculty of Rochester Theological Seminary in 1907 and after several years as a professor of New Testament entered the department of church history, where he taught until his recent retirement. Since his retirement from Colgate-Rochester he has continued on the faculty of the University of Rochester.

It is a pleasure to welcome Dean Knudson. Occasional book reviews from his discriminating pen have appeared in our pages. An A.B. from the University of Michigan and an S.T.D. from Boston University, he received his Ph.D. from the latter in 1900 and a doctorate of theology from Berlin in 1923. In 1906 he joined the faculty of Boston University, after having taught at Denver College, Baker College, and Allegheny College. For

fifteen years he was professor of Old Testament, then transferring to systematic theology and subsequently becoming dean of the theological faculty. He retired in 1938. Among his many books are *The Philosophy of Personalism, The Doctrine of God, The Validity of Religious Experience,* and *The Principles of Christian Ethics.* We are happy to publish this thoughtful essay by this judicious and truly great scholar.

The CROZER QUARTERLY feels a warranted sense of satisfaction at being able to publish "A Cylinder of Nebuchadrezzar from Babylon." Although intended primarily for study by critical scholars, it will be of interest to many of our readers since the cylinder discussed is one in the collection of Crozer Theological Seminary. While being rebaked at Yale under the supervision of Professor Goetze, its value became evident to this eminent Assyriologist, who has made it available to the scholarly world through our pages. Those of our readers who—like the editor—find themselves quite out of their depth so far as the details are concerned, will appreciate the profound knowledge and scrupulous honesty required in the decipherment and profitable discussion of such material. And there is none better fitted than Professor Goetze for this task. He is an internationally-known scholar in the field of his competence. He succeeded Peter Jensen at Marburg in the chair once occupied by Julius Wellhausen. Formerly he had been on the faculty at Heidelberg. In 1934 he came to Yale as professor of Assyriology and Babylonian literature. His volume, *Cultural History of Asia Minor,* was a contribution to learning of the first water. We are happy to introduce this eminent scholar to our readers, and in one issue to be able to present his essay and also his review of a recent volume by a brother Assyriologist, Samuel N. Kramer.

The barest identification of our twenty-two reviewers must suffice. Professors Ferm, Goetze, and Moehlman have already been welcomed. Dr. Bates was for forty-four years professor of Greek at Pennsylvania, retiring in 1939. Dr. and Mrs. Biesanz are the joint authors of *Costa Rican Life,* recently reviewed in these pages (April, 1945). Dr. Bixler is president of Colby. Professor Brightman is one of Boston University's distinguished philosophers. Dean Case, now of the Florida School of Religion, was for many years on the faculty of the University of Chicago. Mr. Fenn, after many years in the pastorate, during which time he gave courses at Harvard, is on the staff of the American Unitarian Association. Dr. Foote, formerly professor of preaching and secretary of the faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, is a Unitarian minister of eminence. All interested in hymnology know his volume, *Three Centuries of American Hymnody.* Dr. Metzger is in the department of New Testament at Princeton Theological Seminary. Dr. Stroup is on the faculty of Brooklyn College. Dean Sperry, of Harvard, needs no introduction to any reader interested in honest religion. Professor Zeitlin is an eminent Talmudist and a professor at Dropsie College. President Aubrey, Dean Batten, and Professors Davis, Enslin, and Keighton are on the Crozer faculty. Drs. Matthews and Neisser, formerly at Crozer, are now professors *emeriti.*

BOOK REVIEWS

The Christian Answer, edited by Henry P. Van Dusen, New York, Scribner, 1945, pp. xi, 195. $2.50.

In fairness to this book, I must confess my initial prejudice as a reviewer. The title seems altogether presumptuous, as if to convey the idea that Christianity is a unified ideology with a monistic answer to perennial questions. It would seem more in taste and to the truth if the title would reflect the open confession on the part of the contributors of the actual situation which, boiled down, resolves itself into the ways some look upon what may be called Christianity. Perhaps this would interfere with a publisher's snappy title, but it would be a sweeter invitation to read what would then be an avowedly humble set of opinions. I would pass this remark by were it not for the fact that the tendency now in certain quarters is to announce almost in papal fashion certain affirmations, which really are opinions, as *the* Christian solution and *the* Christian answer—when, in fact, it is all a matter of interpretation and possibly honest disagreement and debate.

In his introduction, the editor with candor confesses that there has been considerable struggle among those of the Theological Discussion Group (whose voices are supposed to be heard in a kind of invisible authorship of the book) to frame a consensus of what is the meaning of the Christian faith; yet he seems to assert *a priori* that this consensus *is* the faith. No objection—except that there may be others whose ideology might be cast differently and yet who may lay equal claim to a possible Christian Answer.

Professor Tillich opens up on the world situation. With big brush he paints a philosophy of history in typically broad Germanic strokes, seeing philosophical dialectical patterns in politics, religion, art, education, economics, international relations, and then affirms that all must be set right by the Christian Answer. In essence "the Answer" (his) is that history achieves its true centre in the historic Jesus and that the church ("the community which carries the spirit of Jesus Christ through the centuries") is the historical group through which right answers are to be forthcoming, not by way of adaptation but by way of transcendence over world situations. (One wonders what that transcendence is and how it would differ, say, from liberal Jewish ideals?) Dr. Tillich's thought is characteristically Spenglerian in breadth and given to overly broad generalizations and abstractions. Christianity must, he says, do this; Christianity's task is . . .! This Platonic way speaking—of a big Christianity going about and doing things—is unconvincing to a reader of a more Aristotelian frame of mind who sees particular persons in action and not giant entities stalking about. I confess my prejudices against sweeping historical generalizations; perhaps it is because I am too steeped in an American tradition.

Professor T. M. Greene contrasts "Christianity" with secular alternatives. (Why, always, do these men talk so contemptuously about the "secular"? Is the world so alien to their God? I suppose so.) He hauls from the gutter lonely souls and confused spirits (the extreme cases); naughty naturalists, naïve and sophisticated; and the skeptics. He goes right after Sidney Hook, Dewey, and Nagel, with a kind of "righteous" indignation for their deviltry of thought. (There is a fashion now to lambaste naturalists.) He is kinder toward the humanists, rightly recognizing that many of them can hardly be far from the spirit of Jesus. He takes the conventional doctrines of original sin, church, revelation, etc., with revised interpretations—

but, save for his Episcopalian emphasis upon incarnation, it is difficult to distinguish the body of his own apologetics from that, say, of a liberal Jew. I note two contrary views running through Greene's article: Christianity is conceived of as a formal theology, and again it is taken to be synonymous with high ideals and with reasonable religious faith. The major thesis, however, is a theology. The Bible is said to be unique, but this is only stated; there is no argument to support the statement. At many points, a non-Pascalian would ask for more persuasion.

Professor George F. Thomas writes about Christian affirmations, and his approach is typically Niebuhrian: proud reason, secular culture, divine disclosure, sin of idolatry, paradoxes. Now and then he gets an uncircumscribed vision outside-the-pale; *e.g.*, when he rightly admits revelation outside the Scriptures. He erects what I would call a cathedral theology—all the way from sin to the Trinity and the doctrines of the two natures of Jesus—thus posing the premise that Christianity is not a simple way of looking at life (as suggested by a teacher named Jesus walking quietly among simple folk) but rather that it is a theological edifice of solid granite foundations and a superstructure of theological boulders towering high and imposing after centuries of building of theological affirmations. Of course, he modifies the doctrines. In a short closing paragraph he surprises us by saying that Christianity is simple! Yet his "Christian Answer" contains almost the whole gamut of historic doctrines, giving edification perhaps to those who are a part of a certain tradition but surely not convicing to some other types of Christians (*e.g.*, Unitarians, Quakers, and perhaps even Methodists who in Wesleyan style have no such towering theology), to say nothing of honest skeptics to whom the book is partly addressed.

Dr. Edwin Aubrey writes on Christianity and Society. In a clean-cut statement he asserts that Christianity is focalized in the historic Jesus (thus marking Christianity, say, from Judaism) and admits that our notions of Jesus must be distinctive if not exhaustive. He leaves, however, the distinctiveness of Jesus as an historic person unanswered—supposedly a question for the historian. A "Christian" social philosophy is outlined around four major concepts: 1. security, 2. unity, 3. freedom, and 4. meaning. Aside from certain tendencies to speak of Christianity as a concrete abstraction (reification of abstractions) and a slip here and there into a division between secular and religious, Aubrey's essay betrays a good and wholesome Baptist manner of approach (Baptist in the historic sense). He says things with more freshness and abandon than do some of the other writers. For example: a profounder understanding of God is to hold that God changes and is not a Scholastic immutible; as long as a person remains really Christian, he cannot ascribe absolute truth to any of his own interpretations of Christ; Christianity is not merely a theory of democracy; the creative purpose of God always demands the destruction of some old order toward some new structure. (At this point I would retort: hence, should not a theologian dare to be prophetic rather than to be so conscious of his priestly connections?) But he says that Christianity is the only religion that has a church. Is this so? It depends on definition, and a distinctive definition would, indeed, be difficult.)

Writing on Christianity and the Christian, Professor John Knox poses the moral problem of the individual as consisting of a lack of assurance of what his duty is and of the power to do it. The essential problem of Christian ethics is the impracticability of Jesus' ideals (indeed, hard on any human!) and our fullest confidence in them. Our inability to obey God's perfect will in Jesus is not due to an uncertainty of knowledge but to a moral weakness. Moral impotence is the major cause of moral confusion. The resolution of the conflict between ideal and inability

to perform is found in those new resources available to man by God on the condition of right adjustment. The church is defined (magnificently!) in terms of culture. And with a vision he asks: "Who has the right to say 'God cannot reveal Himself to others except in the way He has made Himself known to me'?" This is an admission to the very dubiousness of the title of this volume! Knox's essay is a grand down-to-earth testimony; its strongly personal character makes it singularly convincing.

VERGILIUS FERM

One Kind of Religion, by Helen Wodehouse, New York, Macmillan, 1945, [Cambridge University Press, 1944], pp. 208, $1.75.

This book, so modestly named, is the most stimulating theological volume that I have read in a long time. Sustained by a Christian background, a sensitive, poetic nature, and a well-disciplined philosophic mind, the author bravely sets forth a thesis popular neither with the traditionalist in theology nor with the secularist in philosophy.

The thesis is that vigorous, effective, and satisfying religion is possible without a *personal* God. Starting with a provisional definition of God as "that which I worship and that whose presence upholds me; . . . the sum and substance of all good," she goes on to speak of God as "the concrete universal of all that is good" (p. 12). Wherever we find something that is good—a need fulfilled, a growth consummated, a splendor standing forth, a problem solved—there the universal Good is concrete. In other words, the experience of value is an experience of God.

God is not, however, the giver of good, the guarantor of the value, he *is* the goodness in the good. But to put it this way is, for the author, misleading; for it makes God an *abstract* universal. She prefers to say that insofar anything is good God is moving through it—which is to say both that God attains concrete expression in it, and that God transcends it. He is the "vocation" of any good act or object. He is incarnate in it; yet he negates all incarnations in the name of a positive that goes beyond them. We recognize that the good things we experience go beyond ourselves and we serve them, and in serving them we perceive our own vocation. Thus we are led out into a richer world than we now know; and this is faith, which is essentially loyalty.

At this point the obvious question arises, "Is God then impersonal?" Here she quotes A. E. Taylor to point out that in the formative period of Christian theology the personality of God was insisted upon, but that the phrase appears to have obtained currency in English only in the eighteenth century with Paley's *Natural Theology.* This is not, however, an impressive argument since the personality of God was assumed, certainly, in the New Testament, even though we may allow that the concept had different connotations there. To clear the air, she proposes, "Let us say that God is the true self of the world—what it partly is, and partly seeks to be; and he is that in it which seeks, and the way and the law of its seeking" (p. 45), and later adds, "we must not omit to regard him in the juridical aspect, as representative of a whole which shows through him and for which he speaks" (p. 46).

Does such a God really respond to us? She is able to answer in the affirmative only by redefining response to mean that when one sets himself in a certain relation to the world things happen to him that could not otherwise happen: "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" (pp. 63 f.) "The adoption of a great purpose is less adoption than being adopted" (*ibid.*).

Can we, then, really pray? Again the answer is yes, with a guarding definition of prayer as "intent towards" (p. 66). "We do not only pray *to;* we pray *by* and *with*" (p. 67). "God, as the Substance of Good, can lift us by becoming the object

of our love, and by living as love within us, and by flowing as grace towards us and through us from every source in our own nature and in the world around" (p. 74). The important thing is "to keep close to . . . the intent towards Good." Such prayer, she insists, does not require a personal god; and indeed transcends the categories of personality. An "answer to prayer" means simply that what was aimed at was obtained (p. 119).

Returning, as she repeatedly does, to this central problem of divine personality, she differentiates three elements in a person: "an outline" marking the individual person off from other objects, "a centre of consciousness," and "content of a kind which needs a person, or a group of persons, if it is to exist" (p. 123). She can ascribe content of personality to God, but not a particular centre of consciousness, and as for the outline, she agrees with Hocking that some "handle" is necessary if one is to have any experience of God at all, something like a "self." Yet communion does not demand mutual awareness; we can commune with those who are not aware of us (p. 126). "God in me is aware" (p. 130).

God is not the Absolute, but the universal of all Good (p. 146), the *right* Being of all things, the point of the whole story of our universe (p. 147). Consequently evil has "a very thin and scrappy kind of being" as the universal of nonfulfillment (p. 149). Here she makes a very important point, which traditional theology has too often rejected, "that the time-process itself should be counted as existing . . . within Deity" (p. 153); but she does not allow the apparent implicate that God is finite. In speaking of him as "the perfection of the Absolute," she seeks an escape, but falls thereby, it seems to me, into a confusion regarding the meaning of Absolute. Either the Absolute is perfect, in which case there is no occasion for its perfecting by God, or else the Absolute contains imperfections which serve as a limitation upon God, what she elsewhere refers to as "gaps unpossessed by deity," so that he is insofar finite.

In Jesus Christ God is "limited and specialized and handicapped" (p. 181), but such particularization is not confined to Jesus. Here her mysticism triumphs over her concern with the historical basis of Christian thought, and she never really comes to grips with the Christological problem. Her defense appears to be: "Where . . . the Apostles or their successors perceive God-head in one man, we hope to learn to see it everywhere" (p. 204). This is, of course, the moot point always between Christian theology and philosophy, and we cannot solve by so facile a disclaimer the difficult problem of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ among the avatars.

The volume is stimulating but actually does not carry us much beyond the familiar discussion in this country between humanist and theist. The problem broached is an acute one; but we are left at the end with the old question, "Is God merely another name for values in their organic connection?" and we are left wondering why more use was not made of the insights of Whitehead into this problem, for his name appears nowhere in the book.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, by M. F. Ashley Montagu, second edition, revised and enlarged, with a foreword by Aldous Huxley, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. xvi, 304, $3.25.

Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race has been called the most important current book on the subject of race, its meaning and its effects. If this were true of the first edition, it is even more so of the second, although the original thesis may be severely doubted.

In addition to the features of the first edition (which have been interestingly

described in a prior issue of the CROZER QUARTERLY[1]), the present form of the book adds four new chapters: "Race and Blood," "Myths Relating to the Physical Characters of the American Negro," "Are the Jews a Race?" and "What Is the Solution?" New appendices present information regarding the community-school plan in education for democracy in interracial relationships used in Springfield, Massachusetts, and materials on methods by which the Cranbrook Institute of Science at Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, accomplished an exhibit on the true facts of race. The new chapters in the main should give the critical minister fresh opportunity for broadening his knowledge regarding the fundamentals of race, and the new appendices should enable him to germinate ideas in the field of practical action.

The book is important because it surveys in a rather popular fashion many of the features of the race problem which have needed systematic, yet popular, treatment. To this end, Professor Montagu's attack on the very concept of "race" as a usable term outside of the smallest circles is commendable. But, how small the numbers are who might successfully employ the idea is indicated by Montagu's sharp criticism even of the anthropologists who have been leaders in making race problems intelligent, but whose writings and utterances have at times shown how confused and contradictory the learned may become. According to Montagu, the "modern conception of 'race' has no basis in scientific fact, nor in any other kind of demonstratable fact. It is a pure myth, and it is the tragic myth of our era." The book in general seeks first to establish that claim and later to validate and apply it in various ways. It is a message well worth the attention of the widest reading audience.

For the careful reader, however, there are numerous points regarding the book which are disturbing. For one thing, Professor Montagu is inclined to speak too warmly and generally (and thus loosely) about many of his ideas. The book suffers from a too emphatic stress on many points—points on which the evidence seems hardly as optimistically suggestive as is made out. This kind of treatment of a far-reaching social problem tends to oversimplify, if not to distort, both the nature of the problem and its consequences. Thus, for example, Professor Montagu states: "'Race' prejudice is ultimately merely the effect of an incompletely developed personality . . ." (p. 95). Again, the Lutheran Reformation is given wholehearted credit for "successfully destroying the mythological element in Christianity" for the Germans (p. 24). He seems to come dangerously close to the theory of the social and geographical conditioning of the genes (p. 50). The implication that for psychological purposes racial prejudices originates in the aggressiveness of the individual, a proposition inherent for motives though not for goals (pp. 89 ff.), seems to stand in contrast to the glowing supportive statements on the coöperative nature of men (p. 175). The discussion of inbreeding and its effects is also strongly put, but thoroughly one-sided (pp. 107 ff.). In discussing the learning process, there is repeated the familiar overstress on the rôle of culture; biology seems to be an entirely neutral element in learning (pp. 146 ff.). A hazy theory of evolution and an amazingly puerile notion of automatic creation is espoused in such general terms that one readily questions the purpose of the materials in the connection used (pp. 162 ff.). The suggestion made in the last chapter (which is one of the weakest in the book) as to how the race problem can be solved is amazing:

> We must organize a league for the reform of education. Such a league should at first be on a national scale, with offices in every large city and a central headquarters in Washington. Later on, its activities should be extended to an international scale. There will be no difficulty about that. . . . Every person living in the United States and its possessions should be invited to become a member. Properly organized, such a league can become an enormous power for good. By its

[1] See the review by A. Irving Hallowell, in *Crozer Quarterly, XX*, 1 (January, 1943), pp. 65-66.

means could be secured what we have thus far failed to secure: Peace on earth, goodwill unto all men (p. 251).

It can hardly be imagined that a more insane solution could be offered to serious readers. The suggestion sounds like another oft-repeated and bloated slogan for the solution of all social ills: "Let the church be the church!"

Professor Montagu, moreover, like many others, wishes to have his cake and eat it too. So, there is race and there is no race. He disproves it on an ideologic and scientific level and then seeks to describe the unique features of the American Negro (pp. 192 ff.). He disbelieves in race; yet he speaks on one hand of the fact that "there is no such thing as a Jewish physical type, and there is not, nor was there ever, even anything remotely resembling a Jewish 'race' or ethnic group" (p. 226), and on the other hand he can speak of a "Jewish cast of face" (p. 231). Furthermore, as though adding insult to injury, Professor Montagu does not really say what the Jews are if they are neither a race nor an ethnic group, and from that proceeds to claim that the Jewish "cast of face" is "culturally determined" (p. 231). The easy-going methods of classification which are employed by Montagu make the laborious tasks of the sociologist and anthropologist seem foolish in their complexity and abstruseness, as is evidenced, for example, in the following statement: "It will be generally agreed that those persons who are readily identifiable as Jews almost always originate from the lower socio-economic classes of their community" (p. 231). And so on.

While the errors, overstatements, and misstatements are all too numerous in a work which purports to be scientific, there also are too many important lapses of important concerns for the topic under consideration. Apparently Professor Montagu has not realized thoroughly enough that, simply because he does not choose to think that there is any such thing as race from the scientific point of view (many would doubt the assumption properly defined), the problem of race is not of itself eliminated. So, there is need in the book for an extended account of the passivity and controlling nature of culture. Without it the discussion correctly falls into the fallacy of an exclusively educational solution. Race prejudice cannot be suggillated into non-existence. Moreover, while the title of the book would seem to indicate an understanding of the rôle of myths in human societies, there is little evidence in the book that such an important theme has value for the discussion. The church and Christianity, finally, are not to be found in the index.

HERBERT H. STROUP

Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, by Raphaël Lemkin, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (New York, Columbia University Press), 1944, pp. xxxviii, 674, $7.50.

The study examines very objectively what Germany and her satellites, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, undertook to accomplish in the occupied countries. Part I considers the German techniques of occupation; Part II, the administration of the seventeen occupied countries from Albania to Yugoslavia; Part III, pp. 267-636, prints the statutes, decrees, and other documents concerned with the laws of occupation. The appendix contains the Hague Convention, 1907, in regard to the laws and customs of war on land to which Germany, Hungary, Japan, and Rumania were parties. The table of contents covers twenty-two pages and the index, likewise, twenty-two. A footnote on p. 89 quotes the Joint Declaration by members of the United Nations issued simultaneously in Washington and in London, on December 17, 1942, regarding Hitler's intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.

Part I examines nine aspects of German administrative methods involving set-up,

police, law, courts, property, finance, labor, the legal status of the Jews, and "genocide." A new term had to be coined by the author because a new thing had come to pass in history, namely, the destruction of nations. The liquidation of almost two million Jews by debilitation and starvation, massacres in ghettos and gas chambers and open graves, forced labor, flagrant violation of international law, and the punishment of any who manifested sympathy by giving them shelter, concealing them, or helping them preserve objects of value are topics treated.

The indictment of the German people as such appears in such a passage as "the mere fact that the vast majority of the German people put Hitler into power through free elections is evidence that they freely accepted his program which was secret to nobody." Germany had attacked her neighbors five times since 1864.

Who were Hitler's helpers? The military, who trained reserves and perfected plans of conquest; the businessmen, who penetrated and disrupted foreign economies through cartels, patent devices, and clearing agreements; the propagandists, who organized Germans abroad and prepared the fifth columns; the scientists, who elaborated the doctrines of German hegemony; the educators, who armed spiritually the German youth and trained them for death; the religious leaders. *Post eventum,* in the spring of 1945, Karl Barth awakened to these enormities and joined other Swiss Christians in the declaration concluding, "We ask God that He may grant to the Christian Churches in Germany and among all the peoples after these years of shameful deeds that they may perform their duty of awakening the public conscience in a better way in coming days, in a more thorough and intrepid manner than before." That from one who taught the zero significance of man in Germany ought to make it unanimous. We modestly suggest the American way as substitute for Rom. 13 : 1-7. To think that it requires a Buchenwald to awaken the Christian conscience and that Christians escape responsibility for the crimes of Hitler by quoting the Romans passage!

Decades hence this volume will be consulted not only to discover genocide legislation, annexations, how trials were conducted, and what Mussolini decreed for Albania and Yugoslavia, but whether there is any apology for the default of a Christendom which was the synthesis of the culture of Europe and of Christianity.

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

God Is Not Dead, by Bernard Iddings Bell, New York, Harper, © 1945, pp. xvi, 185, $1.50.

The title of this book was suggested by the famous passage at the beginning of *Thus Spake Zarathustra.* Nietzsche's mythical hero comes down from the mountain and finds an old saint praying in the forest. "When Zarathustra was alone he said to his heart, 'Could it be possible! The old saint in the forest hath not yet heard of it, that God *is dead.*'"

The occasion for the book, and its immediate background, is a series of sermons which Dr. Bell was invited to preach on ten summer Sundays in Trinity Church, New York. A few supplementary addresses have been added to complete the volume.

In planning for the original series Dr. Bell wrote to "fifty highly intelligent lay people" asking for suggestions as to subjects for his sermons. "The list included business executives, poets, physicians, actors, labor leaders, two eminent jurists, four professors of this and that, two women whose salons are famous, two publishers, two journalists, two eminent politicians." Some of these persons were avowedly religious; others made no profession of religion. Each was asked to state his gravest personal problem, whether of faith or conduct.

In its homiletical procedure the book presupposes sound strategy. The resultant sermons were addressed to concrete situations and are not a bow drawn at a venture. It must be said, however, that the list of persons consulted represents, culturally, a rather sophisticated group. The problems they propose betray at times a rather disillusioned and world-weary view of life. However, these collaborators are persons of importance and of indubitable influence in the community.

In some ways the most interesting and stimulating sermons in the volume are those with which it opens. They reflect the worldliness and the sense of perplexity, if not of futility, that one so often meets in the great cities. In the circles to which Dr. Bell turned for his themes there is apparently widespread skepticism as to the worth of the average man. This skepticism invades both the Christian confidence in the value of the individual and democratic faith in the plain citizen. "Look at man historically and weep. Look at man scientifically—sociologically and psychologically —and tremble. Man is a failure and a fool." This verdict from a journalist is matched by another from an editor, "Man is a beast, a low life one at that. Man is a killer. . . . I do wish to believe in God if I can; but I simply cannot believe in man." This is a situation to which modern humanism will have to address itself in all seriousness. Dr. Bell's response may be anticipated: Man is a needy sinner, who must repent if he will be saved.

Curiously, the problem of evil, at least in its conventional forms, is not so much to the front, as a perplexity, as one might expect. Dr. Bell's collaborators are at least intelligent enough to realize that most of the worst evils of our time we have brought upon ourselves. To the occasional query, "Why does God not intervene?" Dr. Bell quotes as a reply a wise remark of C. S. Lewis, "I wonder whether people who ask God to interfere *openly and directly* in our world quite realize what it will be like when He does. When that happens it is the end of the world. When the Author walks on the stage the play is over.

There are candid discussions of the relation of the church to wealth, politics, labor, the veteran, and in conclusion, the peace. There is hard-hitting, unequivocal prose in all that Dr. Bell has to say on these matters. There is moral passion and always a confident faith, as it were the poet's "central peace subsisting at the heart of endless agitation."

Dr. Bell is, as most of us know, a forthright Anglo-Catholic. In these pages he does not pretend otherwise and appeals constantly to his Anglo-Catholicism for his insights and his arguments. But this volume is not primarily an apologia for his creed or a matter of ecclesiastical give-and-take. Its concerns are those of "all sorts and conditions of men," in particular of those "who profess and call themselves Christians."

WILLARD L. SPERRY

The Gospel of Redemption, by Walter T. Conner, Nashville, Broadman, ©1945, pp. x, 369, $3.

In this volume by the professor of systematic theology in Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary the problem of salvation receives detailed treatment. Beginning with man's sin, from which he needs redemption, Professor Conner goes on to discuss election or God's purpose in redemption, the redemptive work of Christ, becoming a Christian, the Christian life, and the consummation of salvation in the coming of the kingdom of God. The theology presented under these various captions is a progressive conservatism. There is a constant endeavor to justify and preserve the faith once and for all delivered; yet accompanying this is a sincere attempt to appropriate some of the insights for which liberalism has contended for fifty years and more. If these

two emphases are illuminated, a clear idea of the author's method and point of view should take shape in our minds.

First, his conservatism. We get clear indications of this in his biblicism and supernaturalism. His constant effort is to buttress and defend biblical positions and also, it seems to the reviewer, to find room in his theological system for whatever is found in biblical ideology. Thus, early in his book, he takes his stand for a personal devil on two grounds: 1. because of the persistence of moral evil in the world and 2. because this is the view presented *in the Bible.* The latter fact clinches the whole matter for him. From this he proceeds to elaborate this aspect of his theology.

Again, his conservatism expresses itself in chapter two in which he deals with "Election: God's Redemptive Purpose." He means by election that all things and events in the world order being known to God and under his control, he knows who is going to be saved and who is not, initiating steps for the redemption of the elect. If men are to be saved from sin, it can never be on their own initiative. They must be moved of God if ever they are to turn to righteousness. The call so to turn does not come to all, moreover, not even to all those who hear the gospel. Apparently, God determines who is to be saved and who is not. Here our author uses Eph. 1:11, in which it is contended that God works all things after the counsel of his own will. God therefore elects his saints. This, contends Professor Conner, "is the basal idea in the doctrine of salvation by grace" (p. 74). Many would hold that here he has utilized a particular strain in biblical thought to the exclusion of other and more flexible biblical conceptions which give man credit for some part in the salvation process. Once more we have the typical Calvinistic absolutism which grants no creative expression by man in the salvation process. Our author goes so far as to hold that "all credit for man's salvation belongs to God" (p. 67). He seems, however, to have some trouble in his own mind with such an absolutistic position. We can almost see him writhing on the horns of his dilemma. In one place he holds that "God predestinates to destruction . . . only those who will not come in" (p. 66). This would seem to indicate that men have some say about whether or not they will be saved. Yet later on he destroys any such synergistic factor by declaring that "it is God's purpose so to direct the providential factors of the man's life as to bring him under gospel influences and so to incline his heart that he will turn from sin to God" (p. 73). Any such view amounts to an absolutism, no matter how much one talks about man's turning. For if God thus favors some and not others, how can the favored ones resist the Almighty? Grace must be held to be irresistible. It is then true to say that "man yields and accepts what God plans and works" (p. 67). The reviewer finds this to be the most unsatisfactory chapter in the book. The author is apparently on the horns of an old theological paradox; namely, that God is absolutely responsible for salvation while man at the same time is a free being. That paradox has never satisfactorily been resolved, nor is it in this latest attempt. This is just another case of a theologian being held in the toils of an absolute supernaturalism.

Yet we have said that the presentation in this volume is of a conservatism which is progressive in character. What do we mean by that? Certainly what we have said already would not seem to indicate any progressive trend. Yet there are other emphases which are much more definitely in line with modern points of view. As a sample of these we consider his emphasis upon the Christian life as a working, growing, active reality. In this emphasis we feel ourselves very much at home, as though we had at last left the vagaries of theological speculation and had put our feet firmly upon mother earth. Thus he holds that "the regeneration of the individual

and the regeneration of society should never be put over against each other as antithetical things; it is not a question of one to the exclusion of the other. They are rather two things that are mutually dependent" (p. 222). Any liberal would clasp his hand on that. Once more, we find him writing: "From the standpoint of God's redemptive purpose, then, we arrive at the paradox that the best world is not a perfect world, but one where we should need to work to make it better" (p. 233). Yet again, "Christianity is fundamentally ethical, personal, and spiritual rather than legal and institutional" (p. 270). And finally: "Character determines destiny, and character is indicated and determined by deeds" (p. 341). These are a few of the progressive emphases to which advanced liberal thinkers will give hearty assent. We might say that in his speculative theology Professor Conner stays well on the right; in his version of the Christian life he stands well to the left.

In conclusion, let me point out that the book has much in it which will offend both the ultraconservative and the liberal. The former will not favor his emphases upon the cruciality of character, the conception of "the second coming" as a continuous factor down through Christian history, and his conceptions of heaven and hell as states of character rather than specific places. On the other hand, the liberals will have difficulty with his personal devil, his theory of election, his bodily resurrection, and his opposition to synergism. As one lays down the volume, one is left with the impression that here is a progressive conservative struggling away from the shackles of an ultraconservatism, who has, however, not yet been able to shake off external authoritarianism and stand as a free spirit before God.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Religion in the Post-War World, edited by Willard L. Sperry, 4 vols., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1945, pp. 115, 115, 106, 114, $1.50 each.

Dean Sperry has seized time by the forelock in bringing together a group of quite diverse authors to deal with the problems confronting the churches after the war. The successive volumes deal with church unity, the veterans, racial adjustments, and education; and each volume is a symposium.

The general tone of the symposia is realistic, liberal, and forward-looking; while, as in all symposia, the quality of the essays is uneven. One closes the first volume with the impression that the non-Roman communions are making real gains towards coöperation, but that the Roman Church will hold aloof, confident of its own superiority and indisposed to yield one whit to Protestants. Meanwhile Judaism, though dependent on the goodwill of the non-Jewish religious majorities, exemplifies considerable internal conflict of view. The inconsequential article by Archibald MacLeish on humanism adds nothing to the volume.

A helpful volume on religion among the "soldiers and sailors" (represented themselves in the volume by a marine!) sketches the religious agencies at work in the military forces in the last war and this one, gives a vivid picture of the religious benightedness of the average recruit, and offers a sane appraisal of the religious significance of war experience. It is unfortunate that something was not done also with the veterans as a religious problem of postwar civilian life. The discussion makes it clear that we should expect no great religious revival after the war; and this, it seems to me, is wise caution!

In the treatment of the race problem little is said that is fresh, though there is here a mine of factual material on ethnology, American Negro development, and programs for handling racial tensions. One of the best essays in the entire series is Margaret Mead's appraisal of the current religious scene in America. She is an

anthropologist with a keen awareness of religious life, and her analyses are penetrating and helpful.

Curiously enough the discussion of education is the most inchoate. Perhaps this is inevitable; but surely some of the mutual contradictions in point of fact could have been resolved before publication. The high point of this volume is the essay by President Butterfield, of Wesleyan University, who expounds with grace and clarity a creative view of the place of religion in higher education.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Sumerian Literary Texts from Nippur in the Museum of the Ancient Orient at Istanbul, by S. N. Kramer, [The Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research. Vol. XXIII for 1943-1944], New Haven, 1944, pp. viii, 47, and 94 plates, $2.50.

This is a volume dedicated to the publication of cuneiform texts. Both the author and the American Schools deserve our hearty thanks for having undertaken the production of this book. As far as the author is concerned, only those who have been engaged in copying original texts themselves can appreciate the amount of patience and ingenuity that goes into a volume of this kind. As far as the sponsoring organization is concerned, it is easy to imagine the dismay of many recipients of the *Annual* who paging through the publication discover that they have been presented with ninety-four plates which they are unable to read, and with bare forty-seven pages, some of them taken up with mere technicalities, less than half of them printed in English. The nonspecialist will inevitably ask: Might it not have been better to devote the available space to the publication of a reconstructed text, preferably in transliteration, and above all to a translation intelligible to all?

In the face of such criticisms let it be emphasized that Sumerology in its present stage needs just the type of publication as that which is here under review.

Science is heavily indebted to Dr. Kramer for the unselfish work he has been carrying on for many years in reconstructing Sumerian literature. He has told us about it in several publications, and has opened up new horizons for the historian of literature as well as that of civilization. Results have been achieved from which also biblical scholars can profit a very great deal.

From the scientific point of view there is only one disconcerting factor in this activity. The reader finds himself time and again referred to unpublished material. Thus, he is not in a position to check up on numerous details, in many cases the most salient details. The procedure of science demands that results can be accepted only if they can be controlled by every worker in the field, that is to say, if the material upon which they are based is available to all. Science is essentially a coöperative affair; the more workers in the field and the greater their agreement, the safer the achievements. By no fault on the part of Dr. Kramer, the work he is doing has developed into a one-man job. This is an unhealthy situation; the sooner it can be remedied, the better. It is a commonplace that it is easier to find a publisher for syntheses and general reports; thus the more grateful we have to be to the American Schools for the decision to devote this *Annual* to the publication of primary source material. It has enabled Dr. Kramer to begin with the presentation of the numerous texts he has copied. It is only in this way that the reconstruction of Sumerian literature can become a scientific reality.

Even the layman, when casually glancing at the copies, will realize why these texts that were excavated half a century ago rested unpublished in the drawers of the museum in Istanbul. They are in most cases very fragmentary and moreover not in a condition that would lend itself to easy decipherment. They become useful only when combined with other fragments which form part of the same composition.

Undoubtedly the situation was bad enough when the tablets emerged from the ground. It is only fair, however, to remark that a bad situation to the detriment of science was made worse by the fate accorded the excavated tablets. Found in one spot, they came to rest in two museums thousands of miles apart. Often one part of the very same tablet is in Istanbul, the other in Philadelphia. Instances could be quoted where a fragment was published, and an additional fragment attached later; one asks could not the join have better been made before the first publication? Is not this a lesson to excavators; and a lesson to museums as well, which often allow the publication of a fragment without seeing to it that a search for adjoining fragments is made?

As matters stand now, we must gratefully accept whatever is presented to us, imperfect as it may be. It may be added that Kramer, and before him Chiera, have greatly helped to improve the situation by communicating lists of published and unpublished texts from which a running transliteration of a composition can be reconstructed.

Kramer belongs to a school of copyists who attempt what may be called a photographic reproduction of the original. The merits of this method of copying are great, and the efforts it demands from the copyist tremendous. It is the only possible method, I should say, with an unknown script and a text which is not at all, or little understood. Its disadvantage lies in the fact that it demands from the reader who uses the copy exactly the same effort which the copyist had to make; the process of decipherment has to be repeated every time the text is read. I personally prefer a more liberal way of copying by which the copyist disengages the maze of wedges he finds on the original for the benefit of the reader. This is possible without "forging" because it is only another interpretation of the three-dimensional script of the original which the nature of our writing materials and our procedures of reproduction compel us to transpose into a two-dimensional script in either case. It is regrettable that some of Kramer's copies, small to begin with, had to be reduced in size. In many cases a better paper (which because of war conditions was unavailable) would have made studying his copies more enjoyable. For some texts other reproductions made from the same copies exist which are more easily read.

When the tablets, some of which are now made available to us in this book, were unearthed, the relationship between biblical literature on the one hand and the Mesopotamian sources on the other seemed rather simple; so simple, in fact, that serious scholars could propagate an interpretation of the situation which made Mesopotamia the intellectual centre of the world from which ideas and ways of expression radiated to outlying and backward districts like Canaanite Palestine. More cautious views conceived of the Bible and of the Babylonian (Sumerian) literature as two variations of a common theme.

Research in the field of the early history of the Near East has made tremendous strides forward since then. As it happens, it has made a situation which seemed simple more and more complicated. Around 1900 the Sumerians were barely known, and there were still people then who denied that they had ever existed. The problem of the relationship between the Sumerians and the Semitic Akkadians (Babylonians and Assyrians), renewed in our days, was not yet clearly posited. It has become clear in the meantime that the Akkadians have never been the immediate neighbors of the Canaanites in Palestine and Phœnicia. In the third millennium they were separated by the Amurrites who played a very considerable part in the history of that period. In the second millennium the Hurrians and Hittites dominated the larger part of the formerly Amurrite territory in Upper Mesopotamia and Syria. The tablets

from Ugarit (Ras Shamra) have again added to our knowledge and revealed the fact that there were in existence between Palestine and Babylonia another literature of which we had barely an inkling a generation ago. To what the increase in our information amounts is essentially this: there can be no question any more of Bible here and Babel there; these two are only two facets of a problem to which there are many others.

Hence, whoever compares, let us say, Genesis and Babylonian Creation, Hebrew Psalms and Babylonian hymns, the Mosaic laws and the Code of Hammurapi, has to reckon with the fact that there were various intermediaries between them of which we know perhaps little, but nevertheless too much to make it advisable to ignore them altogether.

The existence of epics and myths, hymns and lamentations among the Sumerians will hardly surprise anybody. The existence, however, of a large wisdom literature in Mesopotamia (cf. pp. 35 ff.) had been little known outside the small circle of specialists. It has been fashionable for some time to associate this kind of literature with Egypt. We now learn that several thousand years before Ahiqar anxious fathers instructed their inexperienced sons in the subtle art of living successfully. Also that the time-honored scheme of the *certamen* which makes two things compete with one another for greater merit and usefulness, a scheme that is so popular in the Near East later on, has Sumerian antecedents.

The Turkish text of the introduction which runs parallel with its English text is necessitated by the terms under which Dr. Kramer was permitted to work in the Istanbul museum. As far as I understand, it creates a Turkish terminology for the technical terms which Assyriology, like any other branch of science, is compelled to employ. I am afraid that it does not to any degree coincide with the terminology that our colleagues in Ankara and Instanbul must have developed. But I am sure, they would have been consulted beforehand, had that been at all feasible.

ALBRECHT GOETZE

The Ease Era, by Paul Mallon, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1945, pp. 119, $1.50.

The cudgels for authoritarian education are taken up in this book by a distinguished newspaper columnist, whose articles appear in more than 250 daily newspapers with a circulation above 10,000,000. The author claims that he has become "an unpremeditated crusader for the institution of sound values in youth management and education." As a trained writer he presents his material skillfully, but, as is often the case with crusaders, his zeal for his cause does not have a favorable effect upon his judgment.

Mr. Mallon places the blame for juvenile delinquency largely at the door of progressive education; but it must be remembered that the problem is not new. Twenty years ago Judge Benjamin B. Lindsey was doing his notable work for delinquents in the juvenile court of Denver, and in that period industrial schools for delinquents already numbered 158, with an enrollment of 84,317. The panacea proposed for juvenile delinquency is "discipline." The writer insists that the "instinctive tendencies of children must be curbed by discipline until they have reached the age where self-restraint enables them to conform to social customs and to take advantage of social opportunities." Those concerned with progressive education strive to achieve the same end, not by curbing the "instinctive tendencies of children," but by wisely directing them toward the development of worthy character. They do not exclude punishments from their methods, but look upon them as emergency aids only.

Approving reference is made by the author to the discipline of the army and navy.

This discipline is appropriate and effective for the purpose it has in view, but, like all such discipline, fails to carry over, to any great extent, to other situations: it is effective only while it is being enforced. Serious excesses often follow release from it, as is seen in the problem which has arisen because of the association of soldiers and sailors with adolescent girls. Note the pitiable lack of effective discipline revealed in the following quotation: "One soldier has written me protesting that servicemen are not responsible for conditions, that the child-girls chase the men and the problem is one of enforcement against them by their parents, not against soldiers and sailors—and there is evidence to support his point." But Mr. Mallon had already indicated how he would handle the situation. He says: "I could break that up in 15 minutes. Everywhere that soldiers and sailors go, there are MPs. If the military police were ordered to detain and question every serviceman accompanying a girl of doubtful age, and terms in the guardhouse were provided, the practice would soon lose its current trend."

In view of his later successful career as a columnist the author says: "Perhaps I was fortunate in being required to face a rigid, harsh discipline and a standard of scholarship in my schools, which required my little mind to proceed in a direction it would not otherwise have followed." This is interesting in view of his earlier statement, "Personally I could talk myself around practically every subject except Latin." Can it be possible that Mr. Mallon, in a day when "discipline" was so effective, bulled his way through all those other subjects?

Opposition to the principles of progressive education is not nearly as general as the book would make it appear. In the author's comments on the Birmingham Teachers Association Poll he admits that "those who taught the lower grades were nearly unanimous in condemnation of the Mallon articles." Also that "among the principals polled —the administrators in charge of each Birmingham school—only one principal 'agreed with Mr. Mallon,' . . . ten disagreed, and three were on middle ground."

More than twenty years ago, William Heard Kilpatrick, professor of education at Teachers College, Columbia University, in discussing the introduction of the methods of progressive education into established school systems, faced the question, "What are you most afraid of?" His answer was: "That we shall move too fast. . . . I fear the *why* of it all will not be sufficiently understood or the *how* of it sufficiently worked out before people are boasting that they have it. In other words, I fear it will be made a fad." His forebearing was justified. Much harm has been done to the movement by its "professed friends." Its "avowed foes" have been quick to take advantage of this under the militant leadership of Mr. Mallon, who adds to his lack of understanding of the "how" and "why" of progressive education an ungracious attitude toward those to whom he is opposed. Progressive educators are dubbed everything from "panty-waists" to "crack pots," and are accused of being part of a "political education racket."

Whatever reproach may have been brought upon progressive education by faddists and novices, its fundamental principles are sound. Its emphasis is upon the development of strong and socially-minded character. Its aims are in harmony with those of religion—to fortify the human personality with intrinsic power, to the end that conduct may function on the high level of wise and unselfish living. In his preface the author emphasizes the importance of Christian ethics and insists that Christian principles must be accepted and applied. But the power of Christian ethics lies in the fact that its principles are not enforced by coercion. The good deeds of the Christian are the fruit of an inward urge toward worthy life. To aid in the production of such character is the objective of progressive education.

The final chapter of the book stresses the fact that education is the "biggest

industry by far in the United States." This is an important emphasis, but something else should follow. Like other "big business," education should establish laboratories with a view to the improvement of its methods and output. A beginning has been made in such institutions as Teachers College. These should be supported and their number increased. Instead of scoffing at their indispensable service every effort should be exerted to make the true spirit and usefulness of progressive education widely known.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

The Babylonian Talmud in Selection, edited and translated by Leo Auerbach, New York, Philosophical Iibrary, © 1944, pp. 286, $3.

The Talmud is an encyclopædic work which embodies Jewish learning of almost a millennium. The word *Talmud* means study, teaching. The Talmud consists of two parts: Mishna, which was written in Hebrew; and Gemara, which was written in Aramaic. There are two compilations of Gemara, a Babylonian and a Palestinian. The Babylonian Talmud was compiled about the end of the fifth century C. E., while the Palestinian Talmud was never completed on account of the political and social conditions of the Jews in Palestine, where they were persecuted during the third and fourth centuries by the Romans, and subsequently by the Christians.

The Talmud is a veritable mine of Jewish law and lore. It deals with many subjects, such as religion, law, history, ethics, and folklore. No history of the Jews from the time of the Second Commonwealth to the fifth century C. E. can be written without a thorough knowledge of the Talmud.

To the Jews the Talmud became a work second only to the Bible. The influence which the Talmud has exerted on the Jews throughout the ages in great. Jewish life throughout the ages was entirely molded by the teachings of the Talmud. During the Middle Ages, when the Jews were greatly persecuted, they found relief in its study. On the other hand, the church considered the Talmud anti-Christian and a work of blasphemy. In 1242 the Talmud was burned in the streets of Paris. Beginning with the eighteenth century a hostile campaign was launched against the Talmud by the anti-Semites. This was done by means of libels, falsification of texts, and misreadings. One of the most malicious and venomous books against the Talmud, *Entdecktes Judenthum,* was written by Eisenmenger. Since then many books have been written by anti-Semites against the Talmud, and many Christians are still of the opinion that the Talmud contains numerous blasphemous passages and utterances against Jesus and Christianity. Only recently Father Arthur J. Riley at a meeting of the Good Will Neighbor Conference on Anti-Semitism, held in Dorchester, Massachusetts, in September, 1944, justified the burning of the Talmud. He said: "When the condemned, blasphemous and anti-Christian passages were deleted, the Talmud was allowed to be used by the Jews." Father Riley even justified the restrictions against the Jews when he said: "History shows then that the Church placed definite restrictions upon Jewish activity whenever it constituted a danger for Catholics. These restrictions in essence were entirely logical and reasonable" (*Pilot,* Sept. 9, 1944). Incidentally, this speech by Father Riley was delivered at a Good Will meeting in the presence of representatives of Jews and Protestants. I do not know what the Jews replied, if they made a reply, to Father Riley's utterly untrue statement. The Jews in the Middle Ages did not constitute any danger to the Catholics. Some Christians, however, have written books in defense of the Talmud. An anthology of passages from the Talmud dealing with religion, law, and ethics for the average American reader would be certainly a worth-while undertaking.

The Babylonian Talmud in Selection, recently published by the Philosophical

Library, is edited and translated from the Aramaic and Hebrew by Leo Auerbach. It is regrettable that the translator is neither well versed in the subject matter of the Talmud nor steeped in its spirit. The selections are not well chosen and do not adequately represent the Talmud. The talmudic passages given in this volume show that the translator is not familiar with rabbinic literature. Some passages are wrongly translated. On p. 23, for instance, the translator says: "Simon the Just was of the last of the Great Assembly. He used to say: The world exists because of three things: the Law, labor, and the performance of good deeds." The translator does not appear to know that the word *abodah* in this passage has the connotation of worship and not labor.

In many passages the translator misrepresents the Talmud, as on p. 179 where he gives the following rendering of the talmudic passage *Gittin* 38: "Rabbi Shaman ben Aba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: If a slave escapes from prison, he becomes free, and furthermore his master is compelled to give him a bill of emancipation. But Rab [*sic!*] Simon ben Gamaliel taught that he returns to slavery. Rabbi [*sic!*] bar Hanah said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that whenever Rab [*sic!*] Simon ben Gamaliel makes a statement in the Mishna, the law is followed according to his decision." Besides the fact that the translator rendered this passage incorrectly, he misunderstood it. According to him, Rabbi Yohanan differs with Rab (Rabban) Simon ben Gamaliel. As a matter of fact, Rabban Simon ben Gamaliel was a Tana while Rabbi Yohanan was an Amora, and as an Amora he had no authority to dispute the word of a Tana. The rendering of this passage is as follows: "Rab Shaman b. Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: A slave who escapes from prison becomes a free man, and what is more, his master may be compelled to make out a deed of emancipation for him. We have learnt: Rabban Simon b. Gamaliel says, In either case he returns to slavery; Rabbah b. Bar Hanah has stated in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that wherever Rabban Simon b. Gamaliel records a statement in our Mishnah, the *halakah* is in accordance with him. . . . thus is there not a conflict between the two statements of Rabbi Yohnan?" On p. 85 the translation reads: "The betrothal of a daughter of an Israelite to the daughter of a Priest." The text, however, runs as follows: "The daughter of a priest to the son of an Israelite." These are only a few examples of the too many misinterpretations and mistranslations found in this volume.

The title of this volume, *The Babylonian Talmud in Selection,* is deceiving. The publisher printed the words *Babylonian Talmud* in heavy type, and *in Selection* in small type. The reader is led to think that it is really the Babylonian Talmud, while in truth this volume contains a very small portion of the Talmud.

Publication of this volume was intended apparently for the purpose of good will since the jacket of the book carries an endorsement by a clergyman of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Unfortunately, many books of this type are written by Jews with an eye to please some Christians, and with this intention in mind they sacrifice scholarship and historical truth. Many books are written now by Jews in apologetic tone to gain Christian good will. Religious appeasement, like political appeasement, is an illusory policy. It is bound to fail. The anti-Semite cannot be moved by appeasement. He seeks neither justice nor truth. He wants only the destruction of the Jewish people and of their religion. A devout Christian does not look for apologies. He is eager to learn about Jews and Judaism.

There is, indeed, a great need for both an introduction to the Talmud and for an anthology which will not only give to Jews as well as to Christians representative selections of the Babylonian Talmud, which will lead to a right valuation of the

Talmud, but which also will enable students of Christianity and of Judaism to gain a deeper insight into the "parting of the ways."

SOLOMON ZEITLIN

Discovering Plato, by Alexandre Koyré, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. ix, 119, $1.50.

Professor Koyré has performed a useful service for those who would like to become acquainted with Plato. The author, who is a newcomer to our shores, has been professor both at the Sorbonne and at the University of Cairo and is now an associate professor at the New School for Social Research in New York. His object is not to attempt a summary of Plato's writings, but rather to discuss briefly certain phases of his thought, evidently with the idea of tempting the interested reader to turn to the dialogues themselves. His motive is thus excellent. The book falls into two parts: the first entitled "The Dialogue," in which the Philosophic Dialogue, the *Meno,* the *Protagoras,* and the *Theætetus* are considered in turn, and the second part "Politics," with four subsections, Politics and Philosophy, the Just City, Imperfect Cities, and Conclusion. The author rightly emphasizes the dramatic character of the dialogues, a thing which the reader should always keep in mind. The failure to reach a definite conclusion as in the *Meno,* the *Protagoras,* and the *Theætetus* he thinks is not a defect, but was intended by Plato and, we may say, Socrates, to stimulate thought. To make his meaning clear he summarizes the three dialogues just mentioned, adding a brief discussion in which he shows why each dialogue ends as it does. Thus, for example, Meno is not really interested in virtue when he asks Socrates if it can be taught; and at the conclusion of their talk he fails wholly to comprehend the lesson which Socrates by his questions was trying to teach him. In the *Protagoras,* which the author thinks "as amusing as a comedy of Aristophanes" (one wonders how familiar Professor Koyré is with Aristophanes) Plato deals with the same subject as in the *Meno,* but on a higher plane, and the arguments are developed at greater length. Protagoras has a doctrine which must be considered seriously. As a result of the discussion both Socrates and Protagoras find themselves reaching conclusions opposite to those they held at the beginning. It is needless to repeat the steps by which these results are obtained.

The *Theætetus* is somewhat different and is presented in a different way. Socrates asks what is "science," and that is the question Theætetus tries to answer and fails. After examining the dialogue in some detail Professor Koyré asks: "Is not that [reasoning] the very goal pursued in his domain by the mathematician, Theætetus? And is that not what our master Socrates teaches us in a much more general and more profound way when, breaking and destroying the outer shell of error and of opinion that envelopes the soul and holds it trammeled, he opens or reopens for it the road to truth which leads to being? . . . That is what the readers of this astonishing work ought to say to themselves."

When he comes to the second part of his book, the author naturally depends very largely upon the *Republic* though he concerns himself with parts of it only. He emphasizes the importance of the political problems and calls attention to the timeliness of Plato's teachings, "One could," he says, "aver that Plato's entire work is concerned with political preoccupations . . . the problem of the dialogue, the problem of the teaching of philosophy, the criterion of judging and the means of training the select are also basically political problems" . . . . "The philosophical problem and the political problem are one and the same" . . . . "Socrates had to die because he was a philosopher . . . . There was no place for him, for the philosopher in the city." He gives a brief sketch of the theory of Thrasymachus at the beginning of the *Republic* that justice is the

right of the stronger, takes up Plato's refutation of it in his discussion of the just city, and then turns to the imperfect cities "where the place of reason, or better, knowledge, synonymous with duty, is usurped by some other factor—ambition, avarice, search for pleasure, vanity, or crime." Plato's theories of the rise and fall of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny are duly examined, and here we must quote Professor Koyré again. "As the modern reader peruses these passionate and severe, profound and caustic pages, in which Plato describes for us the decadence of Athenian democracy and its downfall through anarchy and demagogy towards dictatorship and despotism, he cannot refrain from saying to himself: *de nobis fabula narratur.*" And further on, "In the midst of the crisis that shocks our world to its very foundations, Plato's message is laden with teachings that deserve reflection."

There is little that one would want to find fault with in the book. Of course ἐπιστήμη does not always mean "science," and the author seems to realize that. His statement that the Athenians elected their magistrates by lot (p.94, n.3 and p.99, n. 12) needs modification. They elected them by lot *from men previously nominated,* which is a very different matter. The translation reads well though one occasionally notices a gallicism, *e.g.* "particularity" (p. 33) and the frequent use of "elite." Misprints are few: ἠιστήμη (p.11,n.7) should be ἐπιστήμη and αληθής (p.44) should be ἀληθής.

WILLIAM NICKERSON BATES

Studies in the Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament, by Kenneth S. Wuest, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1945, pp. 149, $1.50.

This is the eighth of a series of books designed to make the fruits of linguistic research in the Greek New Testament available to the English reader. Mr. Wuest, the teacher of New Testament Greek at Moody Bible Institute, bases this book (as also the earlier ones) on such well-known authorities as Cremer, Liddell and Scott, Moulton and Milligan, Thayer, Trench, and Vincent. Chiefly from these, though also from his own research in the Greek Testament, he assembles some pertinent and helpful information concerning what might be called the theological meaning of the more significant words of the New Testament. He deals, for example,—to cite the words listed under the letter *s*—with such terms as *saint, sanctify, servant, sin, synagogue.* (Strangely enough *Satan* is lacking, nor does Wuest write on *devil.*) In seeking to understand the Greek word or words which lie behind their rendering in the King James Version, Wuest analyzes the passages in which each word occurs, compares the passages with one another, and inquires into the meaning of these Greek words in the classical and *koine* periods. On the whole his conclusions are in accord with the best linguistic scholarship of the first quarter of this century. (Wuest has not drawn upon the wealth of material in Kittel's monumental *Theologisches Wörterbuch,* which began to appear in 1933.)

The gravest defect in Wuest's method is that he so often relies on Athens rather than Jerusalem for assistance in understanding key words of the New Testament. He examines the usage of a term in secular Greek of the preceding and contemporary centuries, but seems to have no interest in what the Old Testament has to offer to the theological lexicographer of the New Testament. References to the Hebrew or even to the Septuagint are conspicuous by their absence. It is no doubt due to this surprising neglect of the Old Testament that Wuest allows himself, for instance, to reproduce the timeworn and (for the New Testament) essentially inadequate definition of a parable as "an illustration thrown in alongside of a truth to make the latter easier to understand" (p. 27). Had he noted that the Hebrew *māshāl* is broader in meaning than the Greek *parabolē,* he would have been able to frame his definition so as to include such sayings as those which are expressly called parables in Mark 7:

15-17 and Luke 4:23 (ARV). Again, his treatment of the word *church* is limited entirely to an etymological analysis of the Greek word with no reference to the usage of *qāhāl* and *'ēdhāh* in Hebrew and their Greek renderings in the Septuagint.

Within these limits Wuest's book will be found to be serviceable for the average pastor who has no time to consult the books on which Wuest depended. The proof-reading is far from being impeccable. In the last three paragraphs of the Preface, for example, one finds "Crudence Concordance," "Liddel" for Liddell," and "Herman" for "Hermann (Cremer)."

BRUCE M. METZGER

An Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Vergilius Ferm, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1945, pp. xix, 844, $10.

This volume is a compact reference work, 9½ x 6½ x 2½ inches and in small type, and the topics stand out clearly on the page. The list of contributors shows wide variation in scholarly standing, but there are sufficient recognized scholars to guarantee the work.

The best way of testing the quality of the book seemed to be to write down at random fifteen terms and names in the history of religions; then to look them up and see how adequately they were treated. My list was as follows: Asoka, Sufi, Baptist, Maitreya, Zohar, teraphim, immaculate conception, druid, Analects, Mithra, Cybele, law, Hermas, Bushido, suttee (sāti).

My first impression was bad, for the name of the great figure appeared neither as Asoka nor as Ashoka. It is true that Asoka appears under "Buddhist terminology," but this is certainly a peculiar heading under which to place the name of the king who was mainly responsible for the spread of Buddhism through India. There should at least have been a cross-reference listing. The same organizing device employed also for a fifteen-page article on "Chinese terminology" is very poor and should be abandoned in a new edition.

The other strange omission was Analects. Surely the great writings of Confucianism deserve a topical heading.

The sufi is treated under "Sufism," but in about seventy-five words only. However, this is about the same as the space given to the Shiites and the Sunnites of Islam; so it is fair. When I turned to Baptist, I saw under "Baptist Churches" nineteen cross references to other articles; and a major article by Conrad Moehlman. This article, while obsessed with exploding the myths of Baptist history, does give a concise objective summary; though omission of any reference to the Baptist World Alliance is surprising.

Maitreya, Zohar, teraphim, the doctrine of the immaculate conception, and the druids are sufficiently noted. Those seeking information about Mithra and Cybele are referred to "Mystery Religions."

Under "law" appear three articles: law in the juridical sense, law in general, and Hebrew law, which give up-to-date coverage of the problems involved.

"Hermas, Shepherd of" is duly recognized; the *Bushido* code of ethics is very briefly described with no notion of its content given; the *suttee* (widow burning) is adequately defined.

The sampling, therefore, reveals a fairly comprehensive encyclopedia, spotty in its quality, reasonably well balanced in its interests, and clearly written. However, the volume is richer than my sampling suggests, for I had not included the problems and authors of philosophy of religion. In this area the reader will find valuable articles on outstanding thinkers, including contemporaries recently deceased, and useful outlines of major concepts and problems in the field. An unusual feature of

the encyclopedia is the listing of well-known lectureships in the religious field; but why, if the Cole, Crozer, and Earl Lectures are mentioned, is there no reference to the Gifford Lectures and the Hibbert Lectures?

My general criticism of the volume is that the editorial organization was not adequately developed, so that categories of topics were not fully explored before assignments were made. But it is a useful work.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The Trollopes, by Lucy Poate Stebbins and Richard Poate Stebbins, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 394 (illustrated), $4.

For some time the work of Anthony Trollope was dismissed by some such judgment as "none of his many novels is of first-rate quality and none is of less than good second-rate quality." This was considered judiciously truthful praise. Then, a little while ago, the late A. Edward Newton founded "The Trollope Society" in a personal attempt to revive interest in the author. Almost the only published material for study was Anthony's autobiography, his brother Thomas' *What I Remember*, and a commentary and a bibliography by Michael Sadlier. Now the Stebbinses have written "The Chronicle of a Writing Family" and revealed by their own bibliography how really much there has been from which to reconstruct the lives and experiences of the Trollopes. Here is the real value and worth of the book. It is an unusually readable, novellike account and is probably as complete a biography as present available material will permit. And biography it is, not a critical literary study; certainly not of Anthony. The effects of his early experiences upon his later character and the real persons he used in his novels are clearly revealed.

While Anthony assumes, unavoidably, the centre of interest, there are also full-length portraits of his mother, Frances Trollope, who wrote almost as much as her famous son; of Thomas, his brother, whose special field was history. The father, too, does not fade into insignificance, for the authors have made his second-rate self a hauntingly real influence upon Anthony and the reader of the book.

Perhaps one would like, to ask how this chronicler of manners, this revealer of humanity in action, this artist of character portrayal, became a writer in the first place. Surely his sedulous adherence to a self-imposed time schedule—250 words every fifteen minutes—does not predispose one to achieve literary eminence. Yet Joseph Wood Krutch has made the statement that "next to [Henry] James, the most discussed of the nineteenth century novelists who wrote in English" is Anthony Trollope. Which raises another question. Why has there been this recent revival of interest? This latter question was certainly not within the intention of the authors, but the former might, perhaps, have received greater attention. We are not quite satisfied with Anthony's own statement in his autobiography and quoted here (p. 291) that his "first object in taking to literature" was the same as a barrister's or a baker's: "I wished to make an income." Somehow our two questions are related, and their answers may really be nascent in the Stebbinses' story.

Here is the most exciting kind of biography. It makes one personally acquainted with the subject and creates a desire, even a decision, to read through his novels. Where else can one find such a gallery of clergymen? Curiously enough, in real life!

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

BOOK NOTICES

The Millennium in the Church: Studies in the History of Christian Chiliasm, by D. H. Kromminga, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1945, pp. 360, $3.

The author sets himself a double task. First, he traces the history of Christian belief in the thousand-year period to be ruled by Christ after his return to earth. Secondly, he defends the propriety of still holding to this belief on the ground of its presence in an infallibly inspired Bible. True, it is supported by only one passage in "Holy Writ," the twentieth chapter of the book of Revelation, but even that scanty testimony is thought to insure the validity of the doctrine for all future time. The historical survey involved the author in much labor for which students of the subject will be duly grateful. He has tracked down with indefatigable energy all the vagaries of chiliastic speculation that have flourished during the Christian centuries. Anyone who has a taste for theological curios will find this volume interesting and instructive. But its constructive interpretation of the data is much less valuable. It assumes that the book of Revelation is a dependable forecast of coming events and that the most important item of Christian belief today should be the emphatic assertion of Christ's return. We ought not to speculate about the day and the hour of his second advent, for scripture says that no man can know when it will be, but the evils of our time indicate that it is near. The labor expended by the author to support this conclusion reminds one of Horace's quip about the mountains suffering birthpangs to bring forth only a ludicrous mouse.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

The Covenant Idea in New England Theology, by Peter Y. De Jong, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1945, pp. 264, $2.50.

As the author points out in his preface, this is a Ph.D. thesis from Hartford Seminary which tries to explain why New England lost its Calvinism. H. W. Schneider has shown that one reason was the progressive rejection of the theocratic ideal. Joseph Haroutunian went on to point out the part played by the gradual substitution of an external code of ethics for the intense spirituality of the forefathers. The present study traces the rise of an emphasis on individual experience and the corresponding loss of an organic view of man's relationship to God. Although New England theology from the beginning was primarily that of the Reformed churches, it showed certain affinities with the beliefs of the Anabaptists. As soon as this interest in personal experience and surrender to God became explicit, it was apparent that the Calvinistic conception of the covenant would have to be modified. The Halfway Covenant was an attempt to retain the theocratic ideal while at the same time making experience of God's grace a requisite for church membership. But the theocratic notion of a God who regulated all the details of personal and group existence could not be reconciled with the idea of a God primarily if not exclusively concerned with the religious life of the soul. Edwards sought to restore divine sovereignty, but in seeking to establish his theology on a rational basis he modified the theory of man's will in such a way as to prepare for the downfall of the conception he sought to save. Bushnell's rejection of the absolute necessity of regeneration in his idea that "the child is potentially regenerate" and that grace rests "upon the established laws of character" virtually, according to the author, "identified the realms of nature and grace." This meant really a denial of the difference between Christians and non-Christians and therefore

an elimination of the distinctiveness of the covenant itself. The book is thorough and well-documented, but it has its quota of the diffuseness characteristic of theses of its type.

J. S. BIXLER

The Light of Faith: An Outline of Religious Thought for Laymen, by Albert W. Palmer, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. ix, 156, $1.75.

Dr. Palmer is one of the elder statesmen of theological education in America. Out of his ripe experience he has written a popular statement of his liberal faith. Some parts of the book are really helpful, such as the account of various views of the resurrection, and the style is clear and suited to the nontechnical reader. It is simple, but at many points oversimple. The layman is surely entitled to know how tense the present struggle for light is; how direly the light of liberal faith is being darkened both by neoörthodox and by naturalistic "shadows." It is true that Dr. Palmer mentions both, only to brush them aside, disposing lightly of neoörthodoxy and accepting naturalism, equally lightly, as a sort of label for his own view (without realizing what this really costs him). Trueblood's *Predicament of Modern Man* (incorrectly quoted as *The Predicament of Humanity* on p. 1) is praised; and Trueblood realizes the seriousness of the struggle for faith. But Palmer fails to convey to the reader a sense of the distressing state of religious thought and faith. Although sharing Palmer's liberalism, I protest against its easygoing optimism. It is true that Dr. Palmer knows that laymen need more than theological mumbo jumbo; but he does not seem to realize that they need more than theological sweetness and light. Laymen will not be helped much by being told again that pain is part of the unsolved mystery. The book is honest and clear, sometimes really clarifying, but the author writes down to the layman. Also he is careless not only about the title of Trueblood's book, but also about the name of Dean *emeritus* Albert C. Knudson, whom he dubs "Alfred." This is an odd lapse for Albert Palmer! A book of this sort is needed; and Dr. Palmer, with more care, could have written a more searching book and a more useful one than this is likely to be.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

Inter-American Affairs, 1944, edited by Arthur P. Whitaker, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. ix, 284, $3.25.

This objective review of the year's developments in inter-American affairs is the fourth in a series especially valuable to students of Latin America. Mr. Whitaker's chapter on politics and diplomacy is also of interest to all those concerned about the United States' foreign policy, which appears especially inconsistent with regard to our southern neighbors. Six other well-qualified contributors have reported trends in economic development, labor and social welfare, and cultural relations. Canada, too often overlooked in discussions of inter-American affairs, is given a separate chapter. Statistical tables, a classified bibliography, lists of the chief executives and foreign ministers, of conferences, and of treaties, and a chronology of events are other reasons why this book is indispensable to any student of the Americas. The historian also will appreciate its objectivity and orderly presentation. The events of 1943 and 1944 emphasized the fundamental dichotomy of the Western Hemisphere—Anglo-Saxon America as distinct from Latin America. It is to be hoped that Mr. Whitaker continues to survey the inter-American scene and that his future volumes will reflect greater understanding and harmony among the nations. Fair, scholarly studies such as this one can contribute much to creating that understanding.

JOHN AND MAVIS BIESANZ

A Well of Fragrant Waters, by Genevieve Wimsatt, Boston, John W. Luce, ©1945, pp. 102, $2.50.

Once again those who enjoy well-written and interestingly interpreted works concerning the literature of the Celestial Kingdom are indebted to Miss Wimsatt. This time she has given a sketch of the life and poems of Hung Tu (Hsuen T'ao). The heroine of the volume, born in Chang-an in the latter part of the eighth century, spent most of her life in Cheng-tu as the resident hostess and courtesan of eleven successive governors of the district. Here she "poured the wine" to the satisfaction of the governors, the visiting envoys, and state guests. She exchanged verses and harmonized lyrics with the leading poets and officials of the dynasty. Here, too, according to literary legend, centuries after she had been buried, did she return to write her most passionate poem and enjoy her most "transcendent romance" with the tutor Tien Chu. This is not a critical work but rather an appreciative introduction to the most romantic of the five greatest poetesses of China and to her songs and poems. The biography is related with charm. The running commentary is clear, illuminating many obscure references. The translations are graceful, and all the more so when one realizes the rhymed quatrain of the original has been preserved. The format of the book is fittingly in harmony with the artistry of the heroine of the volume. The author has stood by the well from which Hung Tu drew the water used in making her later poem-pages. From this well—"said to be still fragrant from the permeation of genius"—Miss Wimsatt has served a delightful draught which refreshes the soul of any who will spend a few hours with the "wine-pouring, song-singing lady of Shu."

CHARLES E. BATTEN

The Church in Our Town, by Rockwell C. Smith, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, © 1945, pp. 190, $1.50.

The title which Mr. Smith very cleverly selected for his book immediately throws over it the deeply human quality of Thorton Wilder's remarkable play, *Our Town.* From beginning to end, the entire treatment of the rural church is oriented around the needs and lives of the men, women, and children who live in rural America, and the vigorous and healthy, economic, social, cultural, moral, and religious growth of their neighborhood. Yet this neighborhood is not portrayed in isolation from either the neighboring city life, the nation as a whole, or even the international welfare. Upon a firm framework of sound sociological, economic, and religious principles, Mr. Smith has erected a practical, thoroughgoing, and inspiring description of what a church not only can but should do if it is really to serve the whole life of a community and its residents. Every vital phase of rural life is treated with a wide understanding and detailed knowledge. Every minister serving a rural church will be sure to find not only definite help but enthusiastic inspiration for his ministry from this excellent blending of penetrating theoretical knowledge and very practical experience. Every denominational officer will be checked in his too easy tendency to treat rural churches as either places of retirement for older ministers or steppingstones to "an important city pulpit" for ministerial beginners. What a mighty moral and religious revolution would be produced in the life of this country if every rural minister could manifest the quality of ministry which pervades this entire book!

DAN HUNTINGTON FENN

Those of the Way, by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Harper, 1945, pp. 146, $1.50.

The back flap of the jacket says that the author has won the title of *The*

Interpreter, "according to the *Crozier (sic) Quarterly,*" for his keen insight into the spiritual meaning of life. Again, in this volume, he has justified the title. "These meditations have been planned for the Lenten season, which the Christian supposedly devotes to self-examination. It is a time when he searches his own conscience and soberly reviews the manner of his living" (p. 132). The plan is not to present studies of incidents in the closing days of Jesus' life, but to challenge the reader to a study of the present days of his own life. To that end, Dean Sperry examines such problems and situations as Christian tolerance in the face of a sense of mission; the attractiveness of an evasion of life's strictures; the demands of conscience and the truths about habit; the sense of the unique and the new, with an entailed loneliness; the worth of the individual and the apparent unfairness of God. All these are woven around the idea of Christianity as "a way" and of Jesus as "the Way." If this seems to be a trite and somewhat banal treatment of the biblical phrases, read the book and make the very pleasant discovery that the author can make the old interesting and the new familiar. There is here another presentation of the religious life in terms of its characteristics and disciplines that are surprisingly similar to those of all higher levels of living. With kindly, but incisive, words, *Those of the Way* makes the Christian life easier to understand and properly harder to achieve.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Hello, Man, by Kenneth L. Patton, Boston, Beacon Press, 1945, pp. 114, $1.

This little book of poems, which can be read through in an evening, is wholly modernist in form and content. There is but one short piece of rhymed verse; the rest is free verse, with considerable sections printed as prose. Read aloud, it sounds quite as much like rather stately prose, starred here and there with shining phrases, as like poetry. The author is a humanist, and celebrates man as the crowning product of creation. Indeed his book gives an illuminating illustration of the point of view of the religious humanist who rejects the theist's interpretation of the universe. The theist, however, will feel that the author has left untouched some of the deeper problems of human psychology, and that when he writes "Man is not the creator, but all nature is the self-creator, the mighty self-mover," he is but attributing to "nature" the qualities and powers to which the theist gives the name of God. But in his poem "The Church of Man" he sets forth a noble ideal for the service of humanity which any church should strive to attain. Not a book of great importance, but interesting as an expression of the emotional and prophetic aspects of naturalistic and humanistic religious thought.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE

Ben Jonson: Poet, by George Burke Johnston, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. ix, 175, $2.

Ben Jonson has received considerable attention as a dramatist and has become the foil of Shakespeare and his admirers. This volume is a critical study of Jonson as "a master poet," based largely upon his nondramatic poems. It argues and substantiates the contention that he was not best characterized as a "classicist," but that "in him meet the classics, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, and (what has been far less generally realized) the principal trends in English Literature of the three centuries following his death" (p.161). This position makes him a refracting and a condensing agent rather than a mere reflecting surface. Indeed, this becomes his greatest importance, that he wove and combined varied traditions and gave them new life. Such a view cautions against a too-strict interpretation of Jonson's poems as being

autobiographical, as, for example, the judgment that he was a misogynist or even a misanthropist and that he held all romances of his time in contempt. Rather was he saying what others, notably those in the pulpit, were saying of the fashions of his age. Here is a study based upon wide reading and acquaintance with the many streams of thought and life in Jonson's age, proceeding steadily, but carefully, to a convincing conclusion.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

A Book of Comfort, compiled by Eric Parker, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. 320, $1.50.

This is definitely a superior book. The selections, from the best of English poetry and prose, have been made without the least concession to the lower levels of sentimentality and cheap emotion—which, alas, is so seldom true of attempts to comfort by the use of literature! Here are the expressions of daring faith, devout intelligence, simple confidence, and inspired strength. Here are the formulæ for comfort. The publisher's invitation to readers to suggest additions for future editions is a challenging one; the chaste spirit of the volume will, of itself, ward off the sullying presence of less than the best.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Power of Non-Violence, by Richard B. Gregg, New York, Fellowship Publications, ©1944, pp. 253, $1.50.

This is a new edition, with substantial omissions and additions, of the volume first published in 1935. However, the thesis, the power of nonviolence, and its validity remain the same. The argument is buttressed by many illustrations drawn from many fields—psychology, biology, etc.—any one of which provides ample material to refute the theory; and its foundations are laid on *if's* and *but's.* If all people were good, then all people would be good. It has much of the charm of the day-dreams of the ivory tower.

I. G. MATTHEWS

All God's Children, by Armond E. Cohen, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. vii, 104, $1.50.

You can read this book in two hours—and it will be two hours well spent. The author is an orthodox rabbi, and he does not pull his punches. His thesis is expressed in his opening words: "I am writing these words because I am sure you do not know me." In ten chapters, each starting with a disarming "Dear Neighbor," he seeks to tell the story of the Jew: who he is, where he came from, what he believes, how he lives, and what he wants. It is racily written. There are are many points where I would disagree: early "Jewish" history and Zionism are two of them. But agreement is of secondary importance. So far as I am competent to judge, it will prove an illuminating statement and will answer many questions which Christians often raise.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

BOOKS RECEIVED

**William Morris, Medievalist and Revolutionary,* by Margaret R. Grennan, New York, King's Crown, 1945, pp. x, 173, $2.50.

**World Economic Survey, 1942-44,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 299, $3.

**Psychology of Religion,* by Paul E. Johnson, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 288, $2.

**William Sylvis, Pioneer of American Labor,* by Jonathan Grossman, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 302, $3.50.

**Radio in Health Education,* prepared under the auspices of the New York Academy of Medicine, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. viii, 120, $1.60.

**Lincoln and the Land of the Sangamon,* by Louis Obed Renne, Boston, Chapman & Grimes, ©1945, pp. 140, $2.50.

**The Coming Great Church,* by Theodore O. Wedel, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. ix, 160, $2.

**Thy Health Shall Spring Forth,* by Russell Dicks, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. vii, 61, $1.25.

**Empirical Philosophies of Religion,* by James Alfred Martin, Jr., New York, King's Crown, 1945, pp. xii, 146, $2.

**The Minister Teaches Religion,* by Frank A. Lindhorst, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 125, $1.

**Event in Eternity,* by Paul Scherer, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. x, 234, $2.

There Is a Spirit: The Nayler Sonnets, by Kenneth Boulding, New York, Fellowship Publications, ©1945, pp. x, 26, 75 cents.

Fourteen sonnets in honor of the seventeenth-century Friend and preacher whose followers gave him a geranium-strewed triumphal entry into Bristol and whose critics (the authorities) gave him a taste of the scourge and branding iron.

**The Gospel according to Gamaliel,* by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. xii, 154, $2.

**What Is Christian Civilization?* by John Baillie, New York, Scribner, 1945, pp. 59, $1.

Points for Emphasis, 1946, by Hight C. Moore, Nashville, Broadman, ©1945, pp. 192, 40 cents.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons, 1946, by Earl L. Douglass, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. xv, 378, $1.50.

**Nature and Values,* by Edgar S. Brightman, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 171, $1.50.

**The Old Testament: Its Form and Purpose,* by Lindsay B. Longacre, New York, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 264, $2.

**The International Law of the Future: Postulates, Principals and Proposals,* Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [distributed by Columbia University Press], 1944, pp. xxi, 196, $2.

**When Life Gets Hard,* by James Gordon Gilkey, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. ix, 138, $1.50.

**The Meaning of Human Experience,* by Lynn Harold Hough, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 367, $3.

**Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery,* edited by B. A. Botkin, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1945, pp. xxi, 286, $3.50.

**Men, Mind and Power,* by David Abrahamsen, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. ix, 155, $2.

**League of Nations and National Minorities,* by P. de Azcárate, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, [distributed by Columbia University Press], 1945, pp. 216, $2.

Broadman Comments: 1946, by W. R. White, Nashville, Broadman, ©1945, pp. 396, $1.50.

**Civilization and Group Relationships,* edited by R. M. MacIver, New York, Institute for Religious Studies, [distributed by Harper], ©1945, pp. xiii, 177, $2.

**World Order: Its Intellectual and Cultural Foundations,* edited by F. Ernest Johnson, New York, Institute for Religious Studies, [distributed by Harper], ©1945, pp. ix, 247, $2.

**This Earth One Country,* by Emeric Sala, Boston, Bruce Humphries, ©1945, pp. 185, $2.50.

**Christ the Lord,* by John Knox, Chicago, Willett Clark, 1945, pp. xi, 146, $1.75.

**Jesus, the Man of Prayer,* by John Henry Strong, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1945, pp. 125, $1.35.

**Valiant for Truth: The Life of Frederick Lincoln Anderson,* by Joseph Chandler Robbins, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1945, pp. ix, 166, $2.50.

**Three Plays: The Hostage, Crusts, The Humiliation of the Father,* by Paul Claudel, translated by John Heard, Boston, Luce, ©1945, pp. 223, $5.

**300 Favorite Poems,* compiled by Thomas Curtis Clark, Chicago, Willett Clark, 1945, pp. 124, $1.

* To be reviewed.